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Chapter

1

INTRODUCTION

Oil spill response in the marine environment has become
increasingly important in the past few decades as the threat
of major oil spills from both oil tankers and offshore oil
exploitation activities has increased.

Although man has been

attempting to deal with human-induced oil spills in the
marine environment for many years, oil spill response today
remains an inexact science.

Much research has been conducted

in the past in order to develop technologies to provide the
most effective means of oil spill response, and such research
is currently ongoing.

Today's available technologies differ

in their method of operation.

For example, mechanical

methods are designed to physically remove oil from the
water's surface; chemical treating agents may help disperse
the oil throughout the water column or herd the oil for
enhanced mechanical recovery; and burning may be used to
remove many of the components of the oil from the water
through combustion.
disadvantages .

Each method ha s it s advantages and

The best method to employ depends on the

specific spill conditions, and oftentimes a combination of
the available technologies provides the best response in
terms o f removing the oil from the water's surface a nd
minimizing damage.

For this reason, it is vitally important

that the nation's oil spill response policy allow for the
ability to make use of all available response technologies.
Otherwise, the capability to effectively respond to marine
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oil spills off the coasts of the United States is severely
limited.
Chemical dispersants are one oil spill response method
that has in the past been virtually precluded from effective
use in the United States.

The concerns surrounding

dispersant use have centered mainly around their potential
toxicity, a fear sparked by the Torrey Canyon l incident of
1967 during which the dispersants used caused more ecological

harm than did the spilled oil.

As a result, the policy

established in the United States to govern dispersant use was
extremely conservative .

It required that numerous agencies

grant approval before dispersants could be used on any oil
spill.

Such a cumbersome decision process basically

prevented dipsersant use because these agencies could never
come to an agreement, or, if they did, the decision always
came too late to conduct effective dipsersant application.
In recent years, however, this prohibitive dispersant
use policy has been recognized as a hindrance to effective
oil spill response in certain situations, especially
situations involving large amounts of oil spilled offshore.
Advances in dispersant technology have created less toxic
dispersants, and much research has been conducted to
lThe Torrey Canyon was a Liberian flagged tanker that ran aground off the
coast of the British Isles in 1967 . The vessel spilled over 100,000 tons of oil
During
which caused extensive damage to the British and French coastlines.
the response, large amounts of first generation dispersants were used to
combat the spill.
They were highly toxic and caused severe ecological damage.
Since this incident, both second and third generation dispersants, which are
much less toxic, have been developed for use in oil spill response. See U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency. Use of Chemical Dispersants for Marine Oil
.s..u..w.s.. EPA/600/R-93/195 (November 1993), 28 .
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determine conditions under which dipsersant use would be most
effective in terms of minimizing overall spill damage.

In

light of these advances, yet the continued inability of
responders to use dispersants, it became apparent that the
United States was perhaps missing opportunities to conduct
the best response to oil spills due to the archaic dispersant
policy.

This problem was highlighted during the Exxon

Valdez 2 disaster.

As a result the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,

enacted as a result of the spill, attempted to improve the
dispersant use policy.

This law required that new oil spill

contingency plans include procedures for obtaining expedited
dispersant use decisions .

Subsequent implementing

regulations called for the development of dispersant preauthorization plans. Under specified conditions, these plans
allow persons in charge of the response at the federal level
to make single-handed dispersant use decisions at the time of
a spill.
The development of these dispersant pre-authorization
plans could potentially make great progress with regard to
increasing the viability of dispersant use for oil spill
response in the United States.

However, the manner in which

these plans are developed is crucial to their successful
implementation, both over the short and long terms.

While

the law requires that the appropriate government agencies

2The tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Prince William Sound. Alaska, in
March of 1989, creating a spill of over eleven million gallon s, the largest spill
to date in U. S. waters. See National Response Team, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,
A Report to the President, (May, 1989) , 1.
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approve the dispersant pre-authorization plans before they
are considered valid, the role of other interested parties in
the dispersant use planning process is not so clear.

The

involvement of other interests, such as environmental groups,
local citizens, resource users such as fishermen, etc., is
largely left to the discretion of each government official in
charge of planning in specific regions around the country.
This presents a potential problem for the likely success of
the dispersant pre-authorization plans.

Interest groups are

a formidable political force and their voice cannot be
ignored at spill time.

Logically,

if such interests have not

been involved in the dispersant pre-authorization planning
process, the potential e xists that they will emerge at the
time of the spill or afterwards to express their views and
ultimately to undermine the ability of the plans to produce
the expected expedited decisions.
Based on this premise, the future success of the new
dispersant pre-authorization plans in attaining e xpedited and
effective dispersant use decisions may be forecast based on
the involvement of appropriate interested parties in the
planning process .

Because dispersant pre-authorization plans

in the Northeast United States are currently in the final
stages of development and approval,

it would be useful at

this time to e xamine the involvement of interest groups in
this process to predict the likely success of these
individual plans.

To examine this issue, a study was

conducted to identif y appropriate interest groups in the five

5
planning Areas of the Northeast region, and to survey them
regarding their interest in oil spill response issues and
activities, their involvement in oil spill response planning
(including dispersant use), and their satisfaction regarding
this involvement.

Based on the results of this study, the

likelihood of the dispersant pre-authorization plans in the
Northeast to be successfully implemented in the future can be
assessed.

Also,

recommendations for steps to improve the

likelihood of success, if needed, can be provided.
The purposes of this paper are thus four-fold.

First,

dispersant use as an oil spill response option and the issues
surrounding dispersant use will be discussed.
past dispersant use policy will be

revie~ed,

Second, the
as will the

recent changes to the policy in terms of the attempt to make
dispersants a viable response option in the United States.
Third, the role of interest groups in oil spill response
issues and the importance of including them in contingency
planning efforts, specifically dispersant planning, will be
discussed.

Lastly, the results of the study to determine the

involvement of interest groups in the dispersant planning
processes in the Northeast will be given, along with an
analysis regarding the implications of the findings, as well
as pertinent recommendations to promote the future success of
dispersant pre-authorization plans, both in the Northeast and
elsewhere in the United States.
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Chapter
2.1

2

OIL

SPILL

RESPONSE

GENERAL

THE IMPORTANCE OF OIL SPILL RESPONSE
"Oil s p i l l s are complex and there is almost no way for a

response to be perceived as successful.,,3
"no one comes out of a spill looking good.
when you go up against Mother Nature.
luck and God.,,4

Stated another way,
There are no winners

. the results depend on

These are basic truths of which oil spill

responders are well aware.

Yet, being capable of implementing

the most coordinated, effective, and efficient response possible
can help to minimize the aesthetic, economic, and ecological
damage of an oil spill.

Therefore, the capability to respond

quickly with the best technology is of the utmost i mp o r t a n c e in
terms of oil spill response .
Proper planning for oil spill response and the ability to
make use of the best available technologies is becoming
increasingly important as the likelihood of large oil spills in
the world's oceans grows.

There are many sources of oil in the

marine environment due to human activities at sea.

Offshore

exploration and exploitation of oil and gas present the threat of
blowouts and considerable spills.

In fact,

several major spills

due to such blow-outs have occurred historically.5

Another

30 ary L. Ott, June Lindstedt-Siva, and Ann Hayward Walker. "Evolving Spill
Managment Systems Under OPA 90 Could Reduc~ Response Effecti,,:eness ," in
1993 International Oil Spill Conference Proceedmgs. by the American
Petroleum Institute (Washington, D. C., 1993): 78.
4Robert Mottley, "Owners Seek Sweeter Deals from Responders," Marine Log
100 (Feb 1995): 20.
S J. Doerffer, Oil Spill Response in the Marine Environment (New York:
Pergamon Press Ltd., 1992): 76 .

7
source of potential release of oil into the marine environment is
marine transportatl' on, whl'ch has lncrease
.
d enormously In
. recent
years.

Presently over 1.5 billion tons of crude oil and

petroleum products are transported each year by more than seven
thousand tankers. 6

In addition, the size of tankers has

increased dramatically.

In the fifteen years between 1965 and

1980, the average size of world tankers grew from 28,000
deadweight tons to over 100,000 deadweight tons. 7

Today there

are tankers over 200,000 deadweight tons in operation .

This

increase in the amount of oil carried in one vessel corresponds
to the potential for more massive oil spills if one of these
vessels were to have an accident .
evident in the statistics.

Larger oil spills are also

From 1967 to 1990, the world

experienced sixty-six spills that exceeded two million gallons,
both from offshore oil and gas e xploration and marine
transportation activities. 8

In addition, the years 1978 to 1993

have shown a general increasing trend in the number of worldwide
oil spills between one and ten million gallons.9
Once a significant oil spill does occur, the response
becomes critical in attempting to minimize damage from the spill,
whether it be tryin g to remove the oil from the water or somehow
6Doerffer, 76.
7David M. Bovet and Charles R. Corbett, "Federal Tanker Oil Spill Legislation:
Implications for Marine Transportation," in Oil Spills :
Management and
Legislative Implications, eds. Malcolm L. Spaulding and Mark Reed (New York:
American Society of Civil Engineers, 1990): 51.
SU. S . Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Coping With an Oiled Sea:
An Analysis of Oil Spill Response Technologies (Washington D. C.: GPO, 1990): 4 .
9Jeff Welch, "Oil Spill Intelligence Report International Oil Spill Database,"
in Proceedings of the 1995 International Oil Spill Conference , (Washington,
D. C., American Petroleum Institute, 1995): 1008 .
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treating the oil so that certain impacts are lessened.
damage can take many forms.

Oil spill

Biological effects include hazards

to human health through eating contaminated seafood; decreases in
fisheries resources and damage to wildlife such as seabirds and
mammals; modification of marine ecosystems by elimination of
certain species with an initial decrease in diversity and
productivity; and modification of habitats which may delay or
prevent recolonization. IO
results.

Aesthetic and economic damage also

Oil spills often contaminate coastal areas, creating

unsightly messes on recreational and beach areas, soiling and
staining harbor areas and vessels, contaminating commercial
shellfish grounds, and posing problems with regard to intake
sources for desalination and power plants. I I

Although damage

resulting from oil spills is usually of limited and local
duration, exceptionally large spills (such as the Torrey Canyon
spill of 117,000 tons or the Amoco Cadiz spill of 230,000 tons)
can persist for several years, especially if they take place in
Arctic or subarctic regions. I2
Thus, it is apparent that the potential for catastrophic
spills is ever increasing due to society's dependence on oil
and the subsequent technological advances in both offshore
oil and gas exploration /exploitation and the maritime
transportation of oil.

In addition, the damages that can be

wrought as a result of such a spill can be devastating.

In

IODoerffer, 79 .
11 National Research Council , Using Oil Dispersants on the Sea (Washington.
D. C.: National Academy Press, 1989): 6.
I2Doerffer. 79 .
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light of these circumstances, effective oil spill response is
vital for the well-being of both the world's oceans and
resources, as well as for the world population and future
generations.

2.2

THE DIFFICULTY WITH OIL SPILL RESPONSE
While the above information stresses the importance of

effective oil spill response, it must be recognized that removing
oil from the marine environment once it has been released is
extremely difficult, and effective methods to accomplish such a
task have remained somewhat of a mystery, even in today's highly
technological society.
The characteristics and behavior of oil spilled in water
contribute largely to the difficulties encountered when
attempting to clean it up .

First, crude oil or petroleum

products undergo a variety of processes once released into
the marine environment.

These include spreading and drift,

evaporation, natural dispersion into the water column,
microbial degradation, etc.
actually aid cleanup.

Some of these processes

For example, evaporation can account

for the removal of up to forty percent of some spills from
the water's surface. 13

Many spills involving lighter

petroleum products evaporate so readily that the need for
spill cleanup is precluded.

Other processes, however,

severely inhibit effective response.
the spreading proces s.

The most noteworthy is

As a result of spreading, the

I3U . S. EPA , Use of Chemical Dispersants. 12.
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thickness of freshly spilled oil can rapidly approach an
average of 0.1 millimeter or less within a matter of a few
hours. I4

Although spreading depends on several factors such

as the type of oil, the amount of oil, and wind and sea
conditions, a spill similar to that experienced with the
Exxon Valdez can spread over six square miles (almost four

thousand acres) during the first twelve hours. 15

Obviously

rapid spreading vastly complicates cleanup efforts both
because the oil begins to impact a very large area very
quickly, and because the oil spreads into an extremely thin
layer which is difficult to remove from the water's surface.
Numerous response methods have been developed and are
continually being improved upon to tackle these difficulties.
The various response options include mechanical containment
and recovery, use of chemical dispersants to transfer the oil
from the surface of the water into the upper water column,
burning the oil in place, accelerating biological treatment
of the oil in place, using sinking agents to move the oil the
ocean floor, and allowing natural processes al one to combat
the oil. 16

The following sections describe and compare

mechanical oil spill cleanup methods, the traditionally
favored U.S. response technology, with dispersants in terms
of their utility as oil spill response options.

As will be

seen, dispersants offer significant advantages over
mechanical cleanup in certain respects, and their use
14Ibid., II.
15U. S. Congress, OT A, II.
16U. S . EPA , Usc of Chemical Di spersants, 5.
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provides the highest potential for minimizing damages under
certain spill conditions.

2.3

MECHANICAL CLEANUP METHODS
Mechanical containment and recovery has been the preferred

response method in the United States. 17

The goal of mechanical

response is to contain the floating spill and to physically
remove as much of the oil as possible from the marine
environment.
The basic components of mechanical recovery systems consist
of booms and skimmers.

Booms are barrier devices placed in the

water to contain the oil spill (to reduce spreading and
facilitate recovery), to divert the oil to areas where recovery
is possible, or to prevent the oil from reaching environmentally
sensitive areas. 18

They are composed of a means of flotation,

a

skirt, a freeboard, a tension member, and weighted ballast. 19
Other types of barrier s e xist, such as those that rely on forced
air to contain the slick, but they are used much less frequently
than traditional booms. 20

Skimmers are the devices that remove

the oil from the water's surface, of which there are many types
such as the weir type, suction devices, sorbent surface devices,
etc. 2I

Together, boom and skimmer combinations attempt to

17Ibid.• 4.
18Doerffer, 133.

19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21 Ibid.. 179.

12
collect the slick into a compact area where the slick thickens
and is removed from the water's surface.
Such mechanical recovery devices are subject to severe
limitations.

The performance of these devices can be inhibited

by oceanic conditions and weather, including currents, waves, and
wind, as well as by the nature of the oil slick itself.22
Containment using booms becomes highly ineffective unless the
currents moving against the boom are less than one knot. 23

In

cases where the current exceeds that speed, the oil tends to dip
beneath the boom and escape, a process called entrainment.

In

addition, booms are limited as far as their utility in the open
seas.

For the boom to be effective, the maximum wave height

should be less than the freeboard of the boom or else the waves,
and the oil, will splash over the top of it.

Thus most boom

barriers lose their effectiveness in wave heights greater than
four feet.~

In addition, booms lose their effectiveness quickly

as wind speeds approach twenty miles per hour. 25

Skimmers are

limited by the same conditions; they work best in calm water with
little or no wave action and if the current velocit y exceeds 0.7
knots, the oil is likel y to be swept underneath the skimmer.~
Other limiting factors are that the recovery rate of skimmers
decreases as the oil slick thickness decreases, being negligible
in thicknesses of less than 1.0 mm, and recovery rate is also

22National Research Council, 14.
23Ibid.
24Ibid., 16.
25U. S . EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants. 4 .
26Doerffer, 159.
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impacted by the presence of debris in the water which can clog
the skimmer. 27

Lastly, the use of booms and skimmers is limited

by the logistical problems of first moving the equipment to the
site and then maneuvering and anchoring the devices, as well as
coordinating the activities of the various vessels needed to
accomplish these tasks. 28
The removal of oil spills from the marine environment
with mechanical methods has thus been likened to "emptying a
very large swimming pool with one, two, or a hundred eye
droppers. "29

In fact, mechanical recovery operations rarely

collect more than ten to fifteen percent of oil in open sea
conditions. 3D Moreover, the future for advances in mechanical
recovery technology do not look promising.

There have been

advances with regard to the development of integrated systems
whereby high capacity mechanical recovery systems are
designed as either temporary or permanent accommodations
aboard vessels .

These advances have improved the mobility

and utility of traditional mechanical recovery systems.
Examples include the new vessel of opportunity skimming
systems, which can be placed onboard any "vessel of
opportunity" for spill response, and single-purpose,
specially designed oil spill response vessels, which are
designed and maintained specifically fo r spill response. 31

27National Research Council, 16.
28Ibid.
290tt, Lindstedt-Siva. and Walker, 75 .
30U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants, 2.
31U.S. Congress , OTA, 17.
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However, these new designs continue to use conventional boom
and skimmer principles and are therefore subject to the same
limitations and inefficiencies of those devices as described
above. 32

Basically, mechanical recovery techniques have

remained on a technological plateau for the past decade and
the technologies they employ are still considered primitive
by many.33

Because the behavior of oil in the environment

which limits mechanical recovery of oil in water is well
understood, the prediction is that no major breakthroughs are
like ly to occur. 34

2.4

DISPERSANTS
With not much light at the end of the tunnel with regard to

mechanical recovery techniques, other oil spill response
techniques must be considered.

Dispersants, while not highly

regarded in the United States as a response method, do offer a
reasonable option to other response methods in certain
circumstances.

Dispersants are "those chemicals that emulsify,

disperse, or solubilize oil i nto the water column or p r omo t e the
surface spreadi ng of oil slicks that facilitates dispersal of the
oil into the water column. ,,35

In more simplified terms, they

break up the oil into small droplets and, through mixing energy

32Ibid.
33U. S . Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
Investigation of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Prince William Sound, Alaska. 101st
Cong., l st Sess.• 18 July 1989: 67.
34U. S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Q.il
Spill Response Technology, 102nd Cong. , 1st Sess., 18 June 1991: 7.
35U . S. EPA. Use of Chemical Dispersants, 13.

15

provided by the sea, cause these droplets to quickly disperse
into the upper ten meters of the water column. 36
There have been many issues surrounding the use of
dispersants as a "cleanup" method.

Dispersants do not actually

remove spilled oil from the water and were thought to potentially
increase adverse effects of oil spills because they themselves
can be toxic.

In addition, questions have arisen concerning the

effectiveness of dispersants in terms of their ability to
actually disperse oil, thereby removing it from the water's
surface.

Innumerable studies have been conducted in the recent

past to satisfy these toxicity and effectiveness concerns, and
both the National Research Council and the Environmental
Protection Agency have compiled available research information
into useful findings regarding the utility of dispersants in oil
spill response.

These findings are summarized below.

The toxicity of dispersants alone, as well as that of
dispersed oils compared to undispersed oils, is important in
determining whether dispersant use will cause more harm than good
during a response.

As far as biological effects, the lethal

toxicity of most dispersants currently considered for use in the
United States and Canada is low compared to the toxicity of the
various components of crude oil and refined oil products.

37

Although sublethal responses to dispersants have been observed,
36Ibid.• 14.
37National Research Council , 257.
First generation dispersants were highly
toxic' their formulations were derived from engine room degrcasers.
Today's
dispersant formulations, however, are much less toxic.
They use nonaromatic
hydrocarbons or water-miscible compounds such as ethylene glycol or glycol
ethers. as the solvent, and also use less toxic surfactants. See National
Research Council, chapter 2, on th e physics and chemistry of dispersants .
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the National Research Council states that it is unlikely that
dispersants would contribute significantly to lethal or sublethal
toxicities. 38

Dispersants themselves, however, can cause adverse

effects on birds and mammals as they reduce the water repellency
of fur and feathers and may reduce the hatchability of eggs.39
With regard to the toxicity of dispersed oils, it has been
found that the acute toxicity of dispersed oils is generally
similar to that of oil in the water column alone. 40

However,

dispersing an oil slick may impose temporary stresses to
organisms in the upper portion of the water column in the area of
application due to higher short term exposure to the toxic
components of the oil. 41
Ecologically, chemically dispersed oils do not adhere as
readily to some organisms or habitats as untreated oil.
Dispersants also tend to increase the rate of biodegradation of
oil in some cases. 42

Because of these facts, dispersants are

likely to reduce the chronic impact of oil on many habitats. 43
However, the acute effects of chemically dispersed oils on
organisms and habitats vary depending on several factors such as
type of habitat, types of organisms present, frequency of water
exchange, etc. 44

Thus any decision to use dispersants when

38Ibid. 257.
Information regarding determinations of dispersant toxicity
and the results of toxicity tests on a variety of organisms appears in National
Research Council, chapter 3.
39Ibid.• 262.
40Ibid., 259.
41 U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants, 26.
42National Research Council, 259. 260 .
43U . S. EPA. Use of Chemical Dispersants. 14.
44National Research Council, 261.
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dispersed oil may impact various species and habitats must be
considered on a case-by-case basis. 45

The American Petroleum

Institute (API) has developed ecologically based guidelines which
describe the desirability of using dispersant in various
habitats.

(See Figure 1.)

The guidelines suggest, for example,

that dispersant use is the preferred response method in open
water offshore/nearshore areas,

is viable in enclosed bays and

harbors, and should be avoided on sheltered sandy beaches.

Such

a matrix, along with information regarding potential impacts on
various species present, can help decision-makers decide on the
best response options for various habitat conditions.
To summarize, the principle biological/ecological benefits
of chemically dispersing an oil slick are to:
-prevent stranding of oil in the intertidal zone, especially
when environmentally sensitive habitats are involved;
-reduce the hazards of discharged oil to marine birds and
mammals by preventing the oil from reaching them;
-enhance the degradation of oil components;
-and reduce the chronic impact on some habitats because of
shorter persistence of oil. 46

The potential biological/ecological disadvantages of
dispersant use include :
-the possible

.

expans~on

of the surface area of slicks

which can increase t h e l ~' ke l ~' h o o d that marine mammals and

45Ibid .
46Ibid., 255.
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seabirds will be impacted;
-the potentially increased effect of dispersed oil on marine
life in the water column near the sea surface;
-and the effect of oil dispersed offshore that may reach
coastal marine habitats and communities. 47

with regard to the various ecological and biological
impacts, then, the decision to use dispersants obviously involves
trade-offs, and the advantages of dispersant use must be
carefully weighed against potential disadvantages.
Along with toxicity concerns, the effectiveness of
dispersants on oil spills has also been a source of controversy .
The ability of dispersants to effectively break up an oil slick
depends on numerous factors.

These include the physical

properties of the spilled oil, the amount of weathering that the
slick has undergone, the chemical composition of the oil, and the
dispersant formulation and dosage rate. 48

Weathering of the

slick is an extremely significant factor.

The longer the oil

, t h e wa t er and the more viscous it becomes due to
remains ln
weathering, the less impact dispersants will have as far as
breaking up the slick. 49

Thus decisions to use dispersants must

be made quickly in order for the dispersants to work as expected.

47lbid.
48Ibid .• 256.
49U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants. 7.
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High effectiveness is possible and has been documented in
laboratory experiments. 50

In field experiments, however,

effectiveness has been relatively low, a fact attributed to
conditions not being proper for effective dispersion, or to the
monitoring method being inaccurate. 51

Presently, the Minerals

Management Service is conducting research to provide
effectiveness data for a variety of test oils, as well as working
to reformulate dispersant chemicals to enhance their
effectiveness on a wider variety of spills. 52

The effectiveness

of dispersants is becoming less questionable and today the
general consensus is that dispersants can remove as much as
thirty percent of a large spill from the surface under good
conditions. 53

Therefore the National Research Council has

recommended that the use of dispersants should be considered as a
first response method for oil spills along with mechanical
recovery. 54
Dispersants definitely have a place in oil spill response .
Probably the biggest advantage from a damage mitigation

50Nalional Research Council , 254 .
51 Ibid, 254.
Dispersant effectiveness during field tests h~S been ~easured
by visual observation, sampling of water-column concentrauon of dlspers.~d
oil or mass balance calculations.
While mass balance measure~e.nts provi e
the' best evidcnce of dispersal of oil at sea, they are extremely difficult to
accom lish in the field as they require a .ve.r y large set of .wate~ samples to be
taken p covering the entire water mass withi n which the 011 ~Ig~~ ~ecome
dispersed. as well as an .accu ralc mcasurement of the amount 0 01
ost
through evaporation.
Ibid., Chapter 4.
52U. S. Congress, Oil Spill Response Technology , 112.
.
.
53U S EPA Use of Chemical Dispersants , 2, based on worldwl.de observallons
. ,
,
fi ld
t of dispersant
of oil spill response using dispersanls . Note that ie
tes s
05
d 78o/t
effectiveness have reported effectiveness . percentages b~tween .
an
o,
See Table 4-3 in National Research Council, 180, and chapter 4.
54National Research Council, 255 .
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perspective is that proper dispersant use can prevent spilled oil
from reaching sensitive shorelines.

As was written by the EPA,

"the least controversial use of dispersants is on an oil slick in
deep water that is heading toward an ecologically sensitive
coastal area."55

Allowing an oil spill to reach the shoreline

and then attempting to remove it can cause significant
environmental and economic impacts. 56

Moreover, once the oil has

stranded on the shoreline, there may be little that can be done
without further damaging the environment. 57
In addition to the potential for damage minimization due to
preventing oil from reaching critical areas or shorelines,
dispersants can offer significant advantages over traditional
mechanical recovery methods in terms of efficiency, cost, and
waste minimization.

With regard to efficiency, dispersants

perform favorably with regard to both effectiveness and encounter
rate, the two factors used to assess efficiency in oil spill
response.58

As already mentioned, the effectiveness of

dispersants in removing oil from the water's surface can be on
the order of thirty percent while mechanical methods average only
ten to fifteen percent. 59
aircraft over large areas

Because dispersants can be applied by
' n relatively short amounts of time,

l

55U. S. EPA, Use of Chemical Dispersants. 29 .
56Ibid .. 9.
57 Ott Lindstedt-Siva. and Walker. 76,
..
580tt' Lindstedt-Siva. and Walker. 75.
Effectiveness refers to fthe ablll~~ to
•.
f
f h water. and encounter rate re ers to
e
remove 011 from the sur ace 0 t ~l' . short amount of time. According to
ability to affect large amounts of 01. I~ ~hat have high effectiveness and high
the authors . oil spill response options
"
chosen to best combat 011 spills .
be
Id
h
encounter rate s ou
59U. S. EPA. Use of Chemical Dispersants. 2.
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they have an extremely high encounter rate compared with that of
mechanical methods.

In fact, dispersants are one of the few

spill countermeasures that can be applied to a large area in a
timely manner.

Because of these characteristics, dispersants,

more than any other method, have the potential to influence the
outcome of a significant spill event. 60
The use of dispersant s can also result in savings in cleanup
costs.

The National Research Council noted that while "costs of

oil spill cleanup are high, they are an order of magnitude more
for mechanical cleanup than for dispersants, and another order of
magnitude more for the cleanup of immediate and obvious damage
done once the oil has corne ashore. ,,61

A study conducted to

compare the cost of oil spill cleanup using these two methods
provides further evidence.

The results of the study found that

the cost of removing oil mechanically from a shoreline ranged
from $65 to $5000 per barrel of oil.

By contrast, the cost of

intercepting the oil at sea by spreading dispersants from a fourengine fixed wing aircraft ranged from $15 per barrel to a
maximum of $65 per b arre 1 . 62

The case for dispersant use is

hat
further supported by the fact t

shoreline cleanup costs in the

United States are expected to increase.

Thi s is due to the fact

60 June Lindstedt-Siva,." Approaches to PElan~in~ fO~ ~~~;a~r~:;t e~se . " M?;~ael
Spill Response," in Oil Dispersants:
New
co oglca
p
.
Flaherty (Philadelphia: ASTM, 1989), 112.
61 National Research Council, 8.
of Dispersants to Combat Oil
62Albert H. Lasday, "Economic Evalua~ion Approaches , ed . L. Michael Flaherty
Spills," in Oil Dispersants:
New Ecological
(Philadelphia: ASTM, 1989), 41.
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that oiled debris is currently classified as hazardous waste
which is expensive to haul and dispose of. 63
The fact that dispersants do not create waste materials is
yet another advantage.

If the goal of oil spill response is to

minimize overall ecological damage, the fact that dispersants do
not create tremendous amounts of waste material which will
eventually have impacts elsewhere must be considered.

In fact,

Ferriere argues that waste minimization concepts should be
addressed as a means of providing for the most ecologically sound
oil spill response. M

While mechanical response creates problems

in terms of waste, dispersants do not and are therefore highly
compatible with waste minimization principles. 65
Obviously dispersants are no panacea for oil spills and
their use requires careful consideration.

Decision-makers must

determine whether the dispersants will be effective on the slick
in question, and must make important trade-off decisions
regarding the impacts of both the oil and the dispersants on the
resources expected to b e a ff ec t e d .

The P o i n t to be made is that

dispersants in some situations can contribute significantly to
minimizing damage from oil spills and therefore should be
available as a viable option when conditions warrant their use.
To be an effective and viable tool, however, certain
prerequisites are necessary.
needed to make dispersant use

Much has been written about what is
feasible given their controversial

63Ibid. 42.
64Dale Ferriere "Waste Minimization Concepts Applied to Oil Spill
". 199'3 International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings,
Response. III
American Petroleum Institute, 1993), Ill.
(Washington, D. c..
65Ibid, 113.
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nature and the technical requirements necessary to apply

them.~

The first prerequisite is a functional decision-making process so
that the decision to use dispersants on a spill can be made
quickly.

This is a must as dispersants lose their effectiveness

over time as oil becomes weathered (see above) .
plans are also necessary.

Contingency

The purpose of such planning is to

settle conflicts and to make decisions regarding dispersant use
prior to a spill, a process which facilitates decision-making at
the time of the spill.

Lastly, an appropriate logistics

capability to apply the dispersants must be present.

Again, due

to the time critical nature of dispersant application, the
chemicals, the application platform (i.e. boat or aircraft), and
technical information regarding application rates and such must
be compiled/positioned and ready to go when "the bell rings."
This logistical capability, however, will only be developed once
the other prerequisites are in pla ce.

No company can be expected

to make such an investment unless it can be sure that dispersant
use is indeed a viable response option.
Given these facts,

it is no wo n d e r dispersants are never

used in the united States .

Up to this point, planning for

been slow and haphazard, and the dispersant
dispersant use has
use policy has involved a cumbersome decision process unable to
,
produce quick decislons.

These probl ems, and the consequent

66Robert Pavia and CDR Lindon A. Onstad , :'Plan~ for Integrating Dispersant
Use in California, " in Procecdings of the 198~ all SQllI Conf~rcnce,
hington 0 C' American Petrol cum Institute, 1985) 85, and Mark L. . I
(W as I
,.
..
.
.. '
0 '1 D' ersants:
New Ecologlca
L av ache "Dispersant Use Considerations, In ~ILJld..!1ISU;p~.~.!ll
. .:. . .-::-~~~~~~=
A roa~hes, ed . L. Michael Flaherty (Philadclp~ia: ASTM, 1989), .1~2. Both
ar~i~les which describe wcll what is needed In terms of prcrequlsltes for
effective

dispersant

use .
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reluctance to prepare logistically for dispersant use, have
basically precluded dispersant use as a response option.

The

next section discusses the past policies surrounding dispersant
use, as well current changes in the policy which attempt to
address these problems.
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Chapter

3.1

3

Dispersant

Use

Policy

THE HISTORY OF U. S. DISPERSANT USE POLICY
As one Coast Guard Admiral stated during a post-Exxon Valdez

congressional hearing,

"the use of dispersants is always

controversial and poses problems when they are considered."
Also,

"the U. S. as a body of organizations and agencies has been

very reluctant to get off into dispersants. ,,67

This reluctance

was in part a direct result of the British response to the Torrey
Canyon incident, during which the dispersants used to combat the

immense oil spill caused more damage than good.

The dispersants

used during that incident were highly to xic; they were developed
as degreasing agents to clean tankers and were not suited for oil
spill response.

The results were an ecological disaster and

natural recovery remained incomplete o ver ten years later. 68
Therefore, as a result of the Torrey Canyon response,
dispersants acquired a poor reputation and were feared for their
potentially toxic effects .

U. S. policy de veloped to govern

dispersant use as an oil spill response option was subsequently
exceptionall y conservati ve.

The Water and Environmental Quality

Improvement Act of 197 0 69 called fo r the development of a
National Contingenc y Plan (NCP) that was to "provide for
efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage
from oil discharges," which could include "containment,
67U . S. Congress , Investigation, 4, 85.
68U. S. EPA , Use of Chemical Dispersants, 28.
69The Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970 amended
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) . See U. S . Statutes at Large,
vol. 84, pt. 1, (1970-1971) :

91.
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dispersal, and removal of oil.,,70

Specifically, the plan was to

describe procedures and techniques for dispersing oil, and was to
include a schedule that
used, and (2)

(1)

identified dispersants that could be

identified waters in which dispersants could be

used and the quantities of dispersant that would be considered
safe. 71

The intent of this National Contingency Plan was not

only to enhance the ability of the United States to respond
effectively to large oil spills, but to protect against the
irresponsible use of dispersants.

In considering the adoption of

this law, the Congress clearly stated that one of the objectives
of the NCP was to "insure that the waters, beaches, and
shorelines, including the marine environment, would not be
damaged through the use of harmful chemicals or other
materials. «r;

The National Contingency Plan that resulted,

promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality in 1970,
reflected these very sentiments. 73
First, the plan advocated the development and utilization of
mechanical and other oil spill control methods that would remove
oil from the environment, and allowed that dispersants be used

70FWPCA, as amended in 1970. Sec . II(c )(2).
71FWPCA, as amended in 1970. Sec. 11(c)(2)(f) and (g).
72Water and Environmental Ouality Improvement Act of 11970. Legislative
History. U. S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, vol. 2 (1970): 2703 .
73 This was not the first National Contingency Plan. The first was the 1968
National Multi-Agency Oil and Ha zardous Materials Contingency Plan.
This
plan, however, only
discussed dispersant use in general terms, establishing
overarching principles to govern the use of chemical dispersants.
The 1970
NCP was the first plan to delineate specific requirements for dispersant use.
See Harold 1. Snyder, "Federal Regulatory Control of Oil Spill Removal
Methods," in Proceedings of the 1975 Conference on the Prevention and
Control of Oil Pollution, (Washington, D. c.: American Petroleum Institute,
1975), 33.
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only if other control methods were jUdged inadequate or
infeasible. 74

It also delineated specific conditions under which

dispersants could be used, as well as specific authorities who
were required to be involved in the decision to use dispersants.
Basically, dispersants were authorized for use only if:

(l)

the

Federal On-Scene Commander (FOSC)75 judged it necessary to reduce
hazards to human life or substantial hazard of fire to property;
(2) the Federal Water Quality Administration (FWQA), in
consultation with the concerned states,

judged that dispersant

use would prevent or reduce substantial hazard to a major segment
of the population(s) of vulnerable species of waterfowl; or (3)
the FWQA, in consultation with the concerned states,

judged that

dispersant use would result in the least overall environmental
damage, or interference with designated uses. 76

The FOSC was

also required to obtain the concurrence of the Department of
Interior (DOl) representative to the Regional Response Team
(RRT)77 before using dispersants.

Specifi c conditions during

which dispersants could not be used were al so s p ec i f i e d .

Those

restrictions were based on the type of oil spilled, the amount of

74Council of Environmental Quality. "National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan. " Federal Register (2 June 1970) vol. 35. no. 106. p.
8513. Annex X. Sec. 2001.3 and 2007 {hereinafter cited as 1970 NCP) .
75 According to the 1970 NCP. the Federal On-Scene Commander (FOSC) was
the single executive agent predesignated by the NCP and regional plans to
coordinate and direct pollution control activities at the scene of a spill or
potential spill. The name of this position has since been changed to Federal
On-Scene Coordinator. but the role remains essentially the same.
76 1970 NCP. Annex X, Sec . 2005.
77Regional Response Teams (RRTs) are responsible for regional planning
and the coordination of preparedness and response actions.
Presently RRTs
consist of members from USCG. EPA . FEMA. DOD. USACE. US Navy SUPSALV, DOE,
USDA. DOC through NOAA. HHS. DOl. DOL. DOT. DOS . NRC. GSA. as well as state and
local agencies.
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oil, the depth of the water, whether the dispersed oil was likely
to impact the shore, and the presence of marine life in the
area. 78

Lastly, stringent requirements were established

regarding dispersant data that was to be provided to FWQA for the
agency's review prior to use of the dispersant. 79

Thus a system

was designed in which dispersants were basically to be used as a
last resort, and only after various individuals and agencies had
both reviewed pertinent data on the specific dispersant to be
used, and had collectively agreed that the stipulated conditions
in the Plan were present in order to justify its use .
After the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, the National Contingency Plan underwent some
changes.

First, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

was

given responsibility for preparation of the Dispersant Schedule
(i.e. the dispersant guidelines)

under Executive Order 11735. 80

Second, the EPA representative to the RRT was required to grant
concurrence to the FOSC before dispersants could be used (vice
the

Dor

representative).

The advice of this representative was

to be binding on the FOSC.81

Third, an "and" was placed between

the stipulated dispersant use conditions listed in the 1970 NCP,
nd i t i o n s be met instead of
thereby requiring that a 11 th ree co
Therefore, although
just one, as had previously been the case.
Plan continued to reflect
some of the players had change d , the

78 1970 NCP, Sec. 2006.
79Ibid., Sec. 2007.
.
80Council on Environmental Quality, "National ad and Hazardous Substan
e s,
·
(13 AU CTust 1973 ) vol. 38, no. 1cSS
Pollution Contingency Plan," Federal R eglSler
E
p. 21888, preamble {hereinafter cited as 1973 NCP) .
811973 NCP, Sec. 1510.36(a)(3).
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fear of dispersants and to place significant hurdles in the path
of dispersant use through the 1970's and the 1980's.
The responsibility for changes to the National Contingency
Plan was delegated to the EPA in Executive Order 12777,82
the Plan has since undergone numerous changes.

and

It will suffice

for the purposes of this paper to review the status of the
National Contingency Plan just prior to passage of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) so that the impact of that law may
be demonstrated .
A revised National Contingency Plan was published in the
federal register as a final rule on March 8, 1990 (just months
prior to the passage of OPA 90).

This plan required that the

FOSC receive concurrence from the EPA representative and the
affected state(s) representative(s) to the RRT, and consult with
the Department of Commerce (DOC) and Department of Interior (001)
natural resource trustees 83 when practicable, before authorizing
dispersant use. 84

(This team of decision-makers is informally

referred to as the "concurrence network.")

In addition to these

specific authorizations, particular dispersants were required to
be listed on the NCP Product Schedule i n order to be considered
for use. 85

The FOSC, however, was authorized t o use dispersants

82U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, " Natio n al Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, " Federal Register (8 March 1990) vol.
55, no. 46, p. 8826 , Statutory Authority {hereinafter cited as 1990 NCP}.
83Natural Resource Trustees are officials of federal natural resource
management agencies designated in subpart G of the current NCP, or
designated state officials or indian tribes , who may pursue claims for natural
resource damages due to oil or hazardou s substance releases.
84 1990 NCP, Sec. 300.91O(a).
85The NCP Product Schedule is a list of dispersants and other chemical or
bioremediation products maintained by the EPA . These products may be
authorized for use on oil discharges as per guidance in the NCP. To have a
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not on the Product Schedule, and without the appropriate
concurrences, if the use of the product was necessary to prevent
or substantially reduce a hazard to human life. 86
Another significant provision in the 1990 NCP stated that
RRTs "shall, as appropriate, consider as part of their planning
activities, the appropriateness of using the dispersants.
listed on the NCP Product Schedule.

. Regional Contingency

Plans (RCPs) shall, as appropriate, address the use of such
products in specific contexts.,,87

rf such plans were approved in

advance by the concurrence network (i.e. EPA and state RRT
representatives and ooc /oor natural resource trustees), the FOSC
could authorize dispersant use at the time of a spill without the
approval of the concurrence network as long as the specific
conditions as laid out in the RCP were followed. 88
Thus through time the National Contingency Plan continued to
maintain a conservative posture toward dispersant use, requiring
that several agencies agree to use them in any specific
circumstance.

In comparison with the earliest editions of the

NCP, the latest revisions prior to OPA 90 actually added an
additional layer of hierarchy onto the already burdensome
decision process by including DOC and 001 natural resource
trustee consultations to the concurrence network.
product placed on the Schedule , certain tests must be undertaken and the
results, as well as other data on the product, must be submitted to EPA . For
dispersants, only those which attain a 45 percent effectiveness value from the
Swirling Flask effectiveness test will be placed on the product schedule . See
the current NCP, Section 300 .915, for all product information and testing
requirements .
86 1990 NCP, Sec. 300.910(c).
87 1990 NCP, Sec. 300.910(e).
88Ibid.
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Some progress was made, however, with regard to the
provisions requiring RRTs to consider pre-planning.

Plans which

pre-approved dispersant use under specific conditions could
tremendously reduce the time necessary to make a dispersant use
decision.

This would help to make dispersants a viable response

option in light of the fact that they are effective only if
applied rapidly after a spill has taken place (explained above.)
Still, the language in the planning provision was such that RRTs
could decide to what extent,
dispersant use.

if any, they wanted to pre-plan for

Also, even if pre-planning were desired,

reaching agreement among the agencies and states with varying
interests proved to be a difficult task.
Despite the best efforts of RRTs across the country to
streamline the dispersant use decision process, often the result
at spill time had been no decision at all or a decision that came
too late to affect the outcome of the spill. 89

Events during the

Exxon Valdez spill underscored these problems and spurred some
needed change in the form of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

3.2

DISPERSANTS AND THE EXXON VALDEZ
Shortly after midnight on March 24 , 1 989, the 987 foot tank

vessel Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William
Sound, Alaska, and what followed was the largest oil spill in

u.

S. history.90

This tragic accident not only demon strated the

inadequacy of the U. S . National Response System as a whole to

890tt, Lindstedt-Siva, and Walker, 75 .
90National Response Team, 1.
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respond to such an incident, but more specifically pointed out
lessons with regard to the dispersant use policies then in place.
At the time of the Exxon Valdez incident, the Regional
Contingency Plan (RCP) for the area of Alaska was actually quite
progressive in terms of its dispersant use policy.

In one of the

first planning efforts of its kind, this RCP included chemical
dispersant pre-authorization procedures for use in Prince William
Sound.

These provisions were intended to allow the FOSC to make

timely dispersant use decisions by providing him with the
authorization to allow dispersant use in certain areas, under
certain conditions, without going through the normal concurrence
network. 91
zones.

The Plan divided Prince William Sound into three

(See Figure 2.)

In zone 1 dispersant use was acceptable

and the FOSC was pre-authorized to use them without RRT/state
concurrence and resource trustee consultation.

In zone 2,

dispersant use was conditional and normal
concurrence/consultation was required.

Waters within zone 3 were

not recommended for dispersant use, however, dispersants could be
authorized through the normal concurrence network. 92
The following chronology was extracted from the Federal OnScene Coordinator's Report, T/V Exxon Valdez oil spill, and
serves to demonstrate the dispersant use decision processes that
occurred during that incident.

When the Exxon Valdez initially

ran aground and began to leak oil, the oil was present in zone 2,
an area of conditional dispersant approval.

91Ibid.. 6.
92Ibid.. 17 ..

The FOSC,

realizing

32a

Figure .2
Zones Of Dispersant Use In Prince William Sound

2 -(Mar 1-0ct.15)

2
1 -Acceptable and OSC preauthorized
2 -Conditional. RAT concurrence required
3 -Not recommended . RAT concurrence required

Source: Na tion al Response Team, The Exx:on Val d ez Oil Spill, A Report to the
President, May 1989, p. 18.
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that dispersants might have been an option and that normal
concurrence would have been required, prompted Alyeska, the
terminal from which the vessel departed, to formally request
approval to use dispersants from the RRT.

This occurred at 0630

on March 24, approximately six hours after the commencement of
the spill.

A ten page formal request for dispersant use was

submitted by Alyeska at 0842.

The FOSC then convened a

conference for 1000 to discuss the dispersant issue.

Delays in

the arrival of key personnel resulted in the meeting being
postponed until 1200.

Deliberations continued until 1510 because

the Coast Guard had many concerns regarding whether or not the
dispersant would work, and those concerns were being weighed
against concerns of local fishermen regarding the potential
impact of the dispersants on the fisheries, among other things.
By the adjournment of the meeting, the leading edge of the spill
had entered zone 1 and the FOSC approved a trial application of
dispersant on the leading edge of the slick.

The initial trial

application was administered at 1800 (approximately sixteen hours
after the onset of the spill) and the results were inconclusive;
observers had difficulty in determining the effectiveness of the
dispersant due to cloudy skies and fading light.

Over the next

two days discussions on dispersants and trial applications
continued with little success.

By the third day of the spill,

the weather had deteriorated and precluded the application of
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dispersants by airplane.

By that time, the window of opportunity

for successful dispersant use had passed. 93
The issue of dispersants became a source of bitter
controversy during the post-incident litigation.

Both Exxon and

Alyeska claimed that the decisions for dispersant use in this
particular incident were too slow and had hindered their ability
to make use of the dispersant option. 94

This was an important

point of contention for these companies because if the decisions
had been quicker, and if they had been able to effectively
utilize dispersants, they might reasonably have been able to
preclude at least some percentage of the shoreline damage
experienced.

Others agreed that the dispersant decision process

was a problem.

For example, the FOSC himself later observed that

the long delay leading up to the first dispersant test may have
handicapped its chances for success. 95

During post-incident

congressional hearings, many witnesses acknowledged the problem
with the existing dispersant use policy in light of what happened
in Alaska.

For instance, the Director of the Chemical Emergency

Preparedness and Prevention Office of the EPA stated that one of
the lessons learned from Valdez was that the decision-making
what technolog y to use needed to be
. ,
processes f or d eterm~n~ng
streamlined. 96
93U. S. Coast Guard. Federal On-Sccnc Coordinator's Report TN Exxon Valdez
Oil Spill (Washington, D. C.: GPO. 1993 ): 40-45 .
.
94U. S. Congress, House. Committee on Public Works and .~r~nsponatlon.
National Oil Spill Contingency Planning and Response CapahIlltlcs, 101st Cong ..
1st Sess., 18 June 1991: 103.
95U. S. Coast Guard, Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Report, 41.
96U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheri es , Oil
Spill Response, 101st Cong .. 1st Scss.. 26 July 1989 : 106 .
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Ironically, Alaska was one of the few places that had an
actual dispersant pre-approval plan in place and the management
of the dispersant issue was actually handled much better than in
previous spills.

Dispersants were considered as an option and a

consensus regarding their use was ultimately reached.

Although

the initial decision was delayed and probably prevented the first
trial application of dispersants from being effective, sixteen
hours was a record in the United States as far as reaching a
dipsersant use decision. 97

Despite these facts,

the Exxon Valdez

incident simply served as a dismal reminder that U. S. dispersant
use policy continued to preclude the effective operational use of
dispersants as an oil spill response option .

Consequently formal

legislation was called for to attempt improvement.

3.3

OPA 90 CHANGES TO THE DISPERSANT USE POLICY
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, passed August 18, 1990, was a

direct result of Exxon Valdez oil spill.

The law sought to

comprehensively address many of the problems associated with both
.
oil splll
preven t'lon and respons e that were brought to light
during that trage d y.

Wl' t h regard to dispersant use policy, OPA

90 made only slight changes, but ones that could be significant
nonetheless.
The Oil P ollution Act of 1990 did not change the basic
h e National Contingency Plan.
purposes of t

The purposes remained

as before to provide for efficient, c oordinated,

and effective

action to minimize damage from oil and h azardo uS substance

97 Ferriere , 114,
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discharges.

Again, such action could include containment,

dispersal, and removal.

Also, the requirement for a schedule of

dispersants that may be used, identification of waters in which
such dispersants may be used, and identification of the
quantities of dispersant that could safely be used did not
change. 98
OPA 90 did, however, establish a new planning entity within
the National Response System.

Area Committees, comprised of

appropriate qualified personnel from various Federal, State, and
local agencies, and under the direction of the Federal OSC for
each Area 99 , were established and tasked with developing Area
Contingency Plans

(ACPs) .100

Area Committees were also

specifically tasked with working with "State and local officials
to expedite decisions for the use of dispersants and other
mitigating substances and devices. ,,101

In addition, the Area

Contingency Plan was to "describe the procedures to be followed
for obtaining an expedited decision regarding the use of
di spersant s . ,,102

Thus these new planning bodies were strictly

mandated by law to address dispersant issues prior to a spill so
that rapid deci sions during a s p i l l were possible.
Consequently the National Contingency Plan was revised to
reflect these changes.

Under the new Plan dated September 15,

980il Pollution Act of 1990, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News,
vol. 1 (1990), Section 4201(d) {hereinafter cited as OPA 90}.
.
99"Areas" designated for the purposes of Area Contingency Plans, l~ the
coastal zone, coincide with the Coast Guard Captain of the Port boundanes as
outlined in 33 Code of Federal Regulations Part 3.
1000PA 90, Sec. 4202(a)(4) .
101Ibid., Sec. 4202(a)(4)(b)(iii).
102Ibid., Sec. 4202(a)(4)(c)(v).
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1994, RRTs and Area Committees are to address the desirability of
using dispersants listed on the NCP Product Schedule.
ACPs shall, as appropriate,

RCPs and

include applicable pre-authorization

plans and address the specific contexts in which dispersant
products should and should not be used.

As before, if such plans

are approved through the concurrence network during the planning
phase, the FOSC is authorized to use dispersants in the
prescribed circumstances without formal concurrence at the time
of the spill. I03

Members of the concurrence network are mandated

to review and either approve, disapprove, or approve with
modifications the pre-authorization plans. I04

This provision

forces the concurrence network to seriously consider dispersant
use; they are no longer allowed to leave the dispersant issue
unresolved by failing to make a decision .

The NCP also states

that the Area Contingency Plan shall provide for the pre-approval
of specific countermeasures or removal actions that,

if

expeditiously applied, will minimize adverse spill-induced
impacts to fish and wildlife resources, their habitat, and other
sensitive environments. 105
Thus the revised NCP maintains the previous concurrence
network decision process, whl' c h has been the traditional
stumbling block to dispersant use, but only in cases not
addressed by pre-authorization plans.

More importantly, it

mandates that RRTs, Area Committees, and members of the
l03U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Nation~l Oil ~ndS HaZa~ou\994)
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan," Fcderal . Re£lster (1
eptern er
.
78
Section
300.910(a)
{hereinaftcr
cued
as
1994
NCP}
.
vo.
1 59 ,no. 1 ,
l04Ibid.
l05Ibid., Sec. 300.210(c)(4)(ii)(D).
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concurrence networks work through the dispersant issues prior to
a spill event, and that Area Committees develop pre-authorization
plans as a component of the new Area Contingency Plans.

The

intent of these requirements is to allow for expedited decisions
regarding response options during a spill so that the most
efficient and effective method can indeed be used .

If

successful, these new pre-authorization plans should help to
quicken dispersant use decision-making and thereby to overcome
the primary obstacle that has in the past precluded the United
States from the capability to use this important oil spill
response tool.
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Chapter

4

Implementation

of

the

New

Dispersant

Use

Policy

4.1

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION - GENERAL
Despite these new statutory requirements for the development

of dispersant pre-authorization plans and procedures for
expedited decisions, it is the actual implementation of these
policies that will determine whether or not they will be
successful.

Implementation is the stage in the policy process

when the policy is moved from the political realm to that of
administration, and the bureaucrac y is actuall y r esponsible for
filling in the details, or putting the n e w pr ogram into effect. 106
In the case of the dispersant p olicy, implementation may be
viewed as the development of the actual pre-authorization plans,
documents which outline specificall y where and under what
conditions dispersants may be used in each Ar ea, and which allow
the FOSC alone to make the decisions concerning the use of
dispersants on a particu lar spill based on the stipulations in
the plan.

The succe s s of these plans, then, can be determined

based on the abilit y of the plan t o allow the FOSC t o make rapid
dispersant decisions without outsid e interference usin g
information in the plan.

This will increas e the viability of

dispersant use, pr oviding a functional decisi on process, as well
as increased confidence in the decision process needed for proper
logistical preparation a s explained above .

106Charles O. Jones. An Introduction to the Study of Public Policy. 3rd cd.
(Monterey:
Brooks/Cole Publishing Co .. 1984 ), 164 .
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with this is mind, the process of developing the preauthorization plans is a vitally important component contributing
to the ultimate success of the new dispersant pre-authorization
plans.

In this case, the process must allow for the

participation of all interested parties in the development of the
plans, that is, in the decisions regarding the use of dispersants
in a particular area.

Otherwise, the potential actions of such

parties or groups, if they disagree with the contents of the
plans, could undermine the plans and thereby sabotage their
chances for success at the time of a spill.

The following

sections will describe the role of interest groups in oil spill
response in general and the importance of incorporating these
groups in the spill response planning processes, both for overall
oil spill response activities, as well as those involving
dispersants.

4.2

OIL SPILL RESPONSE MANAGEMENT - GENERAL
In order to understand the impact that interest groups can

have on spill response decision-making, it is first useful to
understand some of the dynamics of oil spill response in general.
As was stated above, significant oil spills often have farreaching impacts and cause extensive damage, both in economic and
ecological terms.

Thus, when an oil spill occurs, a large number

of individuals and groups of people become impacted in some way
and they therefore have an interest in the spill response and its
ultimate outcome.

These groups and individuals are termed

"stakeholders" in that they have a stake in the outcome of an oil
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spill. 107

One important group of stakeholders is the

environmental stakeholders, or those concerned with the perceived
adverse effects of oil spills on the natural and man-made
environment.

Such stakeholders include environmental

conservation groups, citizen advocacy groups, resource users, and
community groups .

(See Figure 3) .

Since the goals of any oil spill response include satisfying
the goals and objective s of the government, the responsible
party, and the pUblic (which includes the interest group
stakeholders named above) ,108 the optimum method of response
management would seem to allow for all of these groups to be
involved in the decision-making that occurs during a spill.

This

is indicative of an "open" spill response management system,
which is characterized by flexibility,

improvisation by spill

responders, and decentralized decision-making . 109

While this type

of response management system is beneficial in terms of including
all interests in the decisions, it is relatively ineffective in
terms of reaching quick decisions that are necessary during the
emergency/crisis situation of a significant spill.

The more

effective type of management system for oil spill response is the
"closed" system which is charact erized by centralized d ecision107 "Stake ho lde rs" are more precisely defined by the Coast Guard as those
individuals or organizations that have a vested interest in an event or the
actions being taken in response to an event, and also have the power ~o .
directly or indirectly influence the actions being taken or the . orgamzauons
involved. See U. S. Coast Guard, Stakeholder Lesson Plan, OSC Crisis
Management Course, (Yorktown, VA. 1995) .
108Ann Hayward Walker, John R. Harrald, Donald L. Ducey, and Stephen J.
Lacey Implementing an Effective Response Management System, Tech Report
IOSC:001 prepared for the 1995 International. Oil Spill Conference .
(Washington, D. C. : American Petroleum Institute , 1994), 20.
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Figure 3
Examples of Environmental Stakeholders and Their Concerns
Tvne of Stakeholder
State Trustee/RRT Rep

Federal Trustee/RRT Rep

Form of Concern
Regulatory; official lead
local area rep. for public

Regulatory; rep. of the
public interest for certain
resources

Effect on Response
Significant Influence on the
timing and type of proposed
response actions - can employ
political and permitting
controls
Significant influence on the
timing and type of proposed
response actions - can employ
political and permitting
controls
Potentially significant
depending upon the incident;
have the resources to sustain
their activity for the duration
of the incident
Usually high profile generally intense but more
short-term involvement; have
the resources to sustain their
activity if they choose

Established groups;
custodial in approach; may
have
national/international
membership
Advocacy/Citizen Group
Established groups; broad
environmental concerns;
often adversarial or
confrontational; may have
national! international
membership
Resource Users
Economic/Recreational!
Very vocal; sustained interest
Cultural dependency upon and involvement because they
are dependent upon potentially
resources at risk
galvanizes their concern
affected resources; direct
effect on them
Intense involvement for as
Assertive efforts to obtain
Media
long as the incident is
information; it is their job
newsworthy
to obtain information
Can
be
very
vocal, but may be
Informal
groups;
very
Citizens, community
less visible to the media and try
concerned about
groups, academia
for direct contact with
environmental effects;
responders.
direct or indirect
inquiries, may volunteer
assistance
Source: Adapted from Concerns of Environmental Stakeholders table from OSC
Crisis Management Course, USCG Marine Safety School, Yorktown, VA: 1994.
Conservation Group
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making and the direction of operations by a single person.

The

problem with this type of system is that it fails to account for
interests outside of the formal response organization, and
therefore its actions are less likely to be perceived as
successful by external organizations,

including the pUblic. 110

Because neither of these oil spill response management
systems in the strict sense is practicable, oil spill response
planning has emerged to bridge the gap between these two methods.
The process of planning serves to bring together all appropriate
interests in order to set goals, to agree upon courses of action
that will be taken in the event of a spill, and most importantly
to resolve conflicts, before the spill actually takes place.
Pre-spill planning allows for the identification of stakeholder
interests that can reasonably be anticipated to emerge at spill
time, and the incorporation of these concerns into planning
decisions.

This type of approach gives various stakeholder

interests "full involvement in setting priorities and other
strategic issues, while recognizing the compelling need, in the
,
h i f ,,111
heat of battle, to have only one commander In c le .
Considering that pre-spill planning is critical in terms of
resolving potential c onflicts during oil spill response and
providing for an effective decision-making c a p a b i l i t y at spill

l09Ibid, 1.
110Ibid, 2.
. '
111J
h E Lees "Contin(Tcncy Plannina, Contractor Requ irernent s. and 011
osep
.
,
0
0
1
' I 0 '1 Sni ll
Pollution Act of 1990 Implementation," in 1993 nternapona
I
I'"
.
D C
American Petroleum Institute,
Conference Proceedings, (Washington.
'
.:
1993), 52.
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time, it is equally critical that all interested parties, or
stakeholders, that are likely to emerge with concerns at spill
time, be involved in this planning.

Special interest groups,

especially environmental interest groups, have emerged in this
sense, as will be discussed below, and therefore comprise a
significant group of organizations whose views must be considered
during spill response and spill response planning.

4.3

WHY SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN OIL

SPILL RESPONSE - PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN
"Special interest groups are demanding a larger role in
making spi ll-related decisions. 11112

In fact,

interest groups can

be expected to emerge at the time of a spill to make their views
known and to attempt to influence spill response decisions.

The

reasons underlying this phenomenon are not known exa ctly, yet it
can likely be attributed in part to certain fundamental societal
trends that have evolved over the past few decades in the United
States.
The first reason centers around the general desire of
Americans to be involved in g overnmental de cision-making.

Over

,
ha v e demanded a more direct
the past several dec a d es, Amerlcans
role in governmental decision-making, thereb y in creasing
likelihood that the y will demand t o parti c ipate in oil spill
response de cisions.

1120tt, Lindstedl-Siva, and Walker, 75.
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"In democratic society, it is an accepted value that
individuals and groups will have the opportunity to participate
in or be represented in decisions that affect them."113

While

this value is generally accepted and is rather obvious, the
public has only relatively recently demanded to be more directly
involved in governmental decisions, and this has been in response
to general dissatisfaction with government and society.114

As one

author wrote in the 1970's, "there has been a growing concern
that the public, or at least significant portions of it, has
developed an increasing feeling of alienation towards
governmental decision-making.

In some instances, a profound

distrust of the entire system has developed.

"liS

As a result,

pressure groups have increasingly been established as a means for
the public to influence planning and policy-making. 116

This

establishment of groups is considered part of the "citizen
initiated participation movement," a movement characterized by
citizen action (in the form of grassroots organizations, public
interest groups, consumer groups, etc.) which influences and
monitors government .117

The point her e is that "there is a limit

113Helen M. Ingram, "Information Channels and Environmental DecisionMaking," in Environmental Concern , cd. Arvin W. Murch (New York: MSS
Information Corp., 1974), 159.
.
114S tuart Langton, "Citizen Participation in America: . Current ReflectIOns
on the State of the Art," in Citizen Participation in America. cd. Stuart Langton
(Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Company, 1978), 1.
.
115W. R. Derrick Sewell and J. T. Coppock, "A Perspective. on Public
Participation in Planning," in Public Participation in Planniaa. eds. W. R.
Derrick Sewell and J. T. Coppock (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Lid.. 1977), 1.
116Ibid, 2.
117Langton , 1.
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to how much the public will tolerate in silence,"1I8 and citizens
have come to expect the ability to participate in and to
influence government decisions.

Logically,

if government

officials fail to consider public opinion, they can expect vocal
opposition, a situation which may lead policies and programs to
be perceived as failures,

and almost definitely leads to a

decrease in their effectiveness.
In fact,

the government has recognized the importance of

involving the public in decisions in order to promote the success
of programs.

The "citizen involvement" movement, which was

initiated by government and stressed the importance of involving
citizens in improving and gaining support for administrative
decisions and government programs, emerged in the 1940's in the
form of the Administrative Procedures Act. 119
Act,

According to the

agencies developing rules and regulations to implement

legislation were required to,

among other things, provide for

public notice and comment during the rulemaking process.
enacting these requirements,

In

Co n g r e s s apparently recognized the

vested interest of people directly affected by public programs,
and professed that participation was henceforth a right rather
than a privilege. 120

Thi s ideal has been repeated time and time

118Arvin W . Murch . "Who Cares About the Environment?" in
Environmental Concern , ed . Arvin W . Murch (New York: MSS Information
Corp., 1974), 17.
119 Administrative Procedures Act. U. S. Code Congressional Servi ce. (1946),
p. 228 .
120Walter A. Rosenbaum, "Public Involvement as Reform and Ritual: The
Development of Federal Participation Programs ," in Citizen Participation in
America, ed. Stuart Langton (Lexington, Mass : D. C. Heath and Company, 1978),

83.
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again and today almost all new major federal legislative programs
contain citizen participation requirements. 121

In addition,

requirements for active participation in administrative policymaking have proliferated at all levels of government. 122
One important example of participation requirements in
environmental policy is seen in the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) .123

This law requires that agencies prepare

environmental impact statements (EISs) to accompany proposals for
legislation and other major federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. 124

These EISs

must then be made available to the public and to other federal
agencies with environmental responsibilities, so that these
entities may comment on the proposal.

While the substantive

impact of NEPA in terms of impact on decisions has been called
into question, 125 the law itself demonstrates the recognition by
policy-makers that citizen and public interest group
participation is important and necessary in order for government
policies to work.
Besides increasing public desire to partic ipate in
governmental decisions, the second overarching societal trend

121Langton, 3.
122Nelson M. Rosenbaum, "Citize n Participation and Democratic Theory," in
Citizen Participation in America, ed . Stuart Langton (Lexington, Mass : D. C .
Heath and Company, 1978), 43 .
123National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. U. S . Code Congressional and
Administrative News. vol. 1 (1969 ), p. 950. 42 U. S. C. pp.4321-4347.
124National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, (NEPA), Section 102(c) .
125Helen M. Ingram and Scott J. Ullery, "Publi c Participation in
Environmental Decision-Making:
Substance or Illusion?" in Pub lie
Participation in Planning , eds. W. R . Derrick Sewell and J. T . Coppock (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. , 1977), 130.
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that has led to the increased involvement of interest groups in
oil spill response is the growth of environmental concern in the
United States and the subsequent emergence of environmental
organizations.

Since the 1970's, there has been a "remarkably

wides pread upsurge" of interest i n the quality of t h e
environmen t. 126

Also,

there ha s bee n evide nce that a large

segment of the American public has come to share a level of
concern for the environment great enough to become personally
committed to the problem and willing to do something about it. 127
Some obvious reasons for the i nitial rise in co ncern over
the enviro nme nt have been cited as the deterioratio n of certain
easily perceived environmental conditions,
the proliferation of solid wastes,
wildlife species,

such as urban smog,

the endangerment of many

and oceanic oil spills. 128

Another factor

contributing to elevated environmental concern deals with
increased e xpectations concerni ng what the environment should be
like and therefore dis satisfaction with "the s y stem" in place to
address these ma t t e r s . 129

This rise in environmental concern was

manifest in the development of public e n v i r o nme n t a l

interest

groups, which b lo ssomed in the 1 9 60's and gr ew rapidl y in the
1970 'S.130

As a lluded to abov e,

the s e g r o u p s e me r g e d as a result

of a wave of sk eptici s m surrounding gover nme nt institutions, a
126 Anthony Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology. the Issue-Attention Cycle,"
Environmental Concern, ed . Arvin W. Murch (New York:
MSS Information
Corp., 1974), 78.
127Murch, 17.
128Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology," 83.
129Ibid, 84-5 .
130Graham K. Wilson, Interest Groups in the United States, (New York:
Oxford Univers ity Press, 1981), 86, 101.
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substantial decline in trust in government in the 1960's and
70's, and the feeling of environmentalists that their common
interests could only be protected by such groups.131
Notwithstanding the emergence of environmental interest
groups in the 1970's, concern over the environment and the growth
of environmental groups continues.

While the issue of

environmental protection has had its ups and downs, it has been a
persistent concern.

Not only has public support for

environmental protection persisted, it has risen substantially in
recent years. 132

In addition, when viewed in terms of the issue-

attention cycle,133 the issue of environmental quality has certain
characteristics which are expected to keep it from moving to the
"post-problem stage," that is, when the issue is replaced at the
center of public concern and enters a prolonged limbo.

The most

prominent factors that are expected to prevent a rapid decline in
public interest in environmental issues are:

(1) many kinds of

environmental pollution are much more visible and clearly
threatening to people than most other social problems;

(2)

environmental disasters such as oil spills spark and help to
sustain public interest; and (3) environmental degradation is an
issue that threatens almost everyone, not just a small percentage
of the population, and it is not a strictly politically divisive
I3lIbid. 13,87.
132Christopher J. Bosso, "After the Movement:
Environmental Activism in
the 1990's," in Environmental Policy in the 1990's, eds. Norman J. Vig and
Michael E. Kraft (Washington, D. c. Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1994), 31.
133The "issue-attention" cycle is a model which describes the progression of
public attitudes and behavior concerning most key domestic problems . Instead
of remaining focused on anyone issue for very long, the American public
moves through the cycle and becomes continuously engaged in new issues as
time progresses. See Downs. "Up and Down with Ecology."
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issue.I~

Also, if reaction to oil spills is a symptom of current

environmental concern, the fact that even minor spills today
attract a high degree of public attention is evidence that the
public is increasingly aware and vigilant over environmental
damage. 135
Environmental interest groups themselves are also on the
rise.

There are thousands of these groups currently in existence

and their membership numbers into the millions. 136

Figure 4 shows

the increasing membership trends among selected national
environmental groups from 1970 to 1990.

In addition, there has

been a substantial rise in the absolute number of environmental
organizations over the past several years. I37
Thus it has been shown that both environmental concern and
environmental interest groups are on the rise in the United
States, and the public in the form of these groups increasingly
desires to participate in governmental decisions, especially
those concerning the environment.

These societal trends provide

the foundation upon which increased public interest in oil spill
response, and the potential for increased public/interest group
involvement in spill response activities,

is built.

It is these

trends which create the potential for the interference of
I34Downs, "Up and Down with Ecology," 86.
135Karen Zuidinga, Noel Boston. and Ian Robertson. "Managing Public
Support During Oil Spills." in Oil Spills:
Management and Legislative
Implications. eds. Malcolm L. Spaulding and Mark Reed (New York: American
Society of Civil Engineers, 1990). 335.
I36Daniei H. Henning, Environmental Policy and Administration. (New
York: American Elsevier Publishing Co. Inc.. 1974), 24.
I37Helen M. Ingram and Dean E. Mann, "Interest Groups and Environmental
Policy," in Environmental Politics and Policy - Theories and Evidence, ed.
James P. Lester (London : Duke University Press. 1989), 136.
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Figure 4
.
5
M emb ershiT
LP ren dAm
onz Se1ectedN'
ation alEnvironmen
talG roups 197090

Group
Sierra Club
Nat'l Audubon
Society
Nat'l Parks &
Conservation Assoc.
Wilderness Society
Nat'l Wildlife
Federation
Environmental
Defense Fund
Natural Resources
Defense Council

1970
150,000
105,000

1975
170,000
275,000

1980
181,000
400,000

1985
364,000
550,000

1990
600,000
575,000

50,000

@50,000

31,000

45,000

100,000

44,000
3.1 mill.

50,000
3.7 mill.

35,000
4 mill.

150,000
4.5 mill.

350,000
5.8 mill.

nonmbr

30,000

46,000

50,000

150,000

nonmbr

35,000

42,000

50,000

125,000

Source: Bosso, Christopher J. "After the Movement: Environmental Activism

in the 1990's." In Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft, eds., Environmental
Policy in the 1990s. 2nd ed., (Washington D. c.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,

1994):36.
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interest groups in oil spill response management.

Thus these

concepts will be extended below to specifically demonstrate the
importance of the oil spill response planning process, as well as
the involvement of appropriate interest groups in that process.

4.4

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEREST GROUP PARTICIPATION IN OIL SPILL

RESPONSE PLANNING
It has been established above that interest groups,
especially environmental interest groups, are currently
interested in oil spill response decisions and are likely to
increasingly desire involvement.

Despite the fact that their

involvement may compromise the efficiency of spill response
management decisions, their views cannot be ignored by spill
managers.

This is due to the political power of these groups, as

well as the obligation of government officials, especially
administrators in this context, to account for the views of these
public entities, both to uphold the values of democracy, but most
importantly to maintain support for the agency.
First the political power of these groups will be discussed.
In the words of one author of the environmental movement,

"in the

political arena, the environmentalist s have become an interest
group of sufficient power that the y cannot be ignored. "138

These

groups exert powerful and continuous force upon policy
formulation as well as implementation through formal and informal

138S t an L.
Environmental

Albrecht, "Legacy of the Environmental Movement, " in
Concern, ed. Arvin W. Murch (New York:
MSS Information

Corp., 1974), 259.
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interactions with congressmen and administrators. 139

And while it

is true that the current organizations lean more toward political
activity (such as lobbying, campaigning, electioneering, etc.),
they are beginning to extend their involvement to all stages of
the policy process.

They are increasingly realizing the

importance of following through to ensure that programs are
implemented as intended, and to monitor the activities of
administrators who take charge of implementation after program
approval. 140

In addition,

local environmental groups are

proliferating and these groups are aggressively involved in
modifying and influencing local policy decisions through
expressions of their values and opinions. 14 1

Other ways in which

environmental interest groups exert political pressure is through
the media and the courts. 142

As a viable political force,

then,

both congressmen and administrators now more than ever, must be
sensitive and responsive to the needs of these groups.

While

administrators are not popularly elected and may seem to be less
influenced by political pressures than congressmen, they too have
political concerns, which will be discussed below.

Knowledge of

these concerns are important in the context of this paper because
they help to demonstrate the necessary components of successful
administrative policy and program development, concepts which

139Henning, 22, 25.
140Jack D. Kanez, "Crisis Response Planning," APA

17.
141 Henning, 27.
142Wilson, 95.

Journal (Winter 1984),
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apply to dispersant use policies and the implementation of those
policies in the new dispersant pre-authorization plans.
Administrators must be responsive to public interest groups
for two reasons.

The first is to support the democratic ideal

that the government's job is, in essence, to serve the wishes of
the people.

Probably the more influential reason, however, deals

with the practical reality of agency survival.

It is well known

that bureaucracies compete with one another for portions of the
finite government budget and spend inordinate amounts of time and
effort in the pursuit of obtaining "turf" to ensure their
survival. 143

Bureaucratic agencies are caught up in the muddled

soup of politics.
elected officials.

They are paid by taxpayers and are overseen by
They rely on the support of legislators in

terms of gaining the legislation that is beneficial to them as
well as the appropriations that they need to successfull y carry
out their programs.

The support from the legislators, however,

comes indirectly via the public (and public interest groups)

in

that the public has control over whether or not the politician is
re-elected.

To sum this up, public and intere st group approval

is critical for agencies because these groups influence who gets
elected into Congress, which ultimately determines the support
that the agency receives from Congress in the form of legislation
and appropriations.
Department s

This is no secret and it has been said that

(and therefore a g e n c i es ) are "subservient" to the

143Much has been written on the politics of agency survival. Two good
sources on this subject are:
Chapter XVII "Bureau Territoriality" in Anthony
Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, 4th ed . (Boston : Little, Brown, and Company, 1967),
and Matthew Holden, "Imperialism in Bureaucracy," American Political
Science Review (December 1966): 943-51.
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relevant interest groups,IM

with the r esult that bureaucrats are

reluctant to make unpopular and controversial decisions. 145
Oil spill managers have in fact recognized the importance of
involving interest groups in oil spill response management and
planning .

One of the critical success factors for oil spill

response is said to be accounting for stakeholder interests.l~
Clearl y t he prevailing v iew in the oil spill response literature
is that interest group views must be taken into account for spill
responses to have the slightest chance of being successful.

This

point was also made several times durin g the Congressional
hearings on the investigation into the Ex xon Valdez oil spill.
During t he hearings, one congressman said of oil spill response,
planning, and decisions,

"the notion that this problem is going

to be solved by keeping the environmentalists on the outside is a
huge and costly mistake, a huge, huge costl y mistake. ,,147

This

recognition is also evident in the implementation guidance for
the Area Contingency P l a n s .

In this guida nce, Area Committees

are strongly encouraged to solicit advice, guidance, and
expertise from all appropriate sources, which include
environmental groups, concerned citizens, etc.,
development of the Area Co n t i n g e n c y P l ans . 148

in the
La stly, the

importance o f stakeholders i s stressed during the On-Scene
Coordinator' s Crisis Management Course given by the Coast Guard.
144Wilson , 124 .
145 Langton, 7.
146Walker, Harrald, Ducey. and Lacey, 47.
147U. S. Congress. Investigation , 103.
148U. S . Coast Guard. COMDTNOTE 16471, Establishment of Area Committees
and the Development of Area Contingency Plans, dtd 30 SepL 1992 ..
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During the course, two days are spent discussing the importance
of taking stakeholder interests into account during oil spill
response management, and examples are given to demonstrate
possible ramifications of not doing so.149

Four basic words

written in the course lesson plan sum up the situation quite
well.

With regard to ignoring stakeholders during a spill,

"try

and you die" is the advice given.
Still, while the importance of accounting for stakeholder
views has been realized, their inclusion in the spill response
management team is not highly effective, as discussed above.
Thus the emphasis has been placed on involving these groups in
the spill planning process instead.

The goal of this approach is

ultimately to reduce or eliminate the likelihood that these
groups will emerge at the time of a spill, demand that their
views be taken into account, and thereby decrease the efficiency
of spill management decisions.

Coast Guard Admiral Henn

explained that, by widening the community that is making the
decisions in the planning process,

"when the balloon goes up and

you have a spill, you don't have folks that have local community
concerns trying to override decisions that the government

149The three examples of problems that have arisen due to failure to
account for stakeholder interests are (1) the U.S. Department of Energy
became involved in a spill due to complaints of oil companies that the Coast
Guard was "freezing out New England" by closing a waterway in New Jersey;
(2) After feeling that they had been ignored, several small environmental
groups loudly raised complaints about medical waste washing up on the shore.
As a result, the Coast Guard was required to survey hundreds of miles of beach
which yielded only two shopping bags of garbage (none of which contained
medical waste; and (3) A Coast Guard office in Savannah was subject to
Congressional hearings in 1987 due to a 1986 spi II of 50,000 gallons simply
because the manager of a wildlife refuge felt he was not being heard. See U. S.
Coast Guard, Stakeholder Lesson Plan .
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officials have made in preparation for responding to that
spill. ,,150

This is because the participants, in being involved in

the planning, understand better the risks involved, and become
aware of compromises and trade-offs that must sometimes be made
in both spill response and planning. 151

They are forced to

confront the realities of policy-making and may develop more
realistic judgments about what can be expected from spill
response. 1S2

The basic assumption is that if interest groups or

the public is involved in planning, even if their advice is
rejected, they may feel that they have at least had their day "in
court" and are more likely to accept policy decisions, 153 thereby
decreasing the likelihood that they will interfere at spill
time. 154
Although the preceding has predominantly focused on the
importance of interest group participation in general oil spill
response planning, the same concepts hold true, albeit to a
greater extent,

for dispersant use planning .

The criticality of

interest group participation in dispersant planning is perhaps
150U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Qll
Pollution Act of 1990 National and Area Contingency Plans, 102nd Cong., 2nd
Sess., 24 Sept 1992: 31 .
151 U. S. Congress, National Oil Spill Contingency Planning, 21.
lS2Timothy Bcatley, David J. Bower. and William H . Lucy, "Representation in
Comprehensive Planning," Journal of the American Planning Association, vol.
60, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 195.
153 Ingram and Ullery. 123.
154 It should be noted here that although participation should logically
prevent or at least decrease the potential for emergence, this "participation
thesis" has not been proven .
In fact. in many studies greater citizen
involvement in agency planning did not necessarily lead to greater public
acceptance and therefore greater ease in program accomplishment.
See
Rosenbaum, Walter. 92 .
Still, the assumption by spill responders and
government officials in general is that participation is positive and at least
increases the potential for program success.
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greater than that in general oil spill response planning due to
three factors, each of which tends to escalate the potential for
conflict regarding dispersant use decisions.
First, there is a basic dichotomy between the views of the
oil industry and those of environmental groups on dispersant use.
Typically the oil industry has been in favor of more liberal
dispersant use, both because dispersants are a cost effective
response option, and because they (dispersants) have the
potential to significantly reduce ecological and economic damage
(see above) .

In fact,

the American Petroleum Institute (API) has

been highly involved in dispersant research.

The organization

conducted numerous field studies on dispersants and published the
results in a booklet entitled The Role of Chemical Dispersants in
Oil Spill Control. I55

In addition, API contributed in large part

to the development of effective methods for the application of
dispersants by air. I56

As a result of its research, API espouses

the belief that the use of chemical dispersants should be
considered as a primary response option for major offshore oil
spills. I57
Port

Another industrial entity, the Louisiana Offshore Oil

(LOOP), has also been active with various agencies trying to

advance the knowledge and understanding of dispersants. I58

155U. S. Congress.
156U. S. Congress.
Spill Research Needs.
I57Ibid.
I58U. S. Congress.
Transportation. Exxon

304.

Investigation. 57.
House. Committee on Science. Space. and Technology. Q.il
lOlst Cong.. 1st Sess .. 7 Sept 1989. 162.
Senate. Committee on Commerce. Science. and
Oil Spill. lOlst Cong.. l st Sess.. 10 May and 20 July 1989.
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On the other hand, other interest groups, namely
environmental groups and resource users (i.e. fishers)

have

maintained more conservative views on the utility of dispersants.
Many opt for the "precautionary principle," believing that more
research needs to be conducted on the impacts of dispersants on
all types of biota, that baseline data on ecosystems must be
compiled prior to any dispersant use in order to determine long
term impacts, etc.

A fisher from Prince William Sound who

testified during the Exxon Valdez hearings noted that the oil
industry made a strong push for dispersant use during the
response.

She obviously thought this was inappropriate, stating

that dispersant use was "the preferred option for the oil
industry [because it rendered the oil] out of sight, out of
mind. ,,159
Thus the prevailing views of dispersants in the
environmental and industrial communities create the potential for
conflict regarding dispersant use during actual oil spills.

This

potential for c onflict is enhanced due to the difference of these
groups with regard to access in the oil spill response decisionmaking system.

The oil industry, as the entity responsible for

the spill and for the cleanup (the RP or responsible party), is
formally involved in spill management decisi ons as a bonafide
member of the Unified Command. 160

Environmental and other

159U. S. Congress, National Oil Spill Contingency Planning, 486.
160The "Unified Command System" is the response management system in
which several agencies and individuals with jurisdictional oil spill response
responsibilities work as a team to produce coordinated and effective decisions.
The current NCP, in Sect. 300.105(d), articulates this concept as the basic
framework for the response structure under the National Response System.
In
the current response management literature disseminated by the Coast Guard
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interest groups have no formal access to the response management
system.

Because these groups have limited opportunity to

influence decisions at the time of the spill, they are more
likely to emerge in other ways in order for their views to be
heard, making the need for resolving conflicts ahead of time even
more critical.
The third factor that creates the potential for conflict is
that dispersant use remains controversial.
that dispersant use involves trade-offs.

There is no disputing
People or groups

concerned with the conservation of various resources need to
participate in the planning to understand and appreciate the
necessary trade-offs so that the y might understand if and when
their resource might have to be sacrificed for another.
Lastly, dispersant use is a fairly technical issue.

The

general public and many interest groups d o not full y understand
the issues surrounding dispersants .

Thus the y may harbor

incorrect knowledge or, worse yet, they may be easily swayed to
oppose dispersant use during a spill due to information that is
distributed (by the media or o t h e r interest groups, for exa mple),
that may not be factually accurate.

Without specialized training

or some type of e ducation on the dispersant issue, interest
groups become a wildcard and may potentially interfere with spill
management d ecisions based on unfounded information.
Thus the potential for conflict regarding dispersant use
decisions is relativel y h i gh, a fact which underscores the

for the use by Area Committees, the Unified Command is considered to consist
of the federal government, the state government, and the responsible party.
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importance of both planning for dispersant use and including all
interested parties in this planning.

The implications of failing

to plan for dispersant use decisions is, as we have seen, a
matter of history.

Lack of pre-spill planning has resulted in

the inability to use dispersants in the United States, a
condition that has been recognized and addressed in the current
requirements for dispersant pre-authorization plans.

The

implications of failing to involve all interested parties in
dispersant use planning are more a matter of speculation but can
be reasonably forecast.
Failure to involve interest groups in dispersant use
planning can be expected to undermine the success of these plans,
both over the short and long terms.

Success of the plans is

deemed to be measured in terms of their ability to generate rapid
and beneficial dispersant decisions.

In the short term context,

interest groups that have not been involved in planning decisions
may emerge at the time of the spill and interfere with decisionmaking.

Such groups are likely to raise concerns that were not

taken into consideration during the planning process but which
cannot be ignored by the FOSC.

The result is that the FOSC must

consider these views at the time of the spill and, even if the
decision outcome does not change, precious time will have been
spent in the deliberations, thereby reducing the likelihood of a
quick and effective dispersant decision.

Obviously such a

scenario would significantly handicap the dispersant preauthorization plan with regard to its successful implementation
at spill time.

Instances of such interest group interference in
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dispersant use decisions are not abundant.

This is because of

the scarcity of occasions upon which dispersants have even been
considered as a response option in the United States.

The point,

however, can be sufficiently illustrated by the Exxon Valdez oil
spill response.

As stated above, there was a dispersant pre-

authorization plan in place for the Valdez area when the Exxon
Valdez ran aground.

When it came time for the FOSC to make the

decision regarding dispersant use, however, he was obliged to
consider the views of local fishers who had obviously not
participated to the extent necessary in the planning process to
preclude their emergence.

Accounting for these new concerns

contributed to a rather slow decision by the FOSC, a decision
later claimed to be so slow that it prevented effective
dispersant use

(see above) .

It could be argued that interest groups cannot be mobilized
quickly enough, or do not have the access to spill response
decision-makers, to directly interfere with spill-time dispersant
decisions.

This might be true in certain instances.

However, in

such cases these interest groups are likely to take actions while
the response is in progress, or af ter the spill, which are likely
to have negative consequences for dispersant pre-authorization
plans over the long term.

Such groups may voice opposition to

the use of dispersants after they have been used on a spill,
which is likely to show up in the media due to the ability of
these groups to effectively use the media to achieve their
objectives. 161
161Wilson. 95.

As wa s stated above, bureaucrats, and therefore
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oil spill managers, are extremely sensitive to negative public
reaction because of its political implications.

Any of this kind

of "bad press" is likely to promote reluctance on the part of
FOSCs to make single-handed dispersant decisions despite their
ability to do so based on the pre-authorization plans.

Instead,

FOSCs might simply disregard the plans and attempt to gain
agreement from all interested parties at the time of the spill so
that they can de monstrate support if the decision is later
criticized.

Worse yet, they may disregard the option of

dispersant use altogether, feeling that it is too politically
risky, thereby lea ving the dispersa nt pre-authorization plan on
the shelf to collect dust, a fate common to many contingency
plans.

In either case, the dispersant pre-authorization plans

will not be used as intended and dispersants may never be a
viable response option, a long term potential impact of failing
to include interest groups in dispersant pre-authorization
planning.
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that interest
groups must be involved i n di spersant pre-authorization planning,
and spill response planning in general,
successful.

for the planning to be

Participation in dispersant u se planning will

increase general public knowledge on dispersants, help interest
groups for m valid v i e ws on dispers ant use, help spill responders
predict interest group reaction to di spersant use decisions, and
decrease the potential that they will interfere with decisions at
spill time or make vocal criticisms of the decisions after the
spill due to uncertainty about dispersants.

However, while Area
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Committees are highly encourage d to involve outside interests in
the Area planning process, this is not a definite indicator that

such involvement has taken place or will take place.

The amount

and level of outside involvement has been left strictly to the
discretion of each Area Planning Officer (a Coast Guard officer
in the coasta l zone).

In most cases these officers have not

received additional training in group dynamics or in effective
methods to gain public participation in policy decisions,
subjects which are comple x and can be highly problematic. 162
Another complicating factor is that these officers are in most
cases overburdened with work and, despite the best of intentions,
may not be able to spend the time necessary to properly solicit
and include interest groups in the planning.

Planning for

dispersant use poses a special problem in that the issues are of
a technical nature .

For this reason,

in some cases subcommittees

of specialists have been formed to d e a l with these issues.

It is

possible that interest groups may not have been invited to
participate because they are thought to lack the knowledge
required to make informed decisions, an d that group s that have
been invited may not attend,

feeling they will n ot be able to

contribute effectively t o the di scussion.

Th e result i s that

162There are many obstacles to gammg effective public participation in
policy-making.
These include, among other things , the lack of motivation on
the part of some groups to participate, and the fact that they must be
"m ob il ize d " rather than simply informed .
See Rosenbaum, Walter, 91.
Participation may also be seen as inefficient by the bureaucracy , as it causes
increases in costs and delays in terms of policy-making, thereby creating
further obstacles. See Barry Checkoway and Jon Van Til, "What Do We Know
About Citizen Participation?
A Selective Review of Research," in Citizen
Participation in America , ed. Stuart Langton (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and
Company, 1978), 33.
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interest group involvement in dispersant use planning today may
not be at the level necessary to preclude the type of

interference, at the time of the spill or afterward, that will
ultimately undermine the effectiveness of the dispersant preauthorization plans.

If this is the case, it is important to

recognize it and attempt to remedy the situation.

Such attention

is necessary to promote effective dispersant use, and to avoid
wastes in time, money and energy spent planning for dispersant
use, both on the part of government agencies and industry (i.e.
stockpiling and dispersant research), if this technology will
never realistically be used.
For these reasons, a study of the involvement of interest
groups in dispersant use planning in the Northeast United States
was undertaken.

The study is discussed below.
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Chapter

5.1

The

5

Study

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The Northeast United States, from Maine to New Jersey,

comprises two federal regions and five Coast Guard Captain of the
Port

(COTP), or Federal On-Scene Coordinator,

5 and 6) .

zones (see Figures

Also remember from above that each COTP zone comprises

an Area for the purposes of Area Contingency Planning.
Dispersant pre-authorization plans have been developed for each
of these COTP zones, although each differs in terms of the plan
provisions as well as the processes by which the plans were
developed.

Currently the plans are in varying stages of approval

from their respective RRT concurrence networks.

For example, the

New York/New Jersey and Long Island Sound plans have been
approved and in place since April of 1994 while the COTP
Providence, Boston, and Portland plans have been submitted to the
RRT but are
approval. 163

(as of the writing of this paper)

still awaiting

While the specific provisions of each plan are not

important, the processes used to develop the plans are relevant
and will be addressed here briefly.
Basically, the COTP New York and COTP Long Island Sound Area
Committees adopted the Federal Region II dispersant use
guidelines, which were established by the Region II RRT.

The

development of these guidelines did not involve local
interests/interest groups per se.

However, to the extent that

163Phone conversation with Scott Lundgren, First Coast Guard District
Science Advisor to the District Response Advisory Team and Regional Response
Team Representative, 25 September 1995.

64a

Figure 5
Standard Regional Boundaries for Ten Regions

NORlll DAKOTA

&ot1TH DAKOTA

Re .X

Re .IX

Source:

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, "National Oil and
Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan; Final Rule,"
Federal Register (15 September 1994), vol. 59 , no. 178, p. 47428.
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Figure. 6

COn' Portland

Captain of the Port Zones :.:.
...

First Coast Guard District
Seaward boundary extends to 200 miles or Canadian waters
ln1and boundary defined by USCG / US EPA interagency agreement
....... ;.:.:::.:.:

Source: First Coast Guard District Marine Safety Division, Boston, Massachusetts.
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interest groups were involved in the Area planning, they may have
had a voice in whether or not these guidelines were accepted by
the Area Committee.

COTPs Boston and Providence developed a

j oint dispersant pre-authorization plan for Massachusetts and
Rhode Island waters through a special chemical countermeasures
working group comprised of members from both Area Committees.
Lastly, the dispersant pre-authorization plan for the waters off
of Maine and New Hampshire was put together by members of the
COTP Portland Area Committee.
Because of the current stage of development of these
dispersant use plans, as well as the different processes used, it
would be instructive at this po int to investigate the actual
involvement of interest gro ups in this planning in order to
forecast,
plans .
that,

as explained above, the likelihood of success for these

Again, it should be emphasized that there is no guarantee
if interest groups do n o t participate, they will emerge to

undermine the effective implementation of the plans at spill
time, nor if they do participate, that they will not emerge.
logical assumption from the foregoing discussion, however,

The

is

that interest group participation in the development of
dispersant use plans will de crease the potential for de struc tive
interest group interferen ce

(both at spil l time and afterward),

and will therefore in crease the like l ihood that the new
dispersant pre-authorization plans will be able to be implemented
as expected .
Fore castin g the su c cess of these plans i n terms of interest
group participation may reasonabl y be based on four factors.
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They are the difference between industry and environmental group
views on dispersant use, the present and potential involvement of
these interest groups in oil spill response and dispersant use
planning, the satisfaction of these groups with regard to their
participation in the planning process, and these groups'
confidence in governmental spill response decision-making.

Thus

the purpose of the study is to measure these factors and to
consider the implications of the results in terms of the future
success of the new dispersant use plans in the Northeast.
Another purpose is to determine the reasons for this involvement,
or lack thereof, and to provide recommendations if necessary to
enhance interest group participation and thus the likelihood of
success for these plans.
It should be noted here that several other factors may
potentially influence the future success of the dispersant use
plans.

These include,

for example, FOSC training and confidence,

the availability of dispersant equipment, and the potential
interference of private individuals or citizens in spill response
management.

Such factors have not been addressed in this study

due to time and resource constraints, but may provide useful
subjects for future study.

5.2

METHODOLOGY
The study was limited to the Northeast region of the United

States to provide a practicable working area.

Also, because the

activities and views of interest groups vary greatly among
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different geographic regions, 1M data from each Area within the
Northeast region was collected and interpreted separately,
allowing for comparison between the Areas.
The data were collected via telephone survey.165

One survey

was developed for environmental interest groups and resource
users, namely fishermen.

These groups will be referred to as

"interest groups" for the purposes of the study.

The survey

contains questions intended to measure the factors listed above.
A copy of this survey is included as Appendix A.
Subjects of the survey were determined as follows.

Sampling

lists of appropriate interest groups were generated from the
lists of environmental interest groups and fishermen's
associations in each Area Contingency Plan (ACP).

Groups on

these lists which obviously have no concern with oil spill
response were deleted.

In addition, Coast Guard offices in

charge of compiling the ACPs were contacted to provide names and
telephone numbers of appropriate groups which may not appear on
the ACP lists.

The names of additional groups appropriate for

the survey were obtained from other survey subjects during actual
interviews.

Lastly, the first set of survey questions was used

as a screen to further determine the applicability of groups for
164Walker, Harrald, Ducey, and Lacey, 74.
165Two references which were useful in terms of writing effective
questions and useful questionnaires were Michael Quinn Patton, Practical
Evaluation (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), chapters 5 and 6. and Earl
R. Babbie, The Practice of Social Research, 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1989). Two good sources used for information on
telephone survey research techniques were James H. Frey, Survey Research
by Telephone, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989), and Paul J.
Lavrakas, Telephone Survey Methods, 2nd ed. (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1993).
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the purposes of the survey.

Only those groups which have an

interest in marine environmental protection and which have, or
might potentially, become involved in oil spill response issues
were administered the entire survey.
Another important aspect of this survey was that an effort
was made to interview someone within each organization
knowledgeable both on the issue of oil spill response as well as
the organization's involvement and interest in this issue.

This

was successful for the most part as the majority of the survey
subjects held the position of Executive Director or one
comparable within the organization.

This precluded to the

greatest extent possible inaccurate data which may have been
received had persons less aware of the organization's views and
activities been interviewed (such as a summer intern or the
receptionist) .
Surveys were conducted over two weeks and the data obtained
is that which was able to be collected over those two weeks.

It

is stressed here that the sampling sizes used for this study were
relatively small and are not considered statistically valid.
There was no attempt t o contact each and every interest group in
each Area, nor to conduct random sampling of these gr oups, due to
time and resource constraints .

Consequently, the results of the

study must be interpreted with care.

The intention of the study

is simply to provide a general indication of the involvement of
interest groups in dispersant planning in the Areas of the
Northeast, and the probable c onsequences for the success o f these
dispersant use plans.

The results of the study will not, and are
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not expected to, provide absolute conclusions with respect to
these issues.
A second survey was constructed for industry interest
groups, termed "industry groups"

for the purposes of the study.

This survey, a copy of which is included as Appendix B, is much
less extensive than the interest group survey.

Its main purpose

is to provide insight into the industry's perspective on
dispersant use in order to compare it with that of the other
interest groups surveyed.

Also, the involvement of industry

groups in spill planning is not investigated in depth as it is
for the other interest groups, since it is the other interest
groups that are more likely to interfere with the effective
implementation of dispersant use plans at spill time .

Industry

groups, on the other hand, are not likely to cause such problems
because they are generally in favor of dispersant use.

In

addition, they are part of the actual decision-making hierarchy
during spills, making them less likely to emerge during a spill
with complaints about spill response decisions.
A sampling list of industry groups was compiled from a list
of major oil carriers in the United States held by the United
States Coast Guard Headquarters Vessel Re s p o n s e Plan Division.
Because the vessels of these companies operate in waters all
around the country, they are not specific to the Northeast
region.

However, they will serve to provide general indications

of the industry views on dispersant use.

In addition, industry

groups specific to each Area were not used because they are more
closely associated with local oil terminal facilities, the
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managers of which are not likely to have a high interest in
dispersant use due to the nearshore nature of their spills
(dispersants are more an issue in terms of response to vessel
casualties offshore).

Again, the industry group sampling size is

small and is not intended to reflect a statistically valid
sample.
Appendix C contains the standard call sheet used to keep
track of the number of calls made to each organization during the
survey, as well as the disposition of each call.

This tool was

tremendously useful since several calls were necessary to the
majority of organizations before the call was answered or the
appropriate person was available, or the organization required a
call back at a specific time to complete the interview.
of sample groups appears in Appendix D.

The list

The groups contacted, or

with whom contact was attempted, are categorized by Area and then
by survey disposition (i.e. survey completed, refused, screened
out, etc.).

For groups that completed the survey, the person

interviewed, their p ositi o n, an d teleph o ne nu mb e r is given.

5.3

RESULTS
The results of the study are displayed graphically in

Figures 7 through 15.

Figure 7 show s the actual number of

interest groups and industry groups that completed the surveys in
order to give the reader a more concrete meaning of vari ous
percentage s that are reporte d in the results.

At the bottom of

Figures 8 through 15, the questions fr om the applicable survey
used to generate the graph are li sted in order t o help e xplain
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Figure 7

Number of Completed Surveys by Area/Group
Area/Group
Maine/New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Long Island Sound
New York/New Jersey
Industry

Number of Surveys Complete
6
7
5
4
4
6
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the manner in which the information was derived, as well as to
enhance the understanding of the graph's meaning.
Figures 8 and 9 depict the views of interest groups and
industry groups, respectively, with regard to dispersant use.
This information is useful as it can be used to gauge the
potential for conflict between these two sets of groups during a
spill, and therefore the need to pre-plan for dispersant use.

As

expected, the data show a dichotomy between the two sets of
groups on this issue.

While the majority (68%)

of the interest

groups viewed dispersants as useful in certain situations and
over a quarter of them (28%)
industry groups

(83%)

were not in favor,

nearly all of the

were in favor of dispersant use with the

remainder viewing them as useful.

Perhaps unexpected, however,

is the fact that the interest groups were not unequivocally
against dispersant use.

In fact, only a small four percent of

those surveyed were opposed.

This indicates that, although these

sets of groups differ in their views, the majority are not on the
opposite extremes of the spectrum as may have been thought.
basic points are thus derived from these figures.

Two

First,

interest groups and industry groups do differ in their views on
dispersant use, thereby increasing the potential for conflict
between these groups regarding dispersant use during oil spill
response.

Second, on a more positive note, the fact that these

views are not diametrically oppos ed provides a degree of optimism
in that these groups may be able t o reach a g r e e me n t on the use of
dispersants if brought t ogether ahead o f spill time t o plan such
use.
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Figure 8

Views of Environmental/Interest Groups on Favorability of Dispersant Use for Oil
Spill Response

28%

.In Favor
1:1 Trade-offs
68%

II Not in Favor

a Opposed

Question (Interest Group Survey):
4c. Please Choose the statement which most closely accords with your
organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil spills.
1. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should never be used (Opposed).
2. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be used (Not in
favor).
3. Dispersant use involves trade-offs but can minimize the ecological
damage of oil spills in certain situations (Trade-offs).
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered as a first
response option for the majority of significant oil spills (In favor).
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Hgure 9

Views of Industry Groups on Favorability of Dispersant Use for Oil Spill Response

17%

.In Favor
~Hrade-offs

83%

II Not in Favor
E:::JOpposed

Question (Industry Group Survey):
2b. Please Choose the statement which most closely accords with your
organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil spills.
1. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should never be used (Opposed).
2. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be used (Not in
favor).
3. Dispersant use involves trade-off's but can minimize the ecological
damage of oil spills in certain situations (Trade-offs).
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered as a first
response option for the majority of significant oil spills (In favor) .
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Figure 10 also depicts the views of both interest and
industry groups with regard to dispersant use.

In this figure,

however, two questions instead of one from the surveys were used,
and the responses were placed on a point scale from 0 to 15 (0
being Opposed and 15 being Strongly in favor of dispersant use)
In addition, the data were compiled for the interest groups in
each Area separately to allow for comparison between the Areas as
well as between the interest groups and industry.

In Maine/New

Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Long Island Sound,
the average ratings for the interest groups fell directly in the
middle of the scale, meaning basically that they are not opposed
to dispersants but do feel that a careful/conservative approach
should be taken with regard to their use.

The New York/New

Jersey Area differed in that the average was a couple of points
lower, indicating a stronger view toward caution in using
dispersants.

The reason for this difference was not inherent in

the data and therefore may only be speculated upon.

As will be

seen, the New York/New Jersey Area differed from the other Areas
on some of the other issues investigated as well.

Thus any

speculation with regard to the reasons for these differences will
be reserved for the next section, in which conclusions for each
Area will be discussed.

Again,

in Figure 10 the industry rating

was significantly higher than that of the interest groups,
demonstrating the industry's propensity toward dispersant use
compared to the other groups.
The average level of involvement of interest groups in oil
spill response activities and issu es, for both the present and
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Figure 10

Average Views of Interest and Industry Groups Regarding the Favorability of
Dispersant Use for Oil Spill Response
15

10
Favorability
Index:
15=Strongly
in Favor
O=Opposed

5

o

Me/NH

MASS

RI

LIS

NY/NJ

Industry

Area/Group

Questions (both surveys)
4c /2b. Please Choose the statement which most closely accords with your
organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil spills
1. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should never be used (0 pts.).
2. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be used (5 pts.).
3. Dispersant use involves trade-offs but can minimize the ecological
damage of oil spills in certain situations (10 pts.).
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered as a first
response option for the majority of significant oil spills (15 pts.).
4d/2c. My organization/company seeks to or would:
1. Encourage dispersant use (15 pts.).
2. Encourage careful consideration before dispersants are used (10 pts.),
3. Discourage any use of dispersants for oil spill response (0 pts.).
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the future,

by Area,

is shown in Figure 11. 166

In all Areas

except New York/New Jersey, the past involvement averaged between
the medium and the low range, with Rhode Island showing medium
involvement, Massachusetts showing low involvement, and Maine/New
Hampshire and Long Island Sound falling in between.

The past

involvement of the New York/New Jersey groups fell between the
level of medium and high involvement.

Interestingly, the groups

in all but one Area expected increased involvement in oil spill
response issues in the future.

In fact, the future involvement

of groups in Maine/New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
and Long Island Sound is expected to be at the medium level.

The

future involvement of groups in the New York/New Jersey Area is
expected to be nearer the high level.

Significant information

can be yielded from this figure in terms of the importance of
including interest groups in spill response planning.

These

groups have been interested and in volve d in oil spill respo nse
issues, at least to some extent, in the past .

In addition, their

involvement is expected to increase in the future.

This provides

evidence in support of the n otion d i s c u ss e d ab ove that interest
groups are demanding a larger role i n oil spill response
decision-mak ing an d t hat, if n ot s omeh ow i n c l ud ed in the process,
they are not likely to sit back an d remain quiet.
Figure 12 deals specifically wi t h the in v olvement of
interest groups in each Area in oil spill response planning, both

166In Figure II , the level of past/present involvement was obtained by
averaging the responses from question (2aa ) among all the groups in each
particular Area.
The level of future involvement was obtained by averaging
the responses from question (2bbb) among all the groups in each Area .
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Figure 11

Average Involvement of Interest Groups in Oil Spill Response Activities/Issues
15

• Past/Present
t::IFuture

10
Involvement
Index:
15=High
10=Medium
S=Low
O=None

5

IIIIII

o
Me/NH

MASS

RI

LIS

NY/NJ

Area

Questions (Interest Group Survey):
2aa. I would rate my organization's past involvement in oil spill response and
associated issues as:
1. Very Active (l5 pts.)
2. Somewhat Active (10 pts.)
3. Marginally Active (5 pts.)
4. Active Only Under Certain Circumstances (0 pts.)
2bbb. If tomorrow a large tanker had an accident off the coast of my state and
began to spill a significant amount of oil into the coastal waters, my
organization would:
1. Become actively involved in the response actions in order to best protect
the marine environment (15 pts.)
2. Monitor the situation and become involved in the response if specific
concerns of my organization were not being addressed (7 pts.)
3. Not be concerned nor become involved in the spill response (0 pts)
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Figure 12

Involvement of Interest Groups in Oil Spill Response Planning
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C Area Contingency Planning

IDI Dispersant Use Planning
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...........
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RI
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NY/NJ
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Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3a. Does your organization participate in the oil spill response planning
activities of your local Area Committee?
1. Yes
2. No

3. Don't know
4f. Members of my organization have participated in the planning process to
determine when and where dispersants should be used .
1. Yes
2. No

3. Don't know
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general Area Contingency planning and dispersant use planning. 167
In terms of Area Contingency planning, a fairly low percentage of
the groups surveyed participate (33% in Maine/New Hampshire, 33%
in Massachusetts,
Sound).

40% in Rhode Island, and 50% in Long Island

Excepted is New York/New Jersey,

in which 75% of the

groups surveyed do participate in the Area Contingency planning.
While the percentages of groups participating in Area Contingency
Planning in most of the Areas is not enormous, at least some
participation is evident.

On the other hand, the percentage of

groups participating in dispersant use planning is significantly
less in all but one Area.

In Rhode Island, Long Island Sound,

and New York/New Jersey, none of the groups interviewed had been
involved in dispersant use planning.

In Maine/New Hampshire the

percentage involved was a small 17 %.

This time Massachusetts was

the anomaly, showing 33 % participation among the groups
interviewed.

The difference between zero participation and some

participation, albeit small, in dispersant planning among the
Areas is in part understandable.

Since both the New York /New

Jersey and the Long Island Sound adopted the dispersant use plan
developed by the Region II RRT, it is no surprise that local
interest groups were not involved in the development of that
plan.

On the other hand,

in area s where the dispersant plan was

developed by a portion of the Area Committee (which remember is
encouraged by directive to include out side intere sts in the

167The percentage depicted in Figure 12 is the percentage of groups that
responded affirmatively to question (3a) or (4f), with regard to their
involvement in Area Contingency Planning or dispersant use planning,
respectively .
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planning), such as Massachusetts and Maine/New Hampshire, at
least some participation would be expected.
Nonetheless, the results in Figure 12 indicate a
questionable future in terms of effective implementation of these
dispersant use plans.

According to the foundation that has been

laid above, there is significant potential in the Areas of Rhode
Island, Long Island Sound, and New York/New Jersey for interest
groups to undermine the utility of the dispersant use plans, both
over the short and long terms, because they have not participated
in the development of the dispersant use plans .

And while the

potential for destructive interest group interference with regard
to dispersant use in the Areas of Maine/New Hampshire and
Massachusetts is somewhat less, it is still significant due to
the minimal level of interest group participation in dispersant
use planning in those Areas as well.
Besides the actual level of interest group involvement in
dispersant use planning, two other factors which are likely to
impact the successful implementation of the dispersant use plans
were measured in the study.

The first is the satisfaction of the

interest groups regarding their input into the planning process.
Logically, the less satisfied these groups feel in terms of their
opportunity to participate in dispersant use planning decisions,
the more likely they will feel the need to voice their concerns
at the time of a spill or afterward, actions which could
undermine the dispersant use plans.
Figure 13 charts the satisfaction of these interest groups
in terms of their participation in both Area Contingency planning
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Figure 13
Satisfaction of Interest Groups Regarding Their Input into the Planning Process
15

rn Area Contingency Planning

10

III Dispersant Use Planning
Satisfaction
Index:
15=High
10=Medium
5=Low
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Area

Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3d. The concerns of my organization with regard to proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment have adequately been taken into
account in the planning process.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.);
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
3f. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
into how oil spill response in the marine environment will be handled.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
4g. The concerns of my organization have been adequately taken into account
in the current dispersant use planning process.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.); Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
4i. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
with regard to when and where dispersants should be used.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
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and dispersant us e planning. I68

In all Areas, the level of

satisfaction with regard to the Area Contingency Planning ranged
between the medium level and about midway between the low and
medium level.

By comparis on, in all Areas the satisfaction with

participation in dispersant use planning was less.

In Maine/New

Hampshire, Rhode Island, and New York/New Jersey, this level of
satisfaction was basically on the low mark.

In Massachusetts and

Long Island Sound, this level fell about midway between the low
and medium marks.

Generally this figure shows that most interest

groups are not particularly satisfied with the opportunity they
have to participate in oil spill response planning, especially
dispersant use planning.

Again, this lack of satisfaction

increases the likelihood that these interest groups may voice
their opinions at spill time, serving to interfere with the
effective implementation of AC o r dispersant use plans.
The ne xt factor examined was the c onfidence of interest
groups that the government would adequately represent the ir
interests at spill time, both for general oil spill response and
for dispersant use.

Confidence in government decisions is

important b ecause it can be assumed to impact the emergence of
interest groups at spill ti me.

For example, interest groups that

have confidence in the government in terms o f spill response will
be less likely to interfere with the response management team
decisions at the time o f the spill.

This may be the ca se even if

1681n Figure 13 , the responses to questions (3d) and (3f) were averaged, by
group and then Ar ea, to determine the average satisfaction level in each Area
with regard to Area Contingency Planning.
The responses to questions (4g)
and (4i) were averaged, by group and then Area, to determine the average
satisfaction level in each Area with regard to Dispersant Use Planning .
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the group has not been i n vo l v e d in the spill response or
dispersant use planning.

Thus confidence provides another

measure of potential emergence, and is depicted in Figure 14.

In

terms of general oil spill response, the level of confidence in
all Areas ranged from the medium level to midway between the
medium and low level, with the New York/New Jersey Area showing
the lowest confidence.

The results for dispersant use compared

to those for general oil spill response are interesting.

In

Maine/New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Long Island Sound, the
confidence level of government decisions on dispersant use
exceeds or is the same as that for general oil spill response.
Also,

in Massachusetts the confidence level is nearest the medium

level, signifying fairly good confidence.

The most probable

reason for this trend of fairly good confidence with regard to
government dispersant decisions is that most of the public, and
public interest groups, have very limited knowledge about
dispersa nts, h o w they work, or the issues surrounding dispersant
use.

In fact,

man y of the intere st group s s u r v eye d admitted that

they knew very little about dispersants.

Perhaps interest groups

are willing to be more generou s in ter ms of t heir confidence in
governmental decisions surrounding a tec hnical is sue such as
dispers ants because they do not have the knowledge to make
informed decision s themselves.
hypothesis,

While thi s i s an unproven

it is interesting to con sider.

ignorance can be unpredictable.

Co n f i de n c e due to

For example, blind public

confidence may be quic kly erode d if the public or public interest
groups are fed,

or become aware of,

information which portrays
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Figure 14
Average Confidence of Interest Groups That Govemment Will Adequately
Represent Their Interests at Spill Time
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• General Spill Response
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Index:
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Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3e. The concerns of my organization in terms of proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment will be adequately represented by
state or other officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.); Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
4h. The concerns of my organization in terms of dispersant use and protecting
the marine environment will be adequately represented by state or other
officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree (15 pts.): Agree (10 pts.): Disagree (5 pts.):
Strongly Disagree (0 pts.)
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detrimental impacts of government decisions during actual oil
spills.

Thus, although the data show relatively good public

confidence in terms of government decisions on dispersant use,
this confidence should not be relied upon and should not be
expected to maintain public support for spill response decisions
over the long term.

Returning to Figure 14, groups in the New

York/New Jersey Area, in contrast with the other Areas, showed a
rather low level of confidence in government decisions on
dispersant use.

This is most likely because the groups in the

New York/New Jersey Area are more familiar with dispersants than
the groups from the other Areas, therefore making them more
critical of government dispersant decisions.
Finally, Figure 15 combines the two factors of satisfaction
with input into the planning process and confidence in the
government decisions.

The graph depicts the percentage of groups

in each Area that were both dissatisfied with their input into
the planning processes and lacked confidence in government spill
response decisions. 169

If these two factors are accepted as

indicators of potential interest group emergence and consequent
undermining of dispersant use plans as described above, those

169In Figure 15, depicted are percentages of groups that were dissatisfied
with their input into the Area Contingency planning process, as indicated by
responses of "disagree" or "strongly disagree" to questions (3d) and Of), AND
not confident that the government would represent their interests in terms of
Area Contingency Planning, as indicated by responses of "disagree" or
"strongly disagree" to question Oe).
Likewise, the percentages depicted for
Dispersant Use Planning reflect those groups that were dissatisfied with their
input into the dispersant planning process, as indicated by responses of
"disagree" or "strongly disagree" to questions (4g) and (4i) , AND were not
confident that the government would represent their interests in terms of
dispersant use planning, as indicated by responses of "disagree" or "strongly
disagree" to question (4h).
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Figure 15
Percentagage of Interest Groups Dissatisfied with Input in the Planning Process
AND Not Confident That Government Will Represent Their Interests
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Questions (Interest Group Survey):
3d. The concerns of my organization with regard to proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment have adequately been taken into
account in the planning process.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
3e. The concerns of my organization in terms of proper oil spill response
actions to protect the marine environment will be adequately represented by
state or other officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
3f. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
into how oil spill response in the marine environment will be handled.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
4g. The concerns of my organization have been adequately taken into account
in the current dispersant use planning process.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
4h. The concerns of my organization in terms of dispersant use and protecting
the marine environment will be adequately represented by state or other
officials at the time of a spill.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
4i. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to provide input
with regard to when and where dispersants should be used.
Strongly Agree; Agree; Disagree; Strongly Disagree
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groups that show both dissatisfaction and low confidence have the
greatest potential for this interference.
extremely variable.

The results here are

No groups in Maine/New Hampshire,

Massachusetts, or Long Island Sound demonstrated both of these
characteristics with regard to Area Contingenc y Planning.

For

Rhode Island and New York/New Jers ey, 20 % and 25% of the groups
respectively showed both of the characteristics .

In terms of

dispersant use, two Areas (RI and LIS) contained no gr oups which
exhibited both dissatisfaction and lack of confidence together.
The other Areas, however, had significant percentages of groups
that exhibited both chara cteristics, ther eb y indicating an
increased potential for the Areas of Maine/New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and New York /New Jersey to experience probl ems
with the interference of interest groups in the implementation of
their dispersant plans.

5 .4

SURVEY CONCLUSIONS
Bas ed on the foregoing,

some basic conclusions can be made

regarding the probability for the future success of the current
dispersant use plans in each Northe ast Area.

Again these

conclusions are not intended to be a bsolute.

The y are provided

with the caveat that the y are based on a limited st udy of only a
small number of intere st g r o up s fro m each Area.

In addition they

are based on the concepts established throughout the paper, and
supported both by logic and people in the fiel d of oil spill
response (although not neces sarily p r o ve n ) , that participation in
planning, a s we l l as satisfaction wi t h regard to the opportunit y
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to participate and confidence in government decisions, will
impact the potential of interest groups to emerge and undermine
the successful implementation of dispersant use plans.
The conclusions for each Area will be discussed in turn.

In

the Maine/New Hampshire Area the dispersant use plan is not
likely to be successful.

While the involvement of interest

groups in oil spill response issues can be expected to be
significant in the future (Figure 11), the involvement of these
groups in dispersant use planning was low (Figure 12) .

In

addition, one-third of the interest groups in this Area were both
dissatisfied with their opportunity to participate in dispersant
use planning and were not confident that the government would
adequately represent their interests in its decisions.

The

combination of these factors leads to the conclusion that
interest groups are likely to emerge to undermine the successful
implementation of the dispersant use plan in this Area.
In the Massachusetts Area, past involvement of interest
groups in oil spill response issues has been relatively low.
However, this involvement is expected to increase to a
significant level in the future

(Figure 11).

In terms of the

involvement of Massachusetts interest groups in dispersant use
planning, a fairly substantial number (33 %) have been involved
(Figure 12).

This seems to indicate that the Massachusetts Area

Committee has done a good job of including these groups in the
planning.

In fact,

this Area had the highest level of interest

group involvement in dispersant use planning.

Nonetheless,

forty-three percent of the interest groups surveyed were both
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dissatisfied with their involvement and lacked confidence in
government decisions on dispersants

(Figure 15), indicating that

the potential for emergence is still significant among these
groups.

Thus the dispersant use plan in the Massachusetts Area

can be expected to encounter problems during implementation.
The probability for the success of the Rhode Island
dispersant use plan is good based on the data collected.

The

interest groups in the Rhode Island Area have been involved in
oil spill response issues in the past and are expected to
continue this level of involvement in the future

(Figure 11)

And while none of these groups have participated in the
dispersant use planning in this Area (Figure 12), they are not
likely to emerge to undermine the plan.

This is because all of

them are either satisfied with their involvement in the
dispersant planning or are confident in the government's
dispersant use decisions (Figure 15) .

In other words, even

though these groups have not been involved in the dispersant use
planning, and demonstrate low average satisfaction with regard to
this involvement

(Figure 13), they are generally confident that

government a g e n c i e s will adequatel y represent their interests at
spill time.

Thus, on the whole, the interest groups in Rhode

Island are not likel y to emerge and the Rhode Island dispersant
use plan has a fairly good chance for successful implementation.
The Long Island Sound Area results basicall y mirror those
seen for the Rhode Island Area.

The involvement of the Long

Island Sound interest groups has been significant and is expected
to increase in the future

(Figure 11).

Similar to the Rhode
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Island groups, even though they have not participated in the
dispersant use planning (Figure 12), they are reasonably
confident in the government with regard to dispersant use
decisions

(Figure 14).

Again, since none of the groups are both

dissatisfied with their input into dispersant plans and not
confident in the government dispersant decisions

(Figure 15),

emergence is unlikely and implementation of the dispersant use
plan should operate as intended.
Lastly, the likelihood of success for the dispersant use
plan in the New York/New Jersey Area is low based on the study
data.

The past and expected future involvement of interest

groups in this Area is extremely high (Figure 11).

In this case,

none of interest groups participated in the dispersant use
planning (Figure 12) because the planning was conducted at RRT
proceedings, which normally do not include local interest groups.
Also, they showed average low satisfaction regarding this
participation and generally low confidence in the ability of the
government to represent their interests in terms of dispersant
use during spills (Figures 13 & 14).

In fact,

fifty percent of

the groups surveyed were both dissatisfied with their input into
dispersant plans and lacked confidence in government dispersant
decisions

(Figure 15).

This indicates a significant potential

for interest group emergence and interference with dispersant
plan implementation.
Out of all the Areas surveyed, the New York/New Jersey Area
demonstrates the lowest likelihood of successful implementation
for its dispersant use plan.

Also, as alluded to above, the
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results for this Area differed greatly in many respects from
those of the other Areas.

While only speculation, these

differences may be explained by a few general observations.
First, the New York Area is known for its politically active,
vocal, and progressive public.

They know how to make their views

known and how to "get their hands in the pie."

Thus the New

York/New Jersey interest groups are extremely active in oil spill
response issues, and environmental issues in general, much more
so than the generally smaller and less sophisticated groups in
the other Northeast Areas .

These facts help to explain the

results in Figure 11, that the present and future involvement of
interest groups in oil spill response issues in the New York/New
Jersey Area is extremely high compared to the other Areas.

They

also help to explain the very high percentage (75 %) of groups
involved in the Area Contingency Planning in this Area compared
to the other Areas (Figure 12).
Other differences in the New York /New Jersey Area are most
likely due to the fact that dispersant use has been discussed in
this Area for many years while the other Areas have worked on the
issue only since the passage of OPA '90.

For example, as early

as 1983, work was being conducted in the New York area on
guidelines for considering and authorizing the use of chemical
dispersants. 170

Part of this work included a dispersant workshop

170LTJG Robert F . Corbin and Gary Ou, "Federal Region II Regional
Contingency Planning for a Dispersant Decision Process. " in Proceedings of
the 1985 Oil Spill Conference (Washington. D. C. : American Petroleum
Institute, 1985), 4 I 7. This planning was initiated by the Third Coast Guard
District Marine Environmental Response Branch . COTP New York was at that
time pan of the Third Coast Guard District. which no longer exists .
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on Governor's Island, New York, in 1983, which was attended by
over one hundred representatives from various agencies and groups
with interest in oil spill response.

I7 I

This is important because

these efforts served to educate much of the oil spill response
community,

including environmental interest groups, on the issues

of dispersant use.

Thus, at this point in time, many of these

groups are knowledgeable about dispersants, which helps to
explain their desire to become more involved in dispersant use
planning as well as their lack of confidence in government
decisions on dispersants

(Figures 13 and 14).

This is logical

because if the groups understand the issues surrounding
dispersants they are more likely :
on dispersant use and,

(1) to have distinct opinions

(2) to realize if and when the

government's views do not necessarily correspond with their own.
On the other hand, groups less knowledgeable on dispersants, such
as those from the other Areas, may be more willing to let the
government officials take care of the planning because they do
not feel equipped to make sound de cisions

(thus the average

satisfaction w/regard to input scores in Figure 13).

Also, as

discussed above, they may show higher confidence in government
dispersant decisions because they figure that the government
knows best with regard to such an issue (as shown by the good
confidence levels in Figure 14).

These suppositions are actually

supported from information re ceived during the surveys.

For

instance, during the i nterviews the majority of groups from the
Maine /New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Long Island
I7Ilbid .. 418 .
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Sound Areas admitted that they knew very little about
dispersants.

By comparison, the majority of groups surveyed in

the New York/New Jersey Area claimed to be knowledgeable about
dispersants and were generally conversant with regard to
dispersant issues.
One last conclusion deals with the difference between
general Area Contingency (AC) planning and dispersant use
planning.

The two types of planning were depicted separately in

Figures 12 - 15 in order to illustrate vast differences in terms
of the results in many cases.

Generally there was more interest

group involvement in AC planning compared with dispersant
planning, and generally greater satisfaction of interest groups
in terms of the opportunity to participate in AC planning
compared with dispersant planning.

This is significant because

it shows that the ideal of incorporating non-governmental
interest groups into Area Contingency planning has been generally
accepted and is being practiced .

However, this participation has

not for the most part mapped over to dispersant use planning,
even though the dispersant planning is actually part of Area
Contingency planning.

Proposed reasons for this problem and

recommendations for its res olution will be discussed in the next
section.

5.5

RECOMMENDATIONS
Before considering recommendations to improve the dispersant

planning process and to increase t he potential for success of
dispersant use plans,

it is necessary to understand the
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underlying r ea sons for the pre s e nt problems .

Probable cau ses

will be di scussed on the basi s of information obtained from the
study questionnaires,

interviews with Coast Guard Planning

Officers in each of the study Areas, and general concepts
regarding public participation in policy- making.

The reader is

cautioned that the study did not attempt to establish definitive
cause and effect relationships between the various factors that
will be discussed and the lack of interest group participation in
dispersant use planning.

Rather the purpose of the information

is simply to outline some potential cau ses of poor participation,
th ose which should be considered by anyone attempting t o deal
with public participation processes.
Problems with interest group participati on in planning stem
from the acti ons and perceptions of b oth g overnment agencies and
interest gr oups.

The o b s t a c l e s t o effective participation

generated or perceived by intere st group s will be di scu ssed
first.
One ba sic problem discovered in the study is that a large
porti on

(81 %) o f the interest gr oups surve yed stated that they

had not been invited t o participate in the dispersant use
planning.

This is interesting becau se all o f the Coast Guard

Planning Officers inter viewed stated that they had at some point
in time invited environmental interest groups t o participate. 172
172Phone conversation with LT Echol s, Response Offi cer, Coast Guard
Marine Safety Office Portland . ME. 17 February 1995; Phone conversation with
LT Victoria Huyck. Marine Environmental Response Officer, Coast Guard
Captain of the Port New York, NY. 16 February 1995; Phone co nve rs atio n with
LCDR Paul Jewell, Response Officer. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office
Providence. RI, 16 February 1995 ; Phone conversation with LT William
Moeller, Response Officer. Coa st Guard Captain of the Port Long Island Sound,
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In fa ct, the o f f i c e r from COTP Portland was ver y angry about the
whole situation, stating that his office had made several
attempts to enlist the involvement of these groups but they had
not been interested.

His office has thus resorted to sending the

interest groups copies of proposed plans as they are developed,
hoping to get their comments or at least make them aware of what
is going on in order to be able to squash them sh ould the y emerge
with disputes at spill time.

I?3

This discrepancy between

government and interest groups regarding invitati ons t o
participate can be explained relatively easily.

First, the

groups invited may not be the same a s those interviewed.

Als o,

personnel from the interest groups interviewed may not have been
aware of such an invitation, or may h ave forgotten about it,
especiall y if the group h ad only received one invitation at one
point in time.

In any case, the dilemma here is that the

government agencies perceive

(1) that the y have done their job

(by invitin g the interest groups to participate, usuall y b y
sendin g a lett er), and (2) that the interest groups simply are
not interested in taking part in reaching oil s p i l l response
decisions before the spill occurs.

On the other hand, the

interest g r o up s perceive that th ey h ave not been included in the
process at all.
this disconnect.

Obviousl y s ome work needs to be done to repair
As the director of one conservation group in

Rhode Island stated, man y times environmen tal g r o up s must be

NY, 17 February 1995; and Phone conversation with LTJG Robert Seale,
Planning Department, Coast Guard Marine Safety Office Boston. MA , 16
February 1995.
I73Phonecon LT Echols, 17 February 1995 .
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enticed to commit their resources to a particular pursuit.
Usually a letter in the mail is not enough; it may take a
personal phone call from the government agency to the Director
explaining why this group's participation is important and
requesting its contribution to the process. 174
Unfortunately, simply being invited may not result in
increased participation due to other constraints or obstacles for
these interest groups.

A significant fifty-eight percent of the

groups surveyed, when asked if they would participate if given
the opportunity, replied negatively or replied positively with
various caveats

(i.e. they would participate if they had the

time, or more people, etc.).
varied.

The reasons for these replies

Most groups suffer from severe resource

(money, people,

time) constraints and therefore many simply stated that they did
not have the resources to participate in dispersant use planning.
The other aspect of this constraint is priority.

Many groups

stated that oil spill response is not a priority for their
organization, even th ough many expect to become involved in the
issues at the time of a spill .

Another obstacle is the

perception of these interest groups in terms of their ability to
influence the outcome of the planning process.

A few groups

claimed that they would participate only if they could be assured
that their views would be seriously taken into account.

The fact

that interest groups are non-voting members of the Area Committee
(and therefore the dispersant planning subcommittees as well)

174Phone conversation with Mr. Curt Spaulding. Director , Save the Bay,
Providence , RI, 01 June 1995 .
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seems to breed discontent, mistrust, and alienation among some of
these interest groups.

Their reluctance to participate in

dispersant use planning is thus understandable.

These groups

would be foolish to waste scarce resources on activities that are
not likely to have an impact.

The last factor dealing with

interest groups is their lack of knowledge on dispersants and
dispersant issues.

Many of the groups admitted during the survey

that they knew very little or nothing about dispersants.

Also,

based on two survey questions, fifty-eight of the people surveyed
were found to lack general knowledge about how dispersants work
and the issues surrounding dispersant use.

This is a problem

because, as was pointed out by some groups, a group cannot
participate effectively in dispersant use planning if it does not
have a sufficient knowledge base.

Understanding the issues is

important so that the group can establish a position and then
attempt to influence decisions to coincide with its position.
Since many groups at this point in time are not educated on
dispersants, they have no incentive and may be reluctant to
participate in dispersant use planning.
Aside from the interest groups, lack of participation in
dispersant use planning may be precipitated by obstacles created
by government agencies .

First, as was discussed above, Coast

Guard Planning Officers often have a whole host of
responsibilities and may find it too difficult to spend the time
necessary to solicit appropriate representation from all
interested parties for dispersant use planning.

Another problem

is that any type of public participation in policy-making is
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inherently ineffi cient and therefore contrary to the progressseeking goals of government bureaucracies.

As stated by one

author on public participation in policy-making,
" .. . participation is seen as the antithesis to the administrative
values of ef f iciency, economy, and control. 11175

Government

agencies may be relu ctant to seek widespread participation
because it usually increases the time involved in producing
outcomes (plans), may result in deadlock among players or
outcomes that the agency does not favor,

or may cultivate

criticism of the agency's planning, mission, and professional
judgment. 176 While it does not appear that government agencies
have been actively trying to avoid interest group participation
in dispersant use planning for these reasons, these factors could
c onceivably create a subconsci ous reluctance on the part of
agency planners to aggressively pursue interest gr oup
participation.

Lastly, the percepti on o n the part o f bureau cracy

that citizens and interest groups lack informati on and
professional e xpertise is yet another obsta cle. 177 Because
dispersant use is a compl e x and fairly t echnical issue,
government agencies may feel that th ey can make the b est
decisi ons for so c i e t y based on their knowl edge, and that poor
decisions may result fr om the participation of uninformed public
entities in dispersant us e d ecision pr ocesses.

Again, suc h

perceptions could easily pr eclude e f fe c t i ve interest group
participation.
175Checkoway and Van Til, 33.
176Rosenbaum. Walter, 90 .
177 Checkoway and Van Ti I, 33 .
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Thus there are ma n y obstacles that stand in the path of
effective interest group participation in dispersant use planning
both in the Northeast and elsewhere in the United States.

As was

de monstrated in the study, the result in the Northeast has been
widespread lack o f interest group participati on in dispersant use
planning, and the subsequent doomed fate of the majority of the
dispersant use plans currently in existence.

There are

definitely no easy answers to this dilemma, especiall y since the
problems stem from both government agencies and interest groups.
However, two general approaches to deal with dispersant use
planning in the future seem possible.
The first is to continue on the path that has been foll owed
th us far in the Northeast, in o t h e r words to half-heartedly
attempt to in volve all interested parties in the dispersant
planning.

Once such an attempt has been made, government

agencies can c l a i m that they did their part and c a n n o t be
"blamed" if interest groups o r ot hers do not agree with the
contents of the pl an.

This is in fact happening.

Several FOSCs,

while at the OSC Cr i s i s Management Co u r s e in Virginia, stated
that they would simply i gnore interest group opposition or
protests against action s approved in c o nt i n g e n c y plans because
these group s "had the ir chance (to provide input)" and f a i l e d to
take it. 178

Althou gh thi s approach se e ms fair,

practicable wi t h i n our pres ent political s ystem.

it is not
As discussed

abo ve, any government leader is bot h o bligated and placed under
178Phone conversation with LCDR Steve O'Malley, Instructor at OSC Crisis
Management Course. Coast Guard Reserve Training Center, Yorktown, Virginia,
31 May 1995.
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tremendous political pressure to listen to such groups in a
crisis situation, no matter what the previous behavior of the
groups.

Thus, while some FOSCs may want to ignore these groups,

the reality is that in most cases they will not be able to do so,
not without jeopardizing their reputations and their careers.
The other reality is that during very significant spills, the
FOSC's normal decision-making authority will most likely be
supplanted by that of a very high ranking Coast Guard officer
(such as an Admiral), whose concerns will be more intensely
political than those of the FOSC.179

Thus this approach does not

address the underlying dilemma of interest group concern with
dispersant use, and their potential emergence during spills.

It

also does not adequately consider the political atmosphere in
which oil spill response in the United States operates, a factor
which allows interest groups to influence

(directly or

indirectly) spill response decisions whether or not they have
chosen to be involved in planning processes.

Such an approach

will obviously be ineffective in terms of assuring the successful
implementation of current dispersant use plan s.
The other approach, simply stated,
group participation in the process work.

is to make interest
This is difficult

because it involves altering the present behavior of both
government agencies and interest g r o u p s .

While government

agencies can alter their own behavior to improve the situation,
altering that of interest groups is significantly more

179Walker, Harrald, Ducey, and Lacey, 37-8.
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challenging.

However, this appears to be the most plausible way

to develop usable dispersant use plans.
This approach will require tremendous effort, initially on
the part of the Coast Guard Planning Officers, and later on the
part of all involved.

The first step in this process is to

identify resources that may practicably be used to carry out the
necessary tasks of organizing meetings and enlisting the
participation of appropriate interest groups.

Since Coast Guard

Planning Officers are in charge of ensuring the Area Contingency
Plans, and dispersant use plans, are developed, the burden of
coordinating and activating interest group participation in
dispersant use planning most properly falls on their shoulders.
The problem with this, as noted above,

is that some of these

officers are overtasked with various duties.

This can be easily

overcome, however, especially at this point in time.
Presently the Area Contingency Planning process, which began
formally in 1 99 2,

is well established in most Areas and most

sections of the ACPs are fairly well complete, as they have been
worked on steadily for the past three years.
each ACP must be revised annually until 1997
years) ,180 these planning officers,

Thus, even though
(and then every 5

some of which have staffs as

well, now have the time to concentrate specifically if not solely
on dispersant use planning.

This seems like a logical course of

action for officers filling the planning billets established as a
result of OPA 90, now that the original ACP planning burden is
largely completed.

The decision to devote extensive resources to

180U. S. Coast Guard, Commandant Notice 16471, Para . (0).
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dispersant use pl anning, however, must be made individually at
each command.

Each commanding officer would have to be committed

to the process and would have to ensure that their planners were
able to devote the time and energy necessary for such an endeavor
by not a l l o wi n g them to be assigned other primary duties.

In

addition, the command leadership must foster positive working
relati onships with local interest groups by foregoing the
statutory non-voting status of these groups in the proceedings.
Trust and cooperation can only be built by sh owing these groups
that their voice does count and will not be ignored. Without such
an understanding,

interest groups are li kely t o remain distant

and uninterested in dispersant use planning.
The other problem with e xpecting Coa s t Guard planning
officers to develop dispersant use plans based on the
participation o f all interested parties is that they are not
trained in the complex art of consensus building a mo n g groups
with disparate viewpoints.

To overc ome this problem, each Area

planning officer could be tra ined in this area of e xpertise.
While this training would n ot need t o be extensive, and therefore
would not be o v e r l y costly, the fact that new officers fill the
planning billets ever y three o r four y e a r s

(and in s ome cases

even more fre quently) makes this a burdensome requirement .

A

better solution wo u l d be to train a fe w publi c
participation /group dynami cs specialists for positions at the
Headquarter s level.

The se pe opl e c ould the n act as fa c ilitat ors,

attending the dispersant planning meeti ng s in various Areas in
order to hel p direct th e di scus sio n and c h an n e l parti cipants'
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energy into positive outcomes.

Another option would be to hire

private consultants to perform the facilitator function.

The

primary responsibility for planning and organizing the meetings,
as well as leading the discussion and compiling the results of
the meetings into actual plans, would remain with the Area
Planning Officers.

This is important because the local

government agencies and the local interest groups need to
establish a good rapport in order to increase the potential for
cooperation, mutual understanding, and efficiency during an
actual oil spill emergency.

These types of effective working

relationships among local entities are tremendously beneficial in
oil spill response situations and would not evolve if, for
instance, a "dispersant use planning team" from Headquarters were
to be tasked with the entire dispersant use planning process in
each Area.
In order to begin the process in the Northeast Areas, the
following specific sequence of events is recommended.

These

actions are recommended for all five of the Northeast planning
Areas, despite the differing results from the study.

This is

because each Area would benefit by increasing its current level
of interest group participation in dispersant use planning.

For

example, even though the study found that the Rhode Island and
Long Island Sound Areas are less likely to encounter problems
with the implementation of their dispersant use plans, these
Areas still showed nominal interest group participation.
Increasing interest group participation in all of the Areas will
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decrease further the chance that interest groups may emerge and
undermine the dispersant use plans at spill time.
First, each Area Committee/Planning Officer must identify
appropriate interest groups in each Area.

This will require

investigation into what groups are in existence, as well as into
the potential involvement of various groups in oil spill response
issues.

In order for future planning to be successful, all such

groups that might potentially emerge with concerns at spill time
must be identified.

Such an effort has not yet occurred.

The

current lists of environmental groups and other interest group
organizations (i.e. fishermen's associations)

in the Area

Contingenc y Plans are severely inaccurate and incomplete.

One

Northeast planning officer admitted that the lists in his ACP
were thrown together rather haphazardly in order to meet planning
deadlines, and the other ACP lists seem to have been prepared in
a similar manner.
The next and vitally important step is education.

Interest

groups must be made aware of how dispersants work, the issues
surrounding dispersants, and why it is important that dispersants
be available for use in the United States.

This will allow

interest groups to de velop informed views on dispersant use and
will enable them to participate in future planning in an
effective manner.

Both of these factors should increase the

willingness of interest groups to participate in future
dispersant planning.

Organizing an education workshop will

involve a large time commitment.

Each interest group should be

contacted by telephone and convinced that they have an interest
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in attending.

In addition, the Planning officer/ organizer should

stress that each group's in vo l vement is important in order to
ensure the future integrity of the nation's water resources.
While this seems like a monu mental task,
are not unheard of.

such education efforts

The workshop held on Governor's Is land in

1983 (see above) was such an effort.

Also, more recently, a

similar workshop was held in Massachusetts, although the audience
was limited t o oil spill agency officials and
scientists /academia, and the purpose was primari ly to discuss the
impacts of dispersants on marine species protected under the
Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Sp e c i e s Act. 181
Thus, while some education and dispersant discussions are
underway, dispersant education needs to be pursued more
aggressi vely in e a c h Area and to encompass all varieties of
interest groups.
Once the education phase has b ee n accomp lished, similar
worksho ps should be held to de velop new, o r r e vise e xisting,
dispersant plans.

These workshops can b e s ched uled for any time,

as Area Co mmi tt e e s may adopt re visions to ACPs whenever the
Committee d eems it appropriate.

Again, all interested groups

must b e ent iced t o participate thr ough personal phone calls or
other legal coercion methods .

In addit i on,

specially trained

facilitators from Headquarters should b e present at the workshops
to help channel the dis c ussion and work thr ough d isagreements or

181 Mantzaris, Christopher, Chief, Habitat and Protected Resources Division
of NOAA, to Captain P. A. Turlo, Commanding Officer, Coast Guard Marine Safety
Office Providence, RI, of April 4, 1995 . Letter invitation to attend the Protected
Marine Specie s and Oil Spill Countermeasure Innovat ions Workshop.
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stalemate.

The outcome of such workshops will be a set of

criteria delineating when and where dispersants should be used or
not used, agreed upon by all parties, that will then be compiled
into a formal contingency plan to be approved by the concurrence
network.

A plan created through this process will provide

responders with confidence that the plan can be implemented at
spill time without hesitation, and without fear that actions
taken in accordance with the plan might be questioned or
criticized b y groups outside the spill management team.

Such

confidence is necessary if dispersants are ever to be used
effectively and more frequently in the United States.
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Chapter

6

Summa..ry

and

CencI usiens

As has b e e n seen, dis persants have not been highl y regarded
nor utilized in the United States as an o i l spill response
o p t io n .

With o n go i n g rese ar ch an d d e v e lopme nt , h o wever, pre vious

c o n c e r n s rega r ding di spersant t o xicit y an d ef fecti veness ha ve
been somewhat alleviated, and t oday a large p ortion of the
response communit y rec ognizes that d i s p e r s a nt s can in de ed be
useful.

Whil e n ot advi sable f or u s e under c ertain conditi ons and

in certain ha bitats, dispersants can o f f e r signifi cant advantages
over traditional cleanup methods in appropriate situati ons.
These a d vantages can incl u de the mi n imiz a t i o n o f damages,

lower

relative c o s ts , ea se o f applic a tion and th e a bility to reach a
large spill area relativel y rapi dly, and waste re duction.
Dispersant u se p olicy has evolved in keeping with this
growing b o d y o f kn owle dge c o n ce r n i ng di sper sant s and the s h if t in
attitude regarding their u t i l i ty .

Inf l u enc e d b y toxicity fears

and the poor reputation of dispersants, past dispersant use
po li cies s t r ess ed c a u t i o n , t oute d mec h a n ic a l cl eanu p a s the
favored re spon se metho d, an d es tabl i s he d an unwor kabl e d e c i s ion
hierarch y th at ba sically precluded e f f e c t i v e dispersant use from
197 0 to 1 990.

Current poli cy, however, c o n s i d e r s the

prerequisite s of effe ctive di s per s ant u s e an d man d ates that these
iss ues be re s olve d before a s p i ll o cc ur s t o ens u r e the exi stence
of a true di sper sant use capability.

Mo st notably, OPA 90

requires t h a t Area Commit tee s a nd RRTs c o ns id e r whe n a nd where
disp ers ant u s e would be appropriate, and t h at the y devel op
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dispersant pre-authorization plan s .

Through this planning

process and pre-agreement among authori zing agencies,

it is hoped

that quick dispersant use decisions can be made, thereby
increasing the chances for su ccessful responses in situations
where dispersant use is warrante d.
Unfortunately, the d e v e lo p men t of contingency plans is not a
guarantee that they will be implemented as expected.

In the case

of dispersant pre-authorization plans, the v i e ws of interest
groups must be considered.

Interest groups, especially

environmental organizati o n s, are s t a k e ho lde rs in oil spill
response decisions.

In addition, a s a re sult of the general

increasing desire of the American public to participate in
governmental decisions a s well as the growth of environmental
concern in the United States, interest group s have, and can be
expecte d to, become i nvolve d in oil s p i l l

issue s and d ecisions.

Also recognized is that the se int erest groups are a powerful
political force an d while the y may have no direct ro le in oil
spill response decision s, the y certainl y can influe nce these
decisions indirectly.

Thus the c on clusion i s that the views of

these interest g roups mu st be incorpora ted int o the dispersant
planning process in or de r to preven t their i nterference at the
time of the spil l o r afterwar d which woul d un dermi ne the
successful implementation of these plans.
The survey described in this paper was de signed to examine
the participation o f interest groups in the di spersant preauthorization planning in the Northeast Un i t ed States.

The

surve y results conclude that t h e re quisite i nt ere st gr oup
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involvement in dispersant use planning in the Northea st has not
been met.

While g o vernment agencies ha ve made attempts t o

include these groups in the planning processes, they have not
been effecti ve in securing the groups' i nvo l vement no r in
establishing a meaningful dialogue with these gr oups.

As seen in

Figure 12, t h e percentage of interviewed groups which participate
in dispersant us e planning is ve ry smal l or zer o for a ll o f t he
Areas.

Also, Figure 15 sh ows that in the Areas of Maine/New

Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Ne w York /Ne w Jerse y,

significant

percentages of the groups inter viewed are both dissatisfied with
their input in t o the dispersan t p l a n n i n g process, and not
confident that the government will represent their interests
during di spersant use planning.

Thus,

in the Areas o f Maine /New

Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York /New Jersey,

interest

groups ar e likel y to emerge at s p i l l time with c onc erns that ha ve
not been considered in the dispersant use planning pr o cess, and
these plans are n ot lik el y t o b e s u cc e s s f u l ly implemen ted at
spill time .

The dispersant pre-authorization plans developed in

the Rhode Islan d and Long Isla nd So un d Area s ha ve a b et t e r c h a n c e
of success, howe ver, their effe ctive implement atio n is still
ques tiona ble du e to the l ow le ve l of i nterest group p arti cipation
in the dispersant u s e pla nning i n these Areas.
Since the b l a me f or p o o r i n tere st group pa r t ic i p a t i o n lies
both with g o ver n me nt age n cie s a nd the i ntere st gr o up s themselves,
b oth sides must c o ntri bute to a more reliable plan ning process.
Thi s p a p e r c o n clude s t h at th e b es t

r out e a t thi s p o i n t

is for the

government to i nc rease the awareness and knowledge of interest

102
groups with regard to dispersants, to work harder at enticing the
attention of these groups and obtaining their participation in
planning meetings, and to invest resources in facilitators who
can help produce positive outputs from such meetings and ensure
that no group feels as if its views have been ignored in the
process.
Obviously dispersant use planning, together with appropriate
interest group participation, will be a long and slow process
that will require dedi cation, perseverance, and commitment by all
interests .

The necessary effort will be well worth it, however.

Dispersants are a great resource which can enhance the mitigation
of environmental damage from oil spills, and successful
dispersant use planning can improve the p otential effe ctiveness
and efficiency of oil spill response in the United States.

While

the abilit y to use dis persa nts is important, it is more important
to dis c over what response tool s ca n pra cticabl y be put to use in
each Area of the country.
as the planning process.

The ac t u a l outcome is not as important
Far b e t t e r it will be to discover that

dispersant us e in a particul ar Are a will never be accepted, and
to adopt that as the plan, rather than wast e time and money
planning for dispersant use and stockpiling resources just to
encounter oppo sition /o bsta cl es a t s p i l l time.

Re a l i z i n g up front

that dispersant us e will never be widel y acce p t e d in an Area is
beneficial in that resources can then be used to con c entrate o n
prepari ng f or alternate resp onse a c t i v i t i es
c l e a n up ) .

(suc h as mechanical
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Dispersant use planning itself can only be successful if all
interested parties take part.

While OPA '90 and the current NCP

require the development of dispersant use plans, plans
established in a hurried manner by small groups of s p e c i f i c
interests are not likely to be successfully implemente d in the
heat of an oil spill crisis.

Rather, these types of plans, such

as those developed thus far i n the Northeast, are more l ikely to
lead to confusion at spill time because the responders will find
that the plan cannot be implemented as expected.

Als o, they will

lead to frustration on the part of planners, responders, and
industry, all who have d ed i c a t e d numerous hours and many dollars
toward planning and preparing for dispersant u se .

Co nv e r s e l y ,

c arrying out the planning process as d e s c r i b e d above wil l c r e a t e
understanding between various interests, as well as
predictability with regar d to how these interests are li kely to
react to certain response actions .

If dispersant plans are

written to be acceptable to all, there sho ul d be little or no
discussion at spill time, allowing for quick decisions and
efficient r espons e.
Becaus e of th e pr omisin g natur e of dispersant s, the United
States is n ot lik el y t o ban th e u se of thes e s ubstanc es, a n d they
will continue t o loom elu sively over th e heads of all o i l spill
responders.

Th er efore th e current chall en g e is to b rin g

dispersants d own fr om their pr ecari ou s p o si ti o n t o one within the
pr acticabl e o il s p i l l r espo ns e arsenal.

This can o n l y b e

accomplished thr ough extensive educati on and detaile d planning
involving all interested parti es, and th e subsequent development
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of fully implementable dispersant use plans in each Area.

The

commitment should be made, and the planning should begin
immediately, in the Northeast and elsewhere around the country.
The time is approaching for another major spill in U. S. waters.
How shameful it would be not to have resolved the dispersant
issue, and to perhaps miss the opportunity to significantly
impact the outcome of our nation's next oil spill disaster.
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Questionnaire:

Environmental & Interest Groups

Introduction: Hello, my name is Tina Burke and I am a graduate
student at the University of Rhode Island. I am doing a research
project on the involvement of interest groups in oil spill response
and planning. May I please speak with someone who could talk to
me about your organization's interest, views, and activities in the
area of marine environmental protection and oil spill response.
IF ANOTHER PERSON TAKES CALL: Hello, my name is Tina Burke and
I am a graduate student at the University of Rhode Island. I am
presently doing research in the area of interest group involvement In
oil spill response issues and policies to protect the marine
environment. This is an important issue that faces the federal
government as a result of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

If you don't mind, I would like to ask you some questions on thi s
subject in the form of a survey. The interview will last only 10
minutes, okay?
IF NO: May I please schedule a time to call you to conduct this
interview. Your input is important for the validity of my research
and it will also help to provide insight into how future responses to
significant oil spills can adequately consider all interested views .
THE SURVEY

TOPIC: Interest of organization in protection of the marine
environment.

1.

1a.

best

What

IS

the mission or purpose of your organization?

OK, Please respond to the followin g statements by choosing the
answer for your organization :
1b. My organization is interested in protection of the marine
environment and/or resources within the marine
environment.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Other (explain )
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1c.

Oil spills from tank vessels pose a significant threat to the
marine environment.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree

l d.

The nation's oil spill response policy is important in terms
of protecting the marine environmen t from tanker spills.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4 . strongly disagree

II. TOPIC: Involvement/potential for involvement in oil spill
response or oil spill response issues.
2a. Members of my organization have in the past been
involved in oil spill responses, or in discussions on oil spill response
issues.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't Know (ask to speak w/someone else)
If YES:

2aa.

I would rate my organization's past
involvement in oil spill response and associated
issues as:
1. very active (15 pts)
2. somewhat active (10 pts .)
3. marginally active (5 pts. )
4. active only under certain circumstances
(5 pts.)
(such as significant spill size, etc .) - PLEASE
EXPLAIN:
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2b.

The chance or likelihood that my organization may become
involved in spill response issues in the future IS:
1. definite (15 pts.)
2. highly likely (10 pts.)
3. likely only under certain conditions WHAT ARE CONDITIONS? (5 pts.)

4.

Not likely-------WHY?

(0 pts.)

What, if anything, might cause your
organization to become involved in oil spill
response issues? (SKIP to Sect. III)

IF answered 1,2,or 3 above : 2bb. I expect the level of my
organization's involvement in future oil spill response issues
to be:
1. very active (15 pts.)
2. somewhat active (10 pts .)
3. marginally active (5 pts .)
AND, 2bbb. If tomorrow a large tanker had an accident off the
coast of my state and began to spill a significant amount of oil into
the coastal waters, my organization would:
1. Become actively involved in the response actions in order to
best protect the marine environment (15 pts.)
2. Monitor the situation and become involved in the response
if specific concerns of my organization were not being
addressed; or (7 pts.)
3. Not be concerned nor become invol ved in the spill response
(0 pts.)
4. Other: EXPLAIN:
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III. TOPIC: Organization's involvement
response actions.

In

planning for oil spill

Since the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Area
Committees have been formed to develop appropriate response
actions to significant oil spills. These committees are made up of
members of the federal, state, and local governments, as well as local
interest and industry groups. The participation of all of these groups
is intended to ensure all views are taken into consideration when
developing oil spill response policies.
3a. Does your organization participate in the oil spill response
planning activities of your local Area Committee?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
If NO :

3c.

3b.

Has your organization been invited to participate
planning ?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

In

Would your organization be interested in participating
Area Committee planning for oil spill re sponse in the
future?
1. Yes
2. No - WHY??

this

In

3. Don't know - EXPLAIN:

Please respond to the following statements by choosing the best
answer:
3d. The concerns of my organization with regard to proper oil
spill response actions to protect the marine environment have
adequately been taken into account in the planning process .
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts. )
3. disagree (5 pts.)
4. strongly disagree (0 pts.)
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3e. The concerns of my organization in terms of proper oil spill
response actions to protect the marine environment will be
adequately represented by state or other officials at the time of a
spill.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts.)
3. disagree (5 pts.)
4. strongly disagree (0 pts.)
3f. My organization is satisfied with the opportunity it has to
provide input into how oil spill response in the marine environment
will be handled.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts.)
3. disagree (5 pts.)
4. strongly disagree (0 pts.)

IV.

TOPIC:
4a.

Dispersants as an oil spill response method.

Are you familiar with dispersants and how they work?
1. Yes
2. No - explain issue of dispersants and SKIP
to question 4d.

Please respond to the foll owing statements by choosing the
best answer.
4b. Dispersants:
1. remove oil from the water VIa a chemical
reaction.
2. break up surface oil slicks into tiny
droplets which spread out in the upper
water column; or
3. remove oil from the water's surface by
causinco it to sink
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4c. Please choose the statement which most closely accords
with your organization's feelings on dispersant use for offshore oil
spills.
1. Dispersants are toxic to manne life and should never be
used. (0 pts)
2. Dispersants are toxic to marine life and should rarely be
used . (5 pts.)
3. Dispersant use involves trade-offs but can minimize the
ecological damage of oil spills in certain situations. (10 pts.)
4. Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered
as a first response option for the majority of significant
oil spills. (15 pts.)
4d.

My organization seeks to/ would:
1. encourage dispersant use (15 pts)
2. encourage careful consideration before
dispersants are used; or (7.5 pts.)
3. discourage any use of dispersants for
oil spill response (0 pts.)

4e. My organization is familiar with the dispersant use policy
currently being developed for response to oil spills off the Northeast
coast of the United States.
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
4f. Members of my organization have participated in the
planning process to determine when and where dispersants should
be used.
1. Yes
2. No
IF YES:

4ff.

Has being involved in this planning changed your
organization's view of dispersants with regard to
their usefulness? EXPLAIN:
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IF NO:

4fff.

Has your organization been invited to participate
in dispersant use planning?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know
If invited, would your organization be interested
in participating in the future?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know - explain:

Please respond to the following statements by choosing the
best answer:
4g. The concerns of my organization have been adequately
taken into account in the current dispersant use planning process :
1. strongly agree (15 pts)
2. agree (10 pts)
3 . disagree (5 pts. )
4. strongly disagree (0 pts. )
4h. The concerns of my organization in terms of dispersant use
and protecting the marine environment will be adequately
represented by state or other officials at the time of a spill.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (l0 pts.)
3. disagree (5 pts. )
4 . strongly disagree (0 pts.)
4i. My organization IS satisfied with the opportunity it has to
provide input with regard to when and where dispersants should be
used.
1. strongly agree (15 pts.)
2. agree (10 pts. )
3. disagree (5 pts)
4. strongly di sagree (0 pt s.)
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4j. It may be necessary for my organization to express its
views on dispersant use during an actual spill in order to protect the
marine environment and/or the public interest.
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree

Name of Respondent:
Position in organization:
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Questionnaire:

Industry Groups

Introduction:

Hello, my name is Tina Burke and I am a graduate
student at the University of Rhode Island. I am currently conducting
research on the involvement of interest groups in oil spill response
and planning, specifically regarding the use of dispersants. May I
please speak with someone who could talk to me about your
company 's oil spill response planning activities, and its views on
dispersant use for oil spill response.
If you don't mind, I would like ask you some questions on this
subject in the form of a survey. The interview will last only 5
minutes, okay?

IF NO: May I please schedule a time to call you to conduct this
interview? Your input is important for the validity of my research
and will also help to identify how controversial response
technologies, such as dispersants, may be better used in the future.
THE SURVEY

1.

TOPIC:

Company's involvement in Area Contingency Planning .

As you may well know, since the passage of the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, entities called Area Committees have been formed to
develop appropriate response strategies for oil spills around the
country .
1 a.

Do members of your company participate in the oil
response planning activities of any of these Area
Committees?
1. Yes
2. No - WHY?

IF NO:

How does your company's input on how best to respond
to an oil spill become included in these contingency
plans?
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II. TOPIC:

Dispersants as an oil spill response method.

Please respond to the following statements by choosing the
best answer.
2a. Dispersants:
1. remove oil from the water VIa a chemical
reaction;
2. break up surface oil slicks into tiny
droplets which spread out in the upper
water column; or
3. remove oil from the water's surface by
causing it to sink.
2b.

1.

2.
3.

4.

2c.

Please choose the statement which most closely accords
with your company's feelings on dispersant use for
offshore oil spills.
Dispersants are toxic to manne life and should never be
used. (0 pts.)
Dispersants are toxic to manne life and should rarely be
used. (5 pts. )
Dispersant use involves trade-off's but can rmrnmize the
ecological damage of oil spills in certain situations. (10 pts.)
Dispersants are extremely useful and should be considered
as a first response option for the majority of significant
oil spills. (15 pts .)
My company seeks to
1. encourage dispersant use (15 pts.)
2.
encourage carefu I consideration before
dispersants are used; or (7 .5 pts.)
3. discourage any use of dispersants for
oil spill response (0 pts.)

2d. My company is familiar with the dispersant use policies
currently being developed for response to oil spills off the coasts of
the United States.
1. Yes

2. No
3.

Other - explain:
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2e. Members of my company have participated in the planning
process to determine when and where dispersants should be used in
various areas around the country.
1. Yes
2. No
IF YES:

2ee.

Has being involved in this planning changed your
company's view with regard to the usefulness of
dispersants? EXPLAIN:

IF NO: 2eee. WHY?

2f. The views and concerns of my company with regard to
dispersant use have been adequately taken into account in the
current dispersant use plans
1. strongly agree
2. agree
3. disagree
4. strongly disagree
2g. My company is
provide input with regard
be used.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Respondent:
Position in the company:

satisfied with the opportunity it has to
to when and where dispersants should
strongly agree
agree
di sagree
strongly disagree
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Calf

Sheet.

Interest
and

Group Participation jn QjJ
Dispersant Use Planning

Spill

Response

Area:
Organization:
Phone Number:
Point of Contact:

Contact Attempt
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Notes:

Date/Time
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

!
I
I
I
I

Disposition Code
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List

of

Survey

Subjects

1. Maine/New Hampshire Area
A. Completed Telephone Questionnaire
1. Friends of Casco Bay
Cheryl Seavie/Joe Payne
(207)799-8574
2. Maine Marine Mammal
Dennis Dorsey, Director
(207) 883-4562
3.

Sierra Club, Maine
Joan Sacks, Director
(207) 871-8254

Rescue

Chapter

4. Quoddy Spill Prevention
Steve Crawford, President
(207) 853-6238

Group

5. The Nature Conservancy, Maine
Jim Dow, Field Representative
(207) 374-2998
6.

Center

Chapter

Maine Lobstermen's Association
Patton White, Executive Director
(207) 363-6783

B. Survey Not Applicable (screened out)

1. Maine Association
(207) 622-5330
2. Maine Audubon
(207) 781-2330
3. Maine Marine
(207) 443-6222
4.

of

Conservation

Society

Alliance

Natural Resource
(207) 622-3101

Council

of

Maine
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C. Unable to Reach by Telephone

1. Maine Marine
(207) 865-4575

II. Massach usetts

Trades

Association

Area

A. Completed Telephone Questionnaire
1.

Massachusetts Audubon Society
Robert Buschbaum, Coastal Ecologist
(508) 927-1122

2. The Massachusetts Lobstermen
Bill Adler, Executive Director
(617) 545-6984
3. Salem Sound 2000
Sam Cleaves , Program Coordinator
(508) 741-7900
4. Save the Bay/Baywatch
Bruce Berman, Baykeeper
(617) 451 -2860
5. The New England Aquarium
Maggie Mooney-Seus, Con servation Department
(617) 973-5229
6. Massach usetts Cetacea n R esea rc h
Mason Weinrich, Executive Director
(508) 281 -6351
7.

Un it

Massachusetts Public Interest Research
Paul Burns, Director of Toxics Program
(617) 292-4800

B. Survey Not Applicable (screened out)

1. Conservation Law
(617) 350-0990

Foundation

Group
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C. Unable to Reach by Telephone

1. The American
(508) 457-1499

Littoral

Society

2. Sierra Club, Massachusetts
(617) 227-5539
3. Gloucester Fish
(508) 283-0857

Chapter

Commission

4. New England Gillnetters
(508) 922-3941
D. Refused Telephone Survey

1. The Nature Conservancy
(617) 423-2545

2. G r e en pea c e
(617) 266-0098/2021
III.

Rhode Island Area
A. Completed Telephone Questionnaire

1. Save the Bay/Baykeeper
John Torgan, Baykeeper
(401) 272-3540

2. Atlantic

Offshore

Fishermen's

Association

Richard Allen, Vice President

(401) 783-9977

3. Association

for

the

Preservation

Susan Kadar, President

(508) 289-2329

4. Coalition

for

Buzzard's

Bay

Mimi McConnell, Executive Director

(508) 759-1440

of Cape

Cod
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5. The Offshore Mariner's Association
Howard Nickerson, Executive Director
(508 ) 990-1377
B. Survey Not Applicable (screened out)

1. Point Judith Fishermen's
(401) 782-1500

Cooperative

IV. Long Island Sound Area
A . Completed Telephone Questionnaire

1. Long Island Sound Lobstermen's
John German, Sr., President
(516) 286-3335

Association

2. The Nature Conservancy, CT Chapter
Leslie Corey, Jr., Executive Director
(203) 344-0716
3. The Connecticut
Mylin Bull
(203) 259-6305

Environmental

4. The Southern New England
Arthur Madeiras, President
(203) 535-3150

Caucus

Fishermen's

B . Survey Not Applicable (screened out)

1. Long Island Sound
(203) 327-9786

Task

2. Connecticut Citizen's
(203) 561-6006

Action

C. Unable to Reach by Telephone

1. Sounds

Conservancy,

2.

Against

People

Force

Inc.

Pollution

Group

Association
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3.

Friends of the Bay
(212) 206-11 06

4. The Long

Island
(800) 933-7686

Sound

Keeper

V. New YorklNew Jersey Area
A. Completed Telephone Survey
1. New

York Harbor Baykeeper/American
Society
Andy Willner, Baykeeper
(908) 291-0176

2. Natural Resources Defense Council
Nina Sankovitch, Consulting Attorney
(212) 724-4329
3. New York City Audubon
Peter Mott, President
(718) 543-5000

Society

4. Clean Ocean Action
Cindy Ziph, Executive Director
(908) 872-0111
C. Unable to Reach by Telephone

1. Hudson

River

Fis h ermen' s

VI. Industry Groups
1. Sun

Transport
Tom Crawford
(610) 859-1004

2. Exxon
Dave Whims, Response Advisor
(713) 656-9905
3. Shell
Jay Lumbert/Dr. James Beela

Associ ati on

Littoral
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(713) 241-2666
4. Texaco
Mark Weller, Manager, Worldwide Emergency Response
(914) 838-7254

5. Mobile
Robert Leary, Coordinator, Crisis Response Planning
(703) 846-2761

6. OMI Corp.
Dick Holuska, Vice President of Safety Quality and Risk Mgt.
(212) 986-1960
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ABSTRACT

Dumping of wastes into the ocean has gone on for years
especially in the New York Bight.

The National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is mandated by Title II of
the Ocean Dumping Act of 1972 to investigate the effects of
ocean dumping on the marine environment.

However, there is

a perception within Congress, the public and other agencies
that NOAA is not meeting it's responsibilities with regard
to ocean dumping research.
The effectiveness of NOAA's ocean dumping policies and
programs and the difficulties in implementation experienced
by the agency are evaluated by applying George Edwards'
theory of policy implementation.

According to this theory,

four factors - communications, resources, dispositions and
bureaucratic structure - are critical in understanding the
implementation process.

In this case study, NOAA's present

lack of participation in the ocean dumping issue can be
analyzed by examining the historical events of the past
twenty years as they apply to the policy implementation
theory.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Dumping of wastes into the ocean has gone on for years
especially in the New York Bight.

The National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), as the federal
government's primary source of data and information
concerning problems of the ocean and atmosphere, has a
responsibility to investigate man's introduction of wastes
into the marine environment.

This has been mandated not

only in the agency's mission' but also by Title II of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972. 2
However, perceptions within Congress, the pUblic, other
agencies and within NOAA itself are that NOAA is not meeting
its responsibilities with regard to ocean dumping research.
There are three major questions that arise in this
discussion.
shaped?

How have NOAA's ocean dumping pOlicies been

What difficulties have arisen in the implementation

of those research policies?

Finally, how have these

difficulties shaped NOAA's present role in the ocean dumping
situation?

As the science of ocean dumping evolved and

impacted the regulatory process, confusion was created as to
NOAA's role in both processes.

This paper, therefore, will

examine NOAA's policies (science or regulatory?) and the
resultant implementation by using a theory developed by
George Edwards in his book Implementing Public Policy.3

Edwards believes that four factors influence effective
policy development and implementation.

These are

communications, resources, dispositions and bureaucratic
structure.

This study of NOAA will examine the scientific

and historical events relating to ocean dumping as they
apply to the above factors in the context of Edwards'
theory.

The format of this paper will include a discussion

of Edwards' theory followed by an overview of ocean dumping
and the historical events that shaped NOAA's policies.
Finally, the development and implementation of NOAA's
policies will be analyzed using each of Edwards'

factors as

they apply to this case stUdy.

NOTES
1. Robert G. Fleagle, "NOAA's Role and the National Interest",
Science. Technology and Human Values, Vol. II, John Wiley and Sons,
Spring 1986
2. Public Law 92-532: Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
Act of 1972" (hereafter "Ocean Dumping Act")
Public
Policy,
3.
Geo rg e
C.
Edwards
III ,
=I.:.:m::..l:po.::l::.;e::.m=eo=.n:...:t::.:l~·n=q_--=--===-=_--=--=-=:::.=.:.......
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980 (hereafter, "Edwards") .

2

CHAPTER II
OCEANOGRAPHIC AND DUMPSITE BACKGROUND

A discussion of ocean dumping cannot be complete
without a basic description of the oceanographic
characteristics of the New York Bight and the dumpsites
contained within it.

Although the Bight is a receptacle for

the disposal of dredge spoils, construction debris (commonly
called cellar dirt) and industrial wastes, for purposes of
this discussion ocean dumping refers only to sewage sludge
generated by municipal sewage treatment plants and dumped at
the 12 and 106-Mile dumpsites.

The New York Bight and 12-Mile Dumpsite
The New York Bight extends from Delaware Bay to the
eastern end of Long Island and out to the 200 meter depth
contour.

The Bight's apex, where since 1924 most of the

ocean dumping has taken place, is an area bounded to the
south by 40° north latitude, to the east by 73°15' west
longitude, on the north by the Long Island shore, and on the
west by the New Jersey shore. 1

until 1986 when the phase-

in of sludge dumping at the 106-mile site began, all of the
sewage sludge generated by New York city and surrounding
municipalities was dumped at the 12-mile dumpsite. 2

This

area (Fig. 1) is located twelve miles east of Sandy Hook,
New Jersey on the east slope of the Christiaensen Basin in
3

relatively shallow water (less than 25 fathoms).
Circulation of the water in this portion of the inner
New York Bight is strongly influenced by that of the whole
Bight (Montauk Pt. to Cape May)

and by that of the Middle

Atlantic Bight (Nantucket Shoals to cape Hatteras).
However, there are some local influences which have
significant effects on the circulation, principally the
bathymetric configuration of this corner of the Bight and
the flow from the Hudson-Raritan estuary.3
Water mass properties of this portion of the Bight are
influenced by circulation, weather and effluent reaching the
coastal marine waters.

Besides the dumping of wastes,

contaminants enter the water column by way of estuarine
effluents and atmospheric fallout. 4

The 106-Mile Dumpsite
The 106-mile dumpsite is a deep ocean dumpsite located
between 38°40 'N to 39°00 'N and 72°00'W to 72°30W or
approximately 106 mile southeast of Sandy Hook, New Jersey
(Fig. 1).

The site is seaward of the continental shelf

break and water depths range from 1000 to 1400 fathoms.
site was used predominantly for dumping of acid and
alkaline-based industrial wastes from 1961 to 1987. 5
Presently, no industrial concerns hold permits for
industrial waste dumping.

As of December 1987 all sewage

sludge originally dumped at the 12-mile site began to be
4

The

dumped at the l06-mile site. 6
Oceanographic conditions at the l06-mile site are
variable, depending upon the water mass occupying the site.
Slope water is the predominant water mass, however, shelf
water incursions do occur, especially in the spring when
fresh water runoff and wind forcing cause offshore movement
of the shelf/slope front.

Northward meandering of the Gulf

Stream can cause Gulf Stream water to invade the site
although this phenomenon is rare.

More commonly, warm core

rings may traverse the region from northeast to southwest,
aperiodically bringing strong currents and Gulf Stream or
Sargasso Sea water to the site.?
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Bulletin 18: 1987 pp.278-280
3.
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Kenneth W. Barton, "Report of Water Masses Receiving Wastes
from Ocean Dumping at the 106-mile Dumpsi te: October 1, 1986
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CHAPTER III
PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION THEORY

Edwards describes public policy implementation as the
stage of policyrnaking between establishment of a policy and
the consequences of the policy for the people it affects'.
If the objective of a policy is to alleviate a problem and
the results are unsuccessful it may be a fault of either the
policy or the implementation of that policy.
both.

Often it is

In the case of ocean dumping, the establishment of

policy culminated in the passage of the Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (also known as the
Ocean Dumping Act) and the enactment of the related
regulations.

While Congress had originally intended to

phase out ocean dumping in five years, the difficulties
faced by NOAA, as the science agency, and EPA, as the
regulatory agency, in the implementation of that policy may
have contributed to the continuation of ocean dumping
today.2
The four factors Edwards believes influence effective
policy and implementation are communication, resources,
dispositions and bureaucratic structure and each are
discussed below.

8

COMMUNICATIONS
The first requirement for effective policy
implementation is ensuring that those who are to carry out
policy know what they are supposed to do.

This might entail

Congress passing laws that are clear in their intent so that
misunderstandings by the implementors are avoided.
Similarly, this same type of clarity of communication is
important within the confines of an agency or office.
Disagreements and misunderstandings about policies can lead
to distortion of communications within all levels of
government.

Lack of clarity in policymaking can also result

from ambiguous court decisions, public opposition, competing
goals and unfamiliarity with new programs.

All these

factors can upset communications and in turn restrict
implementation. 3
Decentralization of bureaucracy often leads to
communication difficulties.

The more steps there are in the

implementation process, the more likely it is that the
policy will be watered down. 4

In the case of ocean

dumping, the 1972 law mandated the involvement of no less
than four federal agencies in the implementation of the
country's first ocean dumping policy.s
Finally, lack of consistency between lawmaking and
subsequent implementation orders can result in confusing
results. 6

Environmental policymaking in the Reagan
9

administration has largely ignored congressional intent,
judicial standards and public preferences. 7

Therefore,

when implementors receive inconsistent instructions, they
will inevitably be unable to meet all the demands made upon
them.

RESOURCES
Implementation orders may be accurately transmitted in
a clear and consistent manner but if implementors lack the
resources to carry out the policies, implementation is
likely to be ineffective.

Resources are traditionally

thought of as funding, staffing and skills8 but as seen in
the case of ocean dumping good information on inputs (i.e.
what and how much is being dumped where)9 is as important a
resource to the decisionmaking process.

Unfortunately, the

four limiting resources are often interrelated.

Without

enough staff or funding an agency cannot acquire the
necessary information to accurately implement policy.

The

ability of NOAA to supply this needed resource is the major
question of this section.
Because of the complexities involved in the bUdgetary
and personnel processes of the government I intend to
briefly touch on this aspect of the resource problem as it
relates to policy implementation.

10

DISPOSITIONS
In effective policy implementation, the implementors
must not only know what to do and have the resources
available, they must also have the desire to carry out a
policy.

Differing attitudes and perspectives exist in all

levels of government, from top decisionmakers down to
individual bureaucratic units and these, in turn, affect
policy at various points. 10
Bureaucratic units may disagree over responsibility for
an activity thus hindering implementation.

During the early

years of the ocean dumping controversy the competitive
atmosphere between NOAA and EPA made it difficult for the
two agencies to follow out the mandate set forth in the
Ocean Dumping Act."

Although specific departments within

each agency worked closely and well together (for example
EPA's region II office and NOAA's MESA) there was tension in
Washington as the two agencies competed for the various
responsibilities and limited funds.

12

The mission of a specific agency mandated to carry out
a policy may conflict with that policy.

An example of

dispositional problems can be seen between various
departments within NOAA during the early 1980's when NOAA
ocean dumping policy changed from protection of the ocean to
a belief that under certain circumstances, ocean dumping was
a viable alternative to the sewage sludge disposal issue. 13
11

BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE
The prominent characteristics of bureaucracies, namely
standard operating procedures (SOP's) and fragmentation, are
seen by Edwards as possible deterrents to effective policy
implementation.

SOP's are defined as routines to help

public officials to make numerous everyday decisions.
However, SOP's can inhibit change and are often obstacles to
action.

Fragmentation is described as the dispersion of

responsibility for a policy area among several
organizational units.

It can lead to diffusion of

responsibility and can make coordination of policies
d i.f f Lcu l t.c

!"

In the context of NOAA's involvement in the ocean
dumping issue, the inherent problems of bureaucratic
structure have played a significant role.

From the Marine

Ecosystem Analysis project (MESA) to the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), the fragmentation of NOAA has
contributed to its inability to meet its responsibilities.
Similarly, interagency problems existed between NOAA and EPA
as both agencies struggled with the difficulties of a new
po Li cy

i

P

12
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CHAPTER IV
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Public policies result from sequences of decisions
based on political decisions and legislative mandates often
as a result of social and executive pressure.

Environmental

policymaking is not only governed by those factors, but by
natural and man-induced events and by scientific findings.
In examining NOAA's ocean dumping policies it can be shown
that all of the above factors have either contributed to or
inhibited the implementation of that policy'.

This chapter

discusses, chronologically, the significant events that have
shaped NOAA's policies in preparation for the analysis of
implementation processes in the following chapter.

The Early 1970's
In the late 1960's an increasing awareness of the need
to strengthen the federal government's marine biological and
technological capabilities led to a presidential commission
recommending a unified agency to oversee the oceans and
atmosphere. 2

NOAA was formed by executive order in 1970 by

President Richard Nixon 3 and encompassed such agencies as
the National Weather Service, Coast and Geodetic Survey,
Bureau of Sport Fishing and Wildlife (parts of which were

14

incorporated into the National Marine Fisheries Service) and
others.
NOAA was barely a year old when furor over a report on
conditions of the New York Bight thrust the agency into the
public eye.

The paper, called the "Sandy Hook Report" was

prepared for the u.S. Corps of Engineers by the Sandy Hook
Marine Laboratory to examine the effects of dredge spoil and
sewage sludge dumping in the inner New York Bight.

The

results of the study showed that conditions in the Bight
were polluted enough that no macrofauna could exist in
dumpsite areas (including both sewage sludge and dredge
spoil areas) 4 and that a "dead sea"s had been created in
the area.

Disagreements ensued between agencies,

politicians and the public over the significance of the
report and the actual degradation of the Bight and created
controversy that led to congressional investigations and new
Leq i.s La t.Lon",

During this same period the Food and Drug
Administration banned shellfishing in the inner New York
Bight (Fig. 2).

The FDA's decision was based on total and

fecal coliform bacteria levels which exceeded those
recommended by the Federal Water Pollution Control
Administration for estuarine waters used for shellfish
harvesting and cUltivation?

These findings were in part

taken from the "Sandy Hook Report' and from other studies
done by the Sandy Hook Lab.
15
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Fig. 2.

Location of the 12-mile sewage sludge
dumpsite, dredge materials dumpsite and
area closed to commercial shellfishing
in 1970 in the NY Bight8
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In response to the ongoing controversy in the New York
Bight and in recognition of the global impacts of ocean
disposal of wastes, the President's Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) issued it's 1970 report, "Ocean Dumping: A
National Policy,,9.

This report stated "[i]f no action is

taken and ocean dumping continues to increase, the long term
damage to the marine environment will be great.

11'0

These

strong words not only set the tone for the national policy
of the early 1970's, they also embodied the growing belief
at the time that the oceans were to be protected and that
dumping was a temporary stop-gap measure to be eliminated as
rapidly as possible".
As a direct result of the CEQ Report Congress enacted
The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972
(MPRSA).

The Ocean Dumping Act, as it is more commonly

referred to, in Title I directed the Environmental
Protection Agency and Corps of Engineers to establish and
implement regulatory programs for ocean dumping.

Title II

required EPA and NOAA to conduct comprehensive research and
monitoring regarding the effects of ocean dumping and to
investigate and study alternative disposal methods'z.

The

agencies were also to determine methods of minimizing or
ending as soon as possible the ocean disposal of any
"material which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment,
ecological systems, or economic potentialities .... ,,'3.
17

Already recognizing the need to study the effects of
human interference in marine environments, NOAA had created
the Marine Ecosystem Analysis Project (MESA) in early 1973.
The program's goals were 1) to establish an environmental
baseline, 2)

to monitor, predict, and support efforts to

control conditions that degrade the environment and 3) to
alert responsible officials of the onset of environmental
change 14 •

The New York Bight was selected for MESA's five

year pilot program because of i t 1s acute environmental
problems but was considered independent of NOAA's
requirements under Title II of the Ocean Dumping Act 15 •
Other areas such as Prince William Sound and Puget Sound
were considered as likely sites for MESA studies after the
completion of the pilot program 16 •
Not only a scientific data collection and analysis
program, the MESA/New York Bight Project also provided
funding for other research that would identify and answer
pertinent environmental questions about the New York Bight.
More importantly, perhaps, the Project was responsible for
the synthesis of the available information about the Bight,
putting it into a form that could be used by those
developing policy and regulations.

The original intent of

the project was to focus on the Bight as an ecosystem, that
is, look at physical and biological processes and
anthropogenic effects on those processes.

Ocean dumping was

seen as only one aspect of the Bight's dynamics 1?
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In 1973 all this changed.

Dr. William H. Harris, a

geochemist from Brooklyn College announced findings that
sewage sludge dumped at the 12-mile site was, over the three
years of his study, working it's way inshore toward Long
Island beaches 18 •

National interest was sparked by

newspaper articles describing an uninterested and
unconcerned EPA and threats of a IIsludge monster ll defiling
Long Island's south shore beaches 19.
In the middle of all this controversy was NOAA's MESA
program.

Dr. Larry Swanson, director of the MESA program,

testified at an EPA pUblic hearing that there were
potentially deleterious effects from sewage sludge and
indicated an "urgency and importance [in] determining more
accurately the extent of sludge contamination, the oceanic
factors influencing sludge movement, and the extent to which
sludge is impacting or jeopardizing marine life and
beaches.

1120

His conclusion, though, regarding likelihood

of sewage sludge migration of towards shore, was
understandably vague due to the fact that there was little
information available at that time to make any jUdgments 21 •
These determinations, arguably inconclusive, were used by
both EPA and the opponents of ocean dumping to argue their
respective cases and brought NOAA into odds with both
factions.

As a result of it's role as "scientific expert",

and with the increased congressional and media attention,
NOAA was forced to place more focus on the NY Bight project
19

sewage sludge work and less on the original intent of the
MESA program 22 •
In response to the increased controversy and negative
scientific data EPA decided that sludge should be dumped
further offshore.

In 1974, NOAA was called upon to find two

possible sites and reluctantly examined sites between 28 and
70 miles offshore.

Eventually NOAA decided upon one 60

miles offshore although it was never considered by NOAA to
be a viable alternative to the 12-mile site.

EPA

established a deadline of July 1976 for cessation of dumping
at the 12-mile site and earlier if the findings of Dr.
Harris were proven true.

All dumping would be moved to the

60-mile site until December 1981 at which time all dumping
would cease.

NOAA continued to oppose EPA's decisions

regarding the offshore site and when MESA was able to prove
that sludge was not, in fact, migrating shoreward, EPA
rescinded it's plans for the alternate sites.

By now it was

clear NOAA's findings and decisions had become integral in
shaping EPA's policies and regulations and in congressional
and public investigations into the ocean dumping issue 23 •
Renewed controversy erupted in 1976 after a series of
"floatable" incidents fouled the Long Island south shore.
The resultant beach closures fueled pUblic outrage and
required the New York Bight project to once again respond to
heightened media and political attention.

These episodes

were quickly attributed to a series of isolated events in
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Bight area and within seven months an in-depth analysis was
available to the public.

This quick response was credited

to the directed attention of the NY Bight Project and it's
growing understanding of the complexities of the New York
Bight~.

The second incident of the summer of 1976 illustrated
that there was still much to learn about the processes at
work in the region.

A massive fish kill along the New

Jersey coast clearly identified the potential impact of
human interference in the marine environment.

The event

offered the NY Bight Project the opportunity to study oxygen
depletion conditions and raised difficult scientific
questions regarding anthropogenic versus natural occurrences
of this type.

While this large scale event was determined

to be of natural origins, similar pollution-related smaller
scale events illustrated the risks to the Bight.

Subsequent

MESA reports contributed greatly to the understanding of
oxygen depletion conditions. 25

1977 to 1981
The year 1977 was a confusing yet significant time for
the formulation and implementation of NOAA ocean dumping
policy.

For five years (since the 1972 passage of the Ocean

Dumping Act) NOAA's ocean dumping programs had remained
unfunded.

All work was carried out under other programs and

authorizations.

Finally, NOAA's FY 1977 bUdget included
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approximately $1.4 million dollars for ocean dumping
research and monitoring 26 •

with this funding NOAA

established the Ocean Dumping Program whose vague goals were
to assist EPA by providing data for dumpsite analysis and
support of that agency's regulatory process as mandated by
Title II of the Ocean Dumping Act 27 •

This department was a

separate entity from the MESA/NY Bight Program.
NOAA ocean dumping research continued in the NY Bight in
1977.

MESA/NY Bight Project findings indicated little

improvement would result in the Bight if ocean dumping were
stopped, especially if no action took place to control other
pollutants input.

It also strongly opposed any movement of

sludge dumping to another continental shelf site but
considered the 106-mile site suitable for emergency dumping.
(This actually took place in 1977 and 1978 when Camden, New
Jersey was forced to dispose of its sludge at the offshore
site.)

Another branch of NOAA, the National Ocean Service

(NOS), had been conducting surveys at the 106-mile site to
determine baseline environmental conditions since industrial
wastes had been dumped there for years and little was known
about the area 28 •
Concern was growing about the likelihood of actually
"getting out of the ocean" since the search for viable
alternatives to ocean dumping was proving fruitless.

NOAA

was not involved in research into alternatives since most
were land-based and fell under EPA's purview.
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Even though

the 1977 amendments to the Ocean Dumping Act reaffirmed
congressional intent to end ocean dumping that unreasonably
degraded the marine environment by December 1981, the once
protectionist attitude of the government as a result of a
strict interpretation of the law was now in a state of
reappraisal.

A change in the research focus at the 106-mile

site in 1977 and 1978 illustrated these changing attitudes.
Baseline environmental studies were replaced by
investigations into broader use of the site for ocean
disposal~.

The Ocean Dumping Act's call for "off-the-

shelf sites whenever possible ll provided a mandate for this
action and a possible viable alternative to the 12-mile
site.

Concern within the Congress and the scientific

community over the unknowns of dumping in the deeper ocean
were outweighed by the known deterioration of the inshore
dumpsites and the resultant desire to end the contribution
to that degradation.

EPA's new permit renewal process

reflected this change in policy by allowing continued ocean
dumping based on need, status of available alternatives and
an acceptable plan for phase-out within the time frame of
the law.

NOAA's 1977 policy, although still in a state of

flux, was modified to parallel these changes:
"1.
It is NOAA policy to oppose ocean disposal of
sewage sludge; the agency endorses EPA's policy to
terminate this dumping by 1981.
2. NOAA shall continue to oppose moving the existing
sewage sludge dumpsite in the New York Bight on the
basis that to date we have developed no conclusive
evidence that dumping at that site has resulted in
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threat to public health or a danger to local beaches.
However, as dumping at that location continues, such a
threat could materialize, necessitating rapid
relocation.
We believe that the problem of sewage
sludge dumping in the New York Bight should be resolved
in the framework of the Interstate Sanitation
Commission's Sewage Sludge Disposal Management Plan.
However, in the event EPA makes the decision to move
that dumpsite, and the choices are either DWD-106 or
the 6o-mile site, then NOAA favors the use of DWD-106
in order to avoid despoiling a new area.
3. NOAA will not oppose any interim permits issued
by EPA to allow dumping of sewage sludge at DWD-106 on
a temporary basis by the cities of Philadelphia or
Camden in order to allow those municipalities time to
develop their rcroposed land-based disposal
al ternatives. " a
All of these changes, though, were still governed by the
December 1981 deadline.

The use of the oceans for dumping

of certain substances was only seen as the best disposal
option for the immediate future.
The passage in 1978 of the National Ocean Pollution
Planning Act (NOPPA) mandated the establishment of NOAA's
National Marine Pollution Program .

The focus of this new

program was to:
- prepare and update every three years a comprehensive
five-year plan for the overall Federal effort in ocean
pollution research, development,and monitoring (Section
4) ;

- provide financial assistance for such activities if
they received high priority in the five-year plan and
are not being addressed adequately by any existing
Federal programs (Section 6);
- establish a comprehensive, coordinated, and effective
ocean pollution research, development, and monitoring
program (Section 5) ;
- insure that results, findings, and monitoring
programs are disseminated in a timely manner and useful
form to Federal and user groups having an interest in
24

such information (section 8)
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Programs such as the status and Trends Program, National
Shellfish Register and Consequences of Contaminants Program
emerged later as a result of this legislation.

All had

similar goals as the original MESA program but with more
directed objectives.

While the MESA/NY Bight Project

continued to address the very specific issues of ocean
dumping in the New York Bight this legislation intended to
bring a more national focus to NOAA ocean pollution
research, development, and monitoring programs 32 •

The

NOPPA legislation also resulted in the establishment of the
Office of Marine Pollution Assessment (OMPA) at NOAA
headquarters in Rockville, Maryland.

The goals of this

program were the same as the legislation and brought NOAA in
line with the new law.

Since ocean dumping was included,

the Ocean Dumping Program was incorporated into this
department.
In September 1979, the NY Bight Project field
operations ended after almost seven years, two years longer
than the

original intent.

In that time, though, the

program was responsible for collecting more information
about the New York Bight than any other program of its type.
It contributed greatly to the establishment of federal ocean
dumping policy and regulations and was highly regarded for
it's research results regarding both ocean dumping and other
environmental processes at work in the New York Bight 33 •
25

With the end of the NY Bight Project NOAA transferred
the MESA program to NOAA headquarters under OMPA.

In 1981

the MESA program officially ended and it's responsibilities
and mission objectives were absorbed into OMPA.

No other

estuaries were studied by this program as had been
originally envisioned when MESA was formed in 1973.

During

this same period, NOAA administrator, John Byrne, attempted
to move the Ocean Dumping Program to Seattle, Washington, a
move that was presented as an attempt to strengthen NOAA's
pollution programs in the northwest. congressional
disapproval prevented it from happening and later that year,
OMPA was reorganized into Ocean Assessments Division (OAD) ,
a department that continues today (Fig. 4)

.34

Two events in 1981 contributed significantly to the
future direction of federal and program ocean dumping
policies.

The first was the National Committee on Oceans

and Atmosphere (NACOA) report titled "The Role of the Ocean
in a Waste Management Strategy".

The report recommended a

"multimedia" approach to the disposal of wastes with an
emphasis on a determination of costs versus benefit or risk.
The report specifically recommended that EPA reverse its
policy that no ocean dumping permit be issued when a landbased alternative exists.

It went on to say that ocean

dumping by barge or outfall should be allowed to continue in
areas where no unreasonable degradation has resulted if
appropriate conditions existed and there was adherence to
26
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adequate safeguards and monitoring practices.

It advised

EPA to consider the cost and feasibility of land-based
alternatives versus those of ocean disposal and determine
the relative risk of either to the degradation of the
environment and to human health.

This report, therefore,

encouraged policy and management decisions be made in the
context of risk assessment and with a less strict
interpretation of the applicable laws36 •
The second event of 1981 responsible for a change in
policy was the judicial decision made by Federal Judge
Abraham Sofaer in CITY OF NEW YORK v. EPA. 37

Since 1973,

New York city's sewage sludge had failed to meet EPA's
environmental impact criteria for a special permit to be
disposed of at sea.

This was because the levels of PCB's,

hydrocarbons, and other pollutants exceeded EPA standards.
New York city had, nevertheless, been dumping using an
interim special permit which allows waste to be dumped at
sea even though it violates the criteria for the special
permit and if there is no land-based alternative for
disposal.

In 1980 EPA denied New York's application for an

interim permit based on the new stricter regulations imposed
since 1977.

In response, New York challenged EPA's interim

permit process and evaluation criteria.

The final court

decision was in favor of New York city, stating that EPA's
criteria for determining whether New York's ocean dumping
would unreasonably degrade the marine environment,
28

ecological systems and economic potentialities was
"arbitrary and capricious"~.

The decision further stated

that the EPA must consider equally the nine statutory
criteria used to evaluate all permit applications.
Essentially, the include the environmental effect of the
proposed dumping, the need for a permit, the availability
and potential impact of alternative methods of disposal and
the effect of the proposed action on aesthetic, recreational
and economic values.~
The presumed desire of the Ocean Dumping Act was to
protect the oceans from increased degradation as a result of
ocean disposal of waste.

It also intended that EPA be

delegated broad discretion in its duty to prevent and
strictly regulate ocean dumping 4o •

The results of this

court case and the decision by EPA not to appeal Judge
Sofaer's rUling, while betraying the original intent of the
Ocean Dumping Act, more importantly, perhaps, contributed to
an emerging national policy, one of non-preferentia l
treatment of the ocean as a waste disposal medium 4 1 •

1982-1988
The new attitudes towards ocean dumping, brought about
by the events of the previous three years, were accompanied
by increased activity in research and policy-making.

EPA

extended dumping at the 12-mile site for New York City and
six New York and New Jersey municipalities.
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NOAA-sponsored

research at the 106-mile site indicated the environmental
feasibility of dumping sewage sludge there.

Finally, some

cities (Boston, Baltimore and Washington, D.C) were
exploring the possibility of the disposal of their wastes at
sea 42 •
In May 1983, NOAA, in a major shift of policy, issued
this statement:
"Waste disposal practices should be chosen to avoid
significant risk of harm to living and nonliving
resources in any environmental medium - oceans, land,
fresh water, and air.
If it is determined that
disposal is the preferred option to a potential waste
problem, then disposal practices likely to cause least
risk of significant harm regardless of medium should be
chosen. NOAA does not oppose selection of the ocean as
a disposal site if comparative assessment of all
reasonable disposal options indicates that the ocean
option poses the least risk of significant harm.
If
disposal in the ocean is currently causing or
contributing to conditions that cause significant risk
of harm to the marine environment, NOAA urges the
timely assessment of alternative disposal practices and
the selection of an environmentally acceptable
practice. "43
This mirrored the already growing trend to include the
oceans in a waste management strategy, exactly as the NACOA
report had suggested44 •
During the same time , at a congressional hearing, NOAA
testified as to the desirability of moving dumping from the
12-mile to the 106-mile dumpsite.

In the past, NOAA had

maintained a policy that little recovery of the 12-mile site
would be observed unless the input of other pollutants was
to be halted.

Moving dumping out of the 12-mile site was

considered unwise if it meant compromising another area.
30

However, new data had been collected that indicated that it
was environmentally feasible to dump sewage sludge at the
deeper dumpsite.

These included:

- dumped sewage sludge could be diluted by a factor of
10 4 within a few minutes and 105 within a day;
- laboratory and field experiments do not find
significant low level effects at these concentrations;
- there would be negligible benthic effects;
- the concentration and distribution of contaminants
would not be such as to cause much accumulation in
migratory or residence fish, although a few
contaminants
(e.g. PCBs) in sewage sludge probably
contribute to bioaccumulation; and
- there would be no apparent threat to human health. 45
NOAA testified that it's newest policy, based on the above
information, meant that it not only favored use of the deep
water site over the 60-mile site (EPA had begun to consider
this site again) it also favored it above the 12-mile
site~.

From 1983 to 1985 investigations into transferring
sewage sludge disposal to the 106-mile site continued.

The

result was that in April 1985 EPA issued a final denial of
petitions to re-designate the 12-mile site along with a
request that the nine municipalities still dumping at the
12-mile site transfer their operations to the 106-mile site.
The principal factor in this decision was that if dumping at
the 12-mile site were to continue in the manner that would
meet the limited permissible concentrations requirements it
had the potential for creating navigational hazards.
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In

addition, it was shown that the primary source for sewagerelated contaminants found in the Christiansen Basin and
ocean floor north of the site to within five nautical miles
south of Long Island was a result of ocean dumping of sludge
at the inshore site.

Along with the continued closure of

shell fishing beds in the area, increased levels above the
normal ambient levels of heavy metals and halogenated
hydrocarbons were observed at the site.

An orderly 1 1/2

year phase-out schedule was negotiated with the dumpers the
controlling factor being the lack of ocean-going barges
necessary for transport of the sludge to the offshore site
required a 1 1/2 year step-wise schedule 47 •

Completion of

the change-over to the 106-mile site was accomplished on
December 31, 1987.
Since early 1988, controversy has once again erupted
over ocean dumping.

Fishermen claim that catch totals are

down and the incidence of disease in shellfish is on the
increase in the northeast as a result of environmental
degradation from dumping at the offshore site.

Coastal

communities are angered over episodes of medical wastes
washing up on the beaches from New Jersey to Rhode Island
and incorrectly blame sewage sludge dumping.

Scientists,

baffled by large-scale occurrences of dolphin deaths along
the Atlantic coast, have looked to the disposal of wastes at
sea as a possible culprit. 48

Finally, as a result of these

events, pUblic outrage has fueled congress into amending,
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once again, the Ocean Dumping Act in an attempt to close the
loopholes that allowed for the continuation of dumping for
the last eight years.

The Present Ocean Dumping situation
The pendulum has, once again, swung back to a policy of
non-use of the oceans for waste disposal.

In response to

the renewed controversy over movement of sludge dumping to
the lOG-Mile site the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988,
actually an amendment to the 1972 Ocean Dumping Act, was
produced, setting a date of December 31, 1991 for the
cessation of ocean disposal of sewage sludge and industrial
wastes.

In particular, this amendment specifically avoided

the controversy surrounding the determination of
"unreasonable degradation" and benefit and risk comparisons
of waste disposal media by banning ocean dumping outright
and making it economically infeasible to continue dumping
much beyond the cutoff date.

The key provisions include:

- No new dumpers of sewage sludge or industrial waste.
- No dumping of sewage sludge or industrial waste
without a permit and compliance or enforcement
agreement.
- Dumping fees imposed starting 270 days from the
enactment of the Act and continuing until December 31,
1991.
- Financial penalties imposed for dumping after 1991.
The fees, which are expected to be considerable, are
divided amongst EPA, NOAA, and the Coast Guard for
33

monitoring, research and surveillance activities.
the fees will go to

Part of

coastal states clean ocean funds and

part will be held in trust to be returned to the dumpers to
support their development of alternatives. Probably the most
important aspect of the legislation lies in the consent
decrees that have been entered into by the dumpers stating
their plans and schedules for implementing alternatives to
ocean sludge disposal, which legally bind them to their own
p Lana ,"?

This brings us to the present.

It is clear that

historical events have been cause for action and reaction by
both policy-makers and implementors.

The following chapter

examines in depth those responses that have affected NOAA's
role, politically and scientifically, as it relates to the
ocean dumping issue.
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CHAPTER V
NOAA POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

Establishment of public policy can be in many forms,
such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuance of an
executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision or
the promulgation of a regulatory rule.
only the first step.

However, that is

Since policies are rarely self-

executing, their implementation is left to government
agencies to establish programs or regulations to carry out
the policy.

Unfortunately, this process is difficult and

the end result may differ greatly from the original intent
of the law or policy.'
The inhibition of effective policy implementation can
be explained by George Edwards theory, as discussed in
Chapter 2.

The four factors that can impede the policy

process are:
1. Communication - Lack of or unclear communication
disrupts policy implementation.
For example,
communication difficulties can result from laws and
judicial decisions that lack clarity. They can exist
between heads of departments and their employees or
between collaborating agencies.
2. Resources - If those responsible for carrying out
policy lack the resources to do so, policy
implementation will suffer.
For this paper, resources
are defined as funding, information, and authority.
3.
Dispositions - In effective policy implementation,
the implementors must have the desire to carry out a
policy.
Disagreements within or between agencies can
disrupt the implementation process.
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4.
Bureaucratic structure - The structure of
bureaucracies, namely standard operating procedures and
fragmentation can constrain implementation by
inhibiting change and diffusing responsibility.
NOAA is the federal government's primary source of data
and information concerning problems of the ocean and
atmosphere.

This section examines the specific issue of

NOAA's involvement in the implementation of ocean dumping
policy and discusses the agency's own implementation process
as it has been shaped by both the intensely controversial
events of the past twenty years and their relation to
Edwards theory.

Policy Implementation DifficUlties in the Early 1970's
The fledgling NOAA, in the midst of administrative
uncertainty, had little or no bureaucratic structure in
place to link the already existing environmental programs
now under it's purview not to mention develop any new
programs.

The ocean dumping issue, both politically and

scientifically challenging, was only one of many faced by
the new agency.
An early example of both dispositional and
communication difficulties surrounding the ocean dumping
issue arose between the Corps of Engineers and the Sandy
Hook Marine Lab over the "Sandy Hook Report" .
Corps commissioned the then

In 1968, the

u .s. Fish and wildlife Service
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Laboratory at Sandy Hook to study the dumpsites in the New
York Bight (the Corps was, at the time, the closest thing to
a coastal ocean agency; its responsibilities included
maintaining the navigability of U.S. waters).

The purpose

of the report, supposedly, was to help the Corps determine
the advisability of continuing dumping operations at the
present disposal site.

The study was to take two years and

was to assess the ecology of the site by performing chemical
analyses of the water and sediments and pelagic and benthic
studies.
The 1970 report indicated that the dumpsite areas were
severely degraded, a fact that, seemingly, the Corps was
unprepared to accept.

Nor was it prepared to deal with the

controversy the report created 2 •

In an attempt to minimize

the negative impact the COE characterized the report as
"tentative, incomplete and subject to change"3.

Further,

in an interview for BIOSCIENCE, Kenneth Osborne, a COE staff
marine biologist, stated that "the competence of Sandy Hook
is only in fishery biological research.

The Corps only

wrote one contract with Sandy Hook .,. they tried their best
hydrographically but what is needed now is the highest type
of physical oceanography."

When asked why the Sandy Hook

Lab was chosen in the first place, he stated "Sandy Hook was
chosen because they had their own vessels and the Corps
would not have to pay for the purchase of such vessels by
another organization.

[The Corps] would only have to pay
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for the cost of using vessels and not the cost of
purchasing. "4

Since no policy existed, either within the

lab or at the federal level, the Sandy Hook Lab could only
react by defending its studies both to the Corps and to an
outraged public (a pattern that has seemed to exist ever
since) .
The above example illustrates how differences in the
organizational viewpoints (dispositions) and unclear
communications can impede effective policy development and
implementation.

Specifically to ocean dumping, however, the

early controversy with the COE (as a result of the report)
contributed to a somewhat defensive posture that was
necessary for NOAA to maintain in regard to it's ocean
dumping research.

The Sandy Hook Lab was a fisheries

biology research facility, wholly interested in the study of
habitat, predation, life cycles and the many other aspects
of marine life.

The Corps' focus was on construction and

maintenance of marine engineering projects and it had little
experience dealing with environmental impacts of these
projects especially ocean dumpsites.
Similarly, it was not surprising that communication
difficulties also would arise between two agencies with
vastly different missions.

Edwards states that one of the

pitfalls of communication is lack of clarity: transmitted
instructions are vague and often do not specify when or how
a program is to be carried outs.
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This also seemed to be

part of the problem between Sandy Hook and the COE.
It is important to note that perhaps these early
events, that is, those prior to the enactment of MPRSA and
the formation of MESA, are less significant to NOAA's
present position in ocean dumping research.

However, these

patterns seem to exist throughout the next twenty years and,
as this paper examines, has contributed to many of NOAA's
problems in effectively contributing to and implementing a
national ocean dumping policy.

Implementation of The Ocean Dumping Act (MPRSA)

1972-1975

The 1970 CEQ report and the escalating controversy over
ocean dumping were, in part, responsible for the passage of
the MPRSA in 1972.

Through this legislation the country had

established a form of national ocean dumping policy.
However, NOAA, whose responsibilities under MPRSA were
significant, had distinct difficulties in those early few
years developing any kind of implementation plan.
To begin with four Federal agencies shared major
responsibilities for the overall implementation of the Ocean
Dumping Act.

Because interagency coordination was seen as

essential to this mission, the Ocean Disposal Program
coordinating Committee was formed in April 1973 and was
comprised of EPA, NOAA, COE and the Coast Guard 6 •

This was

the first attempt to bring together four diverse
bureaucratic units in both an attempt to avoid duplication
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of research effort and, more importantly to encourage a high
order of interaction.

NOAA was charged with heading this

committee since it was also lead agency in the research and
monitoring of ocean dumping.
Unfortunately this well-intentioned effort to combine
forces was a distinct disappointment 7 •

A NOAA evaluation

described the committee as such:
"While the committee has been useful as a forum for the
exchange of ideas and discussion of common problems, it
has met infrequently and the productivity and pace of
the committee have been disappointingly low.
Reliance
on the four-agency committee for speedy resolution of
substantive problems of ocean disposal is simply not
possible. liB
Edwards describes two possible reasons why this
important attempt at cooperative policy implementation did
not work.

First, within most organizational units there is

often a dominant opinion about the organizations primary
mission.

Focus is placed on those functions of primary

interest leaving those considered as secondary functions
with lesser allocations of time and resources.

Secondly,

bureaucratic units often try to achieve autonomy in carrying
out their responsibilities.

For this reason they do not

want to be controlled by officials outside their
organization or to have to coordinate closely with other
organizations. 9
NOAA's attempt to develop it's own program designed to
address the legislative mandates of the Ocean Dumping Act
seemed equally as difficult.

Edwards describes the
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development of new programs:
"Often the passage of a new policy is followed by a
period of administrative uncertainty in which there is
considerable time lag before any information on
program[s] are disseminated. This period is followed
by one in which rules are made but are then changed
quickly as high-level officials attempt to deal with
the unforseen problems of implementing the policy and
of their own earlier directives."'o
For NOAA this process took nearly three years.

In 1975

the agency finally published its program issue paper, the
purpose of which was to:
"1) outline the program being developed under the
requirements of P.L. 92-523 [the Ocean Dumping Act],
Title II;
2) provide support and justification for the FY 77
bUdget request for the ocean dumping program; and
3) identify a number of issues which still require
resolution in further development of the program.""
NOAA admitted in this document that its process was slow in
developing.

The failure of the Ocean Disposal Program

Coordinating Committee to provide coordination between
agencies left NOAA with sole responsibility for determining
areas of duplicative research as well as areas of inquiry
which were not being adequately covered, all necessarily
addressed in the new ocean dumping program.
NOAA interpreted its role of monitoring and research as
one designed to support and complement the regulatory
programs mandated by the first section of the Ocean Dumping
Act.

A close association between NOAA and EPA therefore was

necessary for effective implementation of this new policy.
Unfortunately, delays in the establishment of an official
relationship between NOAA and EPA headquarters stalled the
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necessary interaction.

Like NOAA's own program development

plan, it took nearly three years before the two agencies
were able to develop an interagency agreement outlining in
detail the steps each agency would take to satisfy their
responsibilities under the MPRSA.
Interagency agreements between bureaucratic units are
often important tools to help define their respective roles
in a policy area.

Bureaucracies, Edwards describes, are

often dependent on standard operating procedures (SOP's),
that is, internal responses developed because of a desire
for uniformity in the operation of complex and widely
dispersed organizations. 12

NOAA's interagency agreements

could be described as a form of SOP's since they establish
specific responsibilities, avenues of communication and
funding sources when working with other agencies.

While

SOP's can inhibit changes in policy or generate undesired
actions they are a necessary form of bureaucratic structure.
In NOAA's case the lack of an interagency agreement and the
bureaucratic steps necessary to establish one have both been
cause for inaction

13

While the establishment of the interagency agreement
developed some guidelines for continued interaction, basic
dispositional difficulties still existed between NOAA and
EPA.

Some authors describe this as a tendency of scientists

to focus on uncertainties which provide opportunities for
discovery, whereas the public and managers tend to desire
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more certainty about their environment and in their
decisionmaking. 14

In this particular case it could be seen

as a sort of scientific disposition versus a regulatory
disposition.

NOAA's lack of support for EPA's decision to

move the 12-mile site out to 60 miles is an example of these
attitudes.

NOAA's policy, concurrent with the protectionist

attitude at the time, did not support possible contamination
of a relatively pristine area of the continental shelf .

Its

findings suggested no significant improvement in water
quality would result at the 12-mile site with the cessation
of sludge dumping only since the input of other contaminants
from the Hudson-Raritan estuary would continue.

Overall,

NOAA insisted that anticipated regulatory decisions should
be based on the best available scientific information. 15
EPA, while supporting this concept, was influenced by more
than purely scientific data.

The highly visual image of a

"sludge monster" devouring congested Long Island beaches was
but one of these influences, generating social and political
pressure and forcing EPA into decisions that may not have
completely considered the scientific realities. 16

While

NOAA's data was finally instrumental in EPA's decision not
to use the 60-mile site the whole process once again placed
NOAA in an defensive role and illustrated the difficulties
of integrating science into regulatory decisionmaking.
Another responsibility of the Ocean Dumping Act
(Section 203) which originally fell upon NOAA's shoulders
46

was the exploration of alternatives to ocean dumping such as
recycling, new industrial processes, incineration, and other
forms of land disposal.

NOAA stated, however, that the

development of these technologies fell outside the
background, mission and competency of the agency.

Since

both the Corps of Engineers and EPA were already involved in
the research of alternatives any involvement by NOAA was
seen by the agency as duplicative.
resources for such an endeavo~7.

Besides, NOAA had no
This "disposition", that

is, the perception that the search for alternatives was
outside it's primary mission, seemed to justify NOAA's
decision to remove itself from the obligation of the law.
In turn, it left in limbo one important aspect of the Ocean
Dumping Act; the exploration of means of minimizing or
ending all dumping of materials into the ocean.

MESA/NY Bight Project
NOAA's Marine Ecosystem Analysis Program (MESA) was
probably one of the most effective implementation tools
available to NOAA during the early years of the ocean
dumping issue.

Its well thought-out mission, its ability to

adapt to new directions and its tightly organized structure
were responsible for its success in providing a better
knowledge of the New York Bight and the impact of waste
disposal in it.
Unlike other programs in NOAA, MESA was blessed with an
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extensive development plan produced by Westinghouse Electric
Corporation. 18

This report detailed the scope of MESA and

provided a valuable foundation from which to build this
program.

In many ways this plan could be likened to a

standard operating procedure, providing specifics on the
program's management and scientific approaches and the
technical resources available.

The report went so far as to

outline each identified task with it's specific objective,
approach, list of recipients, relationship to other tasks
and it's start and end dates. 19
The MESA/NY Bight Project could be described as a
successful implementation tool because it avoided many of
the pitfalls outlined by Edwards.

To start, communications

were consistent and clear because it was a small, cohesive
group located at the site of the problem.

It's products

were applicable and readily available to the users, the
largest being the EPA.

The resources were already available

for the MESA program when it's focus was narrowed to ocean
dumping in the NY Bight.

It had talented people with the

proper skills for the tasks.

Because of it's close

proximity to the problem it received the information
necessary to function properly, either from EPA or from it's
supervised field work.

Because of NOAA's mandate under

MPRSA the program met an immediate need.

Probably most

important, however, was that the program generated quality
information that was used.
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other factors contributed to MESA's success.

The

differing viewpoints between NOAA and EPA common at the
headquarters level were mainly confined to Washington.

MESA

was able to maintain a fairly close working relationship
with EPA Region II throughout most of tenure.

MESA's

program development plan was not so restrictive or firmly
entrenched in the agency's infrastructure that the program
could not effectively pursue the new direction it was thrust
into at the beginning of the ocean dumping crisis.

Although

Edwards describes it as a pitfall, fragmentation may have
been a benefit for MESA.

The physical and bureaucratic

separation from NOAA headquarters may have isolated MESA
from some of the disruptive business of government.
Even in light of its accomplishments, however,
circumstances surrounding the success of the program may
have been partly responsible for the difficulties in policy
development and implementation that later contributed to
NOAA's lack of presence in today's study of ocean waste
disposal.

Within two years of it's inception, MESA was

already considered the "expert"

in the study of ocean

dumping in the New York Bight and it's data was used
extensively by EPA in it's regulatory decisions.

Since

these regulations were under almost constant challenge
whenever they were at all controversial or went against
political desire or popular beliefs NOAA was often put in
the position of defending it's science to both a summoning
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congress and an investigatory press.

Similarly, it's easy

accessibility to EPA, the pUblic and the media was
responsible for continually drawing NOAA into the ocean
~

dumping spotlight,

fact that made people in NOAA

headquarters in Washington very uncomfortable.

According to

Dr. Larry Swanson, then director of the MESA/NY Bight
Project, most of NOAA's other programs and policies were
lacking in controversy leaving the agency both unprepared
for and extremely intimidated by the attention placed on
ocean dumping.

He fully believes that when the time came

for the NY Bight Project to end, NOAA officials "breathed a
sigh of relief".

He also saw the reorganization of MESA and

the physical move of the program as a "retreat" to
Washington, out of the limelight, so to speak, where it
could be better controlled by NOAA officials.

MESA's

incorporation into already existing programs seemed to mark
the beginning of the end of NOAA as a significant
contributor to both ocean dumping science and, ultimately,
pol icy decisions. 20

Resources: Funding, Information, and Authority
Resources, or lack of them, have also played a
significant role in both the early development and continued
presence of NOAA in the ocean dumping policy process.

In

1972 the Ocean Dumping Act allowed a scant one million
dollars for the research necessary to support regulation of
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ocean dumping.

At this time NOAA asked the Department of

Commerce (DOC) for $4.1 million either as a supplemental
"add-on" or amendment to the fiscal year 1974 congressional
submission, but was disapproved.

NOAA asked for no funding

under the Ocean Dumping Act in 1975.

In 1976, DOC approved

$2.0 million of a $5.7 million request by NOAA but the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) disallowed the funds.
Five years after the passage of the Ocean Dumping Act NOAA
requested and Congress finally approved $1.37 million as an
initial appropriation under the Act. 21

It was only then

that NOAA began the Ocean Dumping Program.
It is unclear whether lack of funds was the reason for
the failure to develop a specific NOAA program tasked to
meet the requirements of the Ocean Dumping Act or the lack
of programmatic development stymied the acquisition of funds
necessary to effectively carry out the legislative mandates.
What is clear is its detrimental effect on the acquisition
of the information necessary to support effective policy
implementation.
All work on ocean dumping research up to this point was
conducted using resources from other programs including
MESA, National Ocean Survey (NOS) and NMFS.

MESA resources

were directed to the immediate problems in the New York
Bight in the first five years (see discussion below) as a
result allowing NOAA to meet its requirements under the
Ocean Dumping Act.

However, dispositional issues and
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fragmentation of funding and information sources inhibited
further policy implementation, a consequence still felt
today.

For example, NOS conducted the early baseline

surveys at the 106-mile dumpsite which contained extensive
analyses of the chemical and physical properties of the
site, the office's area of expertise.

only limited

information was included on the biological activity in the
region since this was not an NOS area of expertise.
Personnel within NMFS, at the time, were vehemently opposed
to ocean dumping and therefore did not support research
which was being conducted on the effects of ocean dumping
both at the 12 and 106-mile sites because it might be
construed as supporting continued dumping.

Dr. Robert

Edwards, director of the NMFS Northeast Fisheries Center,
was one of the most outspoken critics thinking NOAA should
not involve itself in dumping matters unless the agency's
position was strictly that of "no dumping".~
theory seems to

Edward's

explain the dynamics of this type of

situation:
"Different bureaucratic units are likely to have
different views on policies.
Intra- and interagency
disagreements inhibit cooperation and hinder
implementation. Within a single policy area, each
relevant agency probably has different priorities,
different commitments, and different methods of
handling problems. Similar differences may arise
between those within different program responsibilities
within an agency. These differences are not conducive
to creating the mutual trust and close working
relationships that are freguently necessary for
effective implementation."
In reality, the consequences of such dispositions have
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had long-term ramifications.

While the baseline studies by

NOS at the 106-mile dumpsite continue to provide pertinent
information on the physical ocean such is not the case for
the biological ocean at the site.

In a recent statement to

a congressional hearing on amendments to the Ocean Dumping
Act NMFS admitted little information on benthic fauna in the
dumpsite region is available after 1976 and in-fact these
early measurements can only provide limited benchmark
information.

It went on to admit that these measurements

should have been accomplished prior to extensive dumping and
at continued intervals after the onset of dumping 24 •
The above examples show that important information may
not have been available for incorporation into the
decisionmaking process.

As policies within NOAA shifted

over time from protectionism to reappraisal and ultimately
to a benefit and risk assessment attitude, in line with
national policies, a greater burden has been placed on the
importance of information required to implement new
programs.

The greater use of the oceans for waste disposal

demands a better knowledge of the processes at work.
Edwards theory views authority as another important
resource in the implementation of policy.

Authority can

vary from program to program and comes in many different
forms:

the right to issue sUbpoenas, issue orders to other

officials, provide or withdraw funds from a program, or take
cases to court.

Implementation problems can exist when two
53

agencies falling within the same jurisdiction have to share
authority. 25

As provided by the Ocean Dumping Act, EPA

clearly maintains authority to issue permits and institute
regulations regarding ocean dumping.

It is less clear,

however, what role was played by the scientific information
and continued monitoring necessary to support those actions.
Certainly during the MESA days NOAA's opinions were heavily
relied upon.

EPA's decision not to allow dumping at the 60-

Mile dumpsite based on NOAA's findings, illustrates how
NOAA's scientific involvement affected policy and
regulations.

Clearly, the greater the role that scientific

information plays in the regulatory process the greater is
it's "authority".

While nowhere in the Ocean Dumping Act

was NOAA given any kind of mandated authority, a sense of
control may have developed as EPA decisions relied upon
NOAA's scientific findings. 26

After the ocean dumping

program responsibilities moved to Washington, D.C. this
issue seemed to disappear probably due to the lack of
cooperation between the two agencies at the headquarter
level.

NOAA Structure and Policies: 1977-1981
According to Edwards theory, the reorganization of
NOAA's ocean dumping programs from 1979 to 1981 could have
contributed significantly to policy implementation problems
within NOAA.

The incorporation of MESA into the Office of
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Marine Pollution Assessment (OMPA), the attempted move of
the ocean dumping program to the northwest, and the
sUbsequent reorganization of OMPA into the Oceans Assessment
Division quickly diluted a viable working program of ocean
dumping research.

While both of these pollution assessment

programs were NOAA's attempt to address broader ocean
pollution issues, the immersion of the ocean dumping
programs into the broader-based pollution programs was seen
by those within the organization as an attempt to distance
the agency from the immediate controversy of ocean dumping.
Edwards reasons that if the disposition of officials within
a bureaucracy is against a policy or the policy's
ramifications to that agency, effective implementation will
suffer.

If, in fact, as Dr. Swanson stated, the attention

NOAA was receiving regarding ocean dumping was intimidating
to the agency, a possible solution would be to lessen the
program's visibility.

The facts are that by 1982 no program

existed within NOAA that dealt exclusively with ocean
dumping.
In actuality, it is not clear what the motivation was
for the reorganization discussed above or the rapid
disappearance of an ocean dumping program within NOAA.
However, on a broader scale the whole time period from 1977
through 1982, when numerous changes in the Federal ocean
dumping policy were taking place, may have made it difficult
for NOAA to keep abreast of and respond to the events and
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decisions of the moment.

Edwards theorizes that

inconsistency in policy and implementation orders can
effectively inhibit the process and send mixed signals to
the agencies attempting to perform their roles.

The

established ocean dumping law (and one must assume, policy)
was made stronger by EPA and Congress in 1977 so that all
dumping that "unreasonably degraded" the oceans would end by
December 1981.

It was also hoped that this would provide an

added incentive to develop alternative disposal techniques.
It had an added effect, however. 27

At the same time as

seemingly restrictive measures were being taken at the
inshore dumpsite increased focus on the 106-Mile Site as one
alternative to the inshore site was also taking place.
Camden, New Jersey was allowed to dispose of their municipal
waste at the 106-Mile site on an emergency basis and
industrial waste continued to be dumped at the site.

NOAA

involvement in the studies of each of these events produced
conclusions suggesting that the highly dispersive nature of
the site could accommodate the kinds and amounts of sludge
dumped at the 12-Mile site. 28

All this seemed to result in

NOAA finding itself supporting limited ocean dumping through
its research into ocean dumping effects all the while
favoring EPA's December 1981 deadline for the cessation of
sludge dumping.

A particular example, while perhaps

anecdotal, nevertheless illustrates the results of
inconsistent and unclear policymaking.
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In the first half of

1977 an internal memorandum from the Acting Administrator
for Marine Resources (dated May 20, 1977) titled "ls Ocean
Dumping Really That Bad" stated:
"Our position on this sUbject has always been that we
are supposed to be the protector of the oceans, but
this may not be reasonable if one takes a broader
context. How will New York City dispose of their
sewage sludge? Can they come up with a new plan in
four years? .. Suppose we take a position that ever~one
should dump sludge at the 106-Mile site? Why not? 9
Inexplicably, at the same time a NOAA issue paper dated May
3, 1977 intending to identify NOAA's policy on ocean
dumping, in part stated:
"It is NOAA's policy to oppose ocean disposal of sewage
sludge; the agency endorses EPA's policy to terminate
this dumping by 1981. ,,30
Edwards policy implementation theory, applied to the
two major events in 1981 (namely the NACOA Report and the
"Sofaer Decision"), illustrates how these events affected
both the formulation of NOAA policy and, in turn, the
implementation of that policy.
Edwards discussion about unclear and inconsistent
policies is borne out in NACOA's report on ocean dumping:
" Because it is impossible to implement all five
statutes [namely Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
MPRSA, Safe Drinking Water Act, Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act and the Clean Air Act] simultaneously,
the implementation of each statute has shifted the
burden of receiving society's waste products to the
medium least regulated at the moment .... NACOA is
concerned that this medium-by-medium approach may have
produced groups of regulations whose primary objective
is to protect a particular medium from use as a waste
disposal medium, without any regard for the impact of
these regulations on other media. 1131
If, in fact, this observation by NACOA was true it could
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have contributed to difficulties for NOAA (or any other
agency for that matter) involved in the implementation of
these laws.
The "Sofaer Decision ll 32 , for the purposes of this
discussion, serves to illustrate 1) the difficulties that
can be encountered by an agency attempting to translate the
language of laws into actions and 2)
in the policymaking process.
issues.

the role of the courts

Edwards theory addresses both

In the first, he acknowledges that laws are often

unclear, sometimes leaving it up to the implementors to
determine the true intent of the law.

Sometimes, however,

the complexity of the issue warrants a certain vagueness.
He reasons:
"Neither executives nor legislators have the time or
expertise to develop and apply all the requisite
details for implementing policy. They have to leave
most (and sometimes all) of the details to
subordinates. 1133
One of the major criticisms made by the "Sofaer Decision"
was EPA's interpretation of the language of the Ocean
Dumping Act, specifically, regarding sewage sludge which
"unreasonably degraded II the environment .

Discussions about

JUdge Sofaer's decision argue that the law acknowledged
scientific and environmentally sensitive regUlations were
necessary for proper implementation of the law and correctly
deferred that responsibility to EPA. 34

In the second

issue, Edwards states that the narrow definitions made by
the courts can significantly impact policy and, in turn, the
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respective implementation. 35

In this particular case,

while the court did not attempt to change the 1981 deadline
for the cessation of dumping, it did focus on EPA's
consideration of the factors involved in the issuance of
ocean dumping permits. 36

Of course, the results of the

court's ruling are well known.

NOAA Policy Issues from 1982 to the present
NOAA's policies in the 1980's certainly reflected the
realities of the law and emerging scientific conclusions
regarding expanded use of the oceans as a waste disposal
option.

The major policy reversal that oceans should not be

accorded a preferential treatment in waste management
decisions was ironically, for a time (in 1983), contrary to
EPA, who proposed special treatment for the ocean with
respect to other disposal media.

In general, though, there

was less problem with coordination between the respective
agencies in the 1980's although this may be reflective of
the fact that there was less coordination. 37
One problem area for NOAA throughout this period and,
most likely, throughout the whole twenty years of ocean
dumping history, was the definition of monitoring.

Similar

to the problems EPA encountered regarding the Ocean Dumping
Act's use of the term "unreasonable degradation", the law
did not clearly define what monitoring meant.

While NOAA

was charged with the responsibility of conducting
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comprehensive research and monitoring regarding the effects
of ocean dumping, in 1984, EPA contracted with Battelle
Ocean Services, a private ocean research firm, to conduct
research, in part to support it's ocean dumping permitting
process.

Discussions with people in EPA have indicated that

EPA employed Battelle because it was not receiving the
necessary information from NOAA.

The present contract

between EPA's Office of Estuarine Protection and Battelle is
for $48 million over three years, a substantial portion of
which goes directly toward monitoring and research at the
106-Mile Site.~
After the reorganization of NOAA's ocean dumping and
marine pollution programs in 1981, the disposition within
the newly formed Ocean Assessment Division was that ocean
dumping was more of a political and social issue and less of
a scientific one.

The Status and Trends, Mussel Watch, and

other marine environmental monitoring programs, while
including the dumpsite areas, were concerned with nationwide data acquisition and analysis.

Consequently, little

more was done specific to ocean dumping in the New York
Bight.
The discussion/conclusions that follow will attempt to
summarize and coalesce the application of Edwards theory to
the events of the past twenty years.

60

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
liThe history of evolving pOlicy on ocean dumping by NOAA
reveals the workings of a federal agency attempting to
reconcile its views on protection of the ocean environment
with legislative mandates, new scientific findings, and the
realities of the given waste disposal situations.'
Philip Cohen
1986

The original premise of this paper that NOAA has not
met its responsibilities under the Ocean Dumping Act with
regard to ocean dumping research and monitoring is based on
three questions.
been shaped?

1) How have NOAA's ocean dumping pOlicies

2) What difficulties have arisen in the

implementation of these policies?

3) How have these issues

shaped NOAA's present role in the ocean dumping situation?
NOAA's policies did not evolve in a void.

They were

concurrent with the three distinct phases of national
policies.

The first approached ocean disposal as a

temporary measure to be eliminated as soon as possible.
Political and social pressure notwithstanding, NOAA saw
itself as a protector of the ocean and its actions reflected
that attitude.

The second phase came about as the realities

of scientific evidence and the lack of practical
alternatives made ocean dumping more feasible for some
substances.

NOAA's decision to not exclude the ocean as a
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disposal medium under certain conditions was the third phase
and followed a national pOlicy that waste management
decisions should be based on a reasonable and comprehensive
assessment of comparable benefits and risks.

With the

passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act, we have, perhaps,
returned to the original phase; non-use of the ocean for
waste disposal.

It is interesting to note that political

determinations were the framework for the decisions to "get
out of the ocean" while those of science found a place for
sewage sludge in the marine environment.
Neatly laying out the direction of pOlicy over the
twenty years, while generically valid, does not include a
portrayal of the often difficult implementation process
associated with policies.

George Edwards emphasized an

explanation of the factors that adversely affect policy
implementation.

This paper, in turn, identifies the

problems associated with the particulars of NOAA's attempts
at implementation and, in effect, overlays them onto Edwards
theory.
While all four factors in Edwards theory have played a
role in this discussion, communication and disposition
problems have most significantly affected the direction of
implementation.

The Ocean Dumping Act assigns NOAA three

responsibilities: 1) monitoring the effects of waste dumped
into the ocean, 2) conducting research programs on longrange effects of pollution and human-induced changes on the
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marine environment, and 3) the search for alternatives.

In

the early years (1970-1972) NOAA's research plans focused on
ecosystem-wide studies into the effects of human activities
on coastal waters. However, vague ocean dumping policies
made it difficult for the newly-formed NOAA to respond to
the growing ocean dumping crisis.

After 1972, more specific

studies at the 12-mile dumpsite were the major focus of
NOAA's research.

Much of this work was in response to

sludge-induced crises, real or imagined .

The understanding

of the dynamics of the New York Bight by MESA/NY Bight
Project was an added benefit received by the monitoring
activities of ocean dumping.

Within the realm of policy,

the Ocean Dumping Act established a statutory-based national
policy with a fair amount of discretion accorded to the
implementing agencies.

In 1974, NOS conducted the first in

series of studies (often referred to as baseline studies) at
the 106-mile site.

Most research was still specific to

montoring of ocean dumping.

This continued until the

reorganization of NOAA ocean dumping and marine pollution
programs in 1981.

However, dispositional difficulties

between and within agencies, along with unclear policies,
provided roadblocks.
It is the period after 1982 that seems to mark the end
of NOAA's ocean dumping-specific monitoring/research
programs.

In NOAA's Ocean Assessment Division FY 1986
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Report to Congress on Ocean Pollution, Monitoring, and
Research they state:
"During the past year the OAD program has continued to
develop the operational capabilities necessary for
analysis of marine and estuarine environmental quality
problems in a national context.
It has directed NOAA's
environmental quality assessment and monitoring efforts
toward coastal and estuarine areas where problems are
more immediate than in the open ocean." [emphasis from
quoted text]
A thorough search of literature revealed no other ocean
dumping studies performed by NOAA either site or activity
specific until 1987 when the 12-mile dumpsite recovery study
by NMFS was undertaken.

Of all studies related to or in the

vicinity of the 106-mile dumpsite conducted after 1984 none
was either sponsored or performed by NOAA.

The studies that

only incidentally incorporated the dumpsites into the
overall sampling strategy, such as MARMAP, NEMP, and status
and Trends were essentially ecosystem-wide monitoring plans.
Ocean dumping influences were considered as only one of the
many pollutant inputs studied.
There is not a clear picture as to whether NOAA failed
in its ocean dumping mandate in some way.

Its original

intent in 1972 with the creation of MESA was to conduct
"ecosystem-wide" research, by including all the factors that
influence the health of a system.

The agency's present-day

programs are similar in that respect.

NOAA is, in fact,

fUllfilling that part of its ocean dumping mandate that
instructs it to conduct long-term research into man's impact
on the marine environment.

However, insofar as NOAA has
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removed itself from the monitoring of ocean dumping, it has
not seemed to have lived up to its mandate.

The

acknowledged lack of information regarding benthic fauna,
the non-existence of any recent dumpsite studies, and EPA's
employment of Battelle to conduct it's research in support
of the permitting process all seem to support this premise.
There is renewed interest by NOAA in the deepwater
dumpsite since the passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of
1988.

A cynical person might suggest that this interest

stems from the large influx of money as a result of the
dumper's user fees.

A hopeful person might believe that

this represents a golden opportunity to delve deeper into a
relatively unknown area.

It might be suggested there are

certain realities to both.

NOTES
1.
from "NOAA Pol icies" p , 10.
This seems to summarize the
difficulties facing NOAA as a scientific agency. It seemed like an
appropriate quote for the conclusion.
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